Partisan and ideological sources of fiscal deficits in the United States

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 541-559

  Krause, George A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034339634     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2669263     Document Type: Article

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