Associative obligations, voluntarism, and equality

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 77, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 289-309

  Jeske, Diane ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002036268     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.1996.tb00172.x     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. For discussions in the political context, see, in particular, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986)
2. and Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)
3. For discussions in the moral context see John Kekes, "Morality and Impartiality", The Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986) 357-73
4. and John Cottingham, "Partiality, Favouritism and Morality", American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981) 295-303
5. Bernard Williams' work has also been influential on this issue, although it is often unclear whether he is defending special obligations or extra-moral permissions to be partial to intimates; see, for example, his "Persons, Character, and Morality" in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-19
6. Andrew Oldenquist, in his "Loyalties", Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), 173-93, attempts to show that associative obligations are at the bottom of all social morality
7. Samuel Scheffler, "Families, Nations, and Strangers", The Lindley Lecture at the University of Kansas (October 17, 1994), 18. All page references in parentheses in the text are to this work
8. Strategy (ii) has been defended in detail by David Brink. See, for example, his "Rational Egoism, Self, and Others" in Identity, Character, and Morality, O. Flanagan and A. Rorty (eds.), (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 339-78. I have intended only to point out the intuitive obstacle facing the defender of such a strategy, without making any claims as to whether that obstacle can be overcome
9. In his "A Critique of Utilitarianism" in Utilitarianism: For and Against with J.J.C. Smart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973)
10. For a discussion of "reasons of autonomy", see Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 164ff
11. See Michael Slote, Common-sense Morality and Consequentialism (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 26ff, for a discussion and defense of this strong type of autonomy and its role in generating what he calls 'agent-favoring' permissions. I agree with Slote that Williams probably has the weak sense of autonomy in mind in his arguments against utilitarianism. His examples of Jim and the Indians and of George the chemist rely, I think, for their force upon Jim's and George's autonomy in the weak sense being violated by the requirements of utilitarianism
12. The type of response that I have offered to the voluntarist has a parallel in the intrapersonal case as a response to the presentist who asks why I am required to sacrifice more for my future self than I am required to sacrifice for other persons. Most of my projects are private projects, i.e. they involve an essential reference to me, and, more particularly, to me in the future. So requirements that I make sacrifices for my own future self cannot be infringements of my autonomy - in fact, one might argue, making such sacrifices may be a requirement of my being an autonomous agent. For a discussion of private projects and their significance to issues concerning personal identity, see John Perry, "The Importance of Being Identical" in The Identities of Persons A. Rorty (ed.), (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 67-90
13. See Dworkin, Law's Empire (see note 1 above)
14. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), section 51
15. and A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), chapter VI, for discussions of the natural duty of justice
16. Cf. Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980)
17. I am leaving aside a consequentialist move to rules, rather than particular acts, as the primary objects of evaluation, given the grave and familiar difficulties with such moves. For a discussion of both act and rule consequentialism and their prospects for accommodating special obligations, see my "Relatives and Relativism", with Richard Fumerton, Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
18. The distributivist might object even to this permission. After all, it might be said, impartiality demands that when persons' needs are equally urgent, they should have an equal chance of and equal claims to being provided with aid. If persons are allowed to choose on the basis of personal affection, outsiders will have far less of a chance of being helped. So when claims are equally urgent, a coin should be flipped. But impartiality only demands that we give the appropriate weight to all moral considerations - when those run out, it is difficult to see any objection to making a choice on another basis, as long as that basis is not itself morally objectionable. For more on such issues, see my "Moral Deliberation, Non-moral Ends, and the Virtuous Agent", with Tracy Isaacs, Ethics (forthcoming)