Are Board Members Pawns or Watchdogs? The Link between CEO Pay and Firm Performance

Group and Organization Management

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 6-26

  Buchholtz, Ann K ^a   Young, Michael N ^b   Powell, Gary N ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032353987     PISSN: 10596011     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1059601198231002     Document Type: Article

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