Post-communist insecurity

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 47, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 31-37

  Nelson, Daniel N ^a  

^a George C Marshall Europ Ctr S   (Germany)

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EID: 0034259439     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2000.11655899     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. These are the author's estimates. An estimated 250,000 people died in the 1991-95 Serb wars against Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 40,000 in the two Chechen wars, and another 20,000 in Kosovo. Similar numbers in the fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan's ongoing civil war, Albania's civil conflict, Georgia's battle against Ossetian separatists, and a few other smaller outbreaks would take the total to over 400,000. The forcible uprooting of peoples in the former Yugoslavia in various wars has included at least 3 million displaced (internally or externally) persons, and far more if temporary shelter is included. Various conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia easily double this number, if not more.
2. Conversation with the author in Garmisch, Germany, February 2000.
3. The notion of security as a dynamic balance between threats and capacities has been developed in several articles, among which are Daniel N. Nelson, "Security After Hegemony," Bulletin of Peace Proposals 22, no. 3 (September 1991): 332-45; idem, "Germany and the Balance Between Threats and Capacities in Europe," International Politics 34, no. 1 (March 1997): 53-78; and idem, "Great Powers, Global Insecurity," in World Security: Challenges for a New Century, ed. Michael Klare and Yogesh Chandrani, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).
4. The notion of security as a dynamic balance between threats and capacities has been developed in several articles, among which are Daniel N. Nelson, "Security After Hegemony," Bulletin of Peace Proposals 22, no. 3 (September 1991): 332-45; idem, "Germany and the Balance Between Threats and Capacities in Europe," International Politics 34, no. 1 (March 1997): 53-78; and idem, "Great Powers, Global Insecurity," in World Security: Challenges for a New Century, ed. Michael Klare and Yogesh Chandrani, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).
5. The notion of security as a dynamic balance between threats and capacities has been developed in several articles, among which are Daniel N. Nelson, "Security After Hegemony," Bulletin of Peace Proposals 22, no. 3 (September 1991): 332-45; idem, "Germany and the Balance Between Threats and Capacities in Europe," International Politics 34, no. 1 (March 1997): 53-78; and idem, "Great Powers, Global Insecurity," in World Security: Challenges for a New Century, ed. Michael Klare and Yogesh Chandrani, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).
6. For an explanation of U.S. opposition to collective security as the cold war ended and in the early 1990s, see Daniel N. Nelson, "America and Collective Security in Europe," Journal of Strategic Studies 17, no. 4 (December 1994): 105-24.
7. Humanitarian intervention, rather than altruism, is consistent with considerations of perceived national interest. See David N. Gibbs, "Realpolitik and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Somalia," International Politics 37, no. 1 (March 2000): 41-55.
8. Here, of course, I refer to Samuel Huntington's views, although similar theses are widespread. See Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 22-49.
9. The liberal peace/democratic peace literature, now vast, incorporates many assumptions about the pacific powers of democracy, whether the processes, institutions, or norms inherent to such systems. A flavor of this view is offered in Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), especially chaps. 2 and 6. Further, see John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (fall 1994): 87-125.
10. The liberal peace/democratic peace literature, now vast, incorporates many assumptions about the pacific powers of democracy, whether the processes, institutions, or norms inherent to such systems. A flavor of this view is offered in Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), especially chaps. 2 and 6. Further, see John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (fall 1994): 87-125.
11. Innumerable authors have linked economic reforms and democratic consolidation; for example, Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Many others suggest that the consolidation of stable democracies and accruing the benefits of such a milieu are associated with broader developmental trends. Some of this refers back to Seymour Martin Lipset's views, expressed more than forty years ago, about the socioeconomic conditions without which democracy is unlikely. See his "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 71-85. Absent capitalist economic development, the balance of class power cannot shift from the landlord class to subordinate classes. See Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, "The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 1 (1993): 71-85. Capitalist development, democracy, and the benefits of peace and prosperity: a winning combination.
12. Innumerable authors have linked economic reforms and democratic consolidation; for example, Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Many others suggest that the consolidation of stable democracies and accruing the benefits of such a milieu are associated with broader developmental trends. Some of this refers back to Seymour Martin Lipset's views, expressed more than forty years ago, about the socioeconomic conditions without which democracy is unlikely. See his "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 71-85. Absent capitalist economic development, the balance of class power cannot shift from the landlord class to subordinate classes. See Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, "The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 1 (1993): 71-85. Capitalist development, democracy, and the benefits of peace and prosperity: a winning combination.
13. Innumerable authors have linked economic reforms and democratic consolidation; for example, Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Many others suggest that the consolidation of stable democracies and accruing the benefits of such a milieu are associated with broader developmental trends. Some of this refers back to Seymour Martin Lipset's views, expressed more than forty years ago, about the socioeconomic conditions without which democracy is unlikely. See his "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 71-85. Absent capitalist economic development, the balance of class power cannot shift from the landlord class to subordinate classes. See Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, "The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 1 (1993): 71-85. Capitalist development, democracy, and the benefits of peace and prosperity: a winning combination.
14. This view is reflected in Minxin Pei and Ariel David Adesnik, "Why Recessions Don't Start Revolutions," Foreign Policy, no. 118 (spring 2000): 138-51.
15. See Daniel N. Nelson and Thomas Szayna, "NATO's Metamorphosis and Its New Members," Problems of Post-Communism 45, no. 4 (July/ August 1998): 32-43.
16. Details of such problems, specifically in the Czech Republic, with comparisons to non-NATO members Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, are in Daniel N. Nelson and Marybeth Ulrich, "Intractable Problems: Dilemmas of Democratic Transition in National Security Structures" (paper presented at the annual conference of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March 17, 2000).
17. John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15 (summer 1990): 5-56.
18. These data are reported in Daniel N. Nelson, Threats and Capacities (manuscript in progress).