Postwar deficit spending in the United States

American Politics Research

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 139-167

  Hahm, Sung Deuk ^a,d   Kamlet, Mark S ^b,e   Mowery, David C ^b,c,f,g  

^a Korea University   (South Korea)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^e Department of Information Systems   (United States)

^f UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^g NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002262747     PISSN: 1532673X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X9702500201     Document Type: Article

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