Technical change and the evolution of class conscious norms

Review of Radical Political Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 470-481

  Matthews, Peter Hans ^a  

^a MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Class consciousness; Evolution; Norms; Technical change

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034258760     PISSN: 04866134     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/048661340003200312     Document Type: Article

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