Jiang Zemin's successors: The rise of the fourth generation of leaders in the PRC

China Quarterly

Volumn , Issue 161, 2000, Pages 1-40

  Cheng, Li ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LEADERSHIP; NATIONAL POLITICS; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

CHINA;

EID: 0034056077     PISSN: 00094439     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0305741000003921     Document Type: Article

References (122)

1. For a detailed discussion of the age distribution of leadership bodies of the 15th Party Congress and its comparison with previous Party congresses, see Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: full-fledged technocratic leadership with partial control by Jiang Zemin," Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 3 (March 1998), pp. 231-264.
2. Shijie ribao (World Journal), 3 March 1998, p. A1.
3. Xiao Yu, "New generation aims for the top: 'fourth generation' leaders are taking the helm in both central and regional administrations," South China Morning Post, 6 August 1998, p. 1; and "Hu Jintao: Communist Party 'golden boy'," Agence France Presse, 15 March 1998, South China Morning Post, 25 August 1998, p. 1; and Shijie ribao, 25 August 1998, p. A9.
4. Xiao Yu, "New generation aims for the top: 'fourth generation' leaders are taking the helm in both central and regional administrations," South China Morning Post, 6 August 1998, p. 1; and "Hu Jintao: Communist Party 'golden boy'," Agence France Presse, 15 March 1998, South China Morning Post, 25 August 1998, p. 1; and Shijie ribao, 25 August 1998, p. A9.
5. Xiao Yu, "New generation aims for the top: 'fourth generation' leaders are taking the helm in both central and regional administrations," South China Morning Post, 6 August 1998, p. 1; and "Hu Jintao: Communist Party 'golden boy'," Agence France Presse, 15 March 1998, South China Morning Post, 25 August 1998, p. 1; and Shijie ribao, 25 August 1998, p. A9.
6. Xiao Yu, "New generation aims for the top: 'fourth generation' leaders are taking the helm in both central and regional administrations," South China Morning Post, 6 August 1998, p. 1; and "Hu Jintao: Communist Party 'golden boy'," Agence France Presse, 15 March 1998, South China Morning Post, 25 August 1998, p. 1; and Shijie ribao, 25 August 1998, p. A9.
7. China News Analysis, No. 1607 (1 April 1998), pp. 4-5; and No. 1613-14 (1-15 July 1998), pp. 18-20.
8. China News Analysis, No. 1607 (1 April 1998), pp. 4-5; and No. 1613-14 (1-15 July 1998), pp. 18-20.
9. Xiao Yu, "Fourth generation of leadership takes shape. Hu groomed to be next helmsman," South China Morning Post, 7 July 1998.
10. Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 3 August 1998, p. 1.
11. China Daily, 20 June 1998, p. 1.
12. Liao Gailong and Fan Yuan (comp.), Zhongguo renming da cidian xiandai dangzhengjun lingdaorenwujuan (Who's Who in China, the Volume on Current Party, Government, and Military Leaders), 1994 ed. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994). For the complete list of the categories of leaders included in the volume, see pp. xi-vx. An overwhelming majority of the fourth generation of leaders are not included in the previous 1989 edition.
13. Members or alternates of the 15th Central Committee of the CCP often serve in other apacities. For example, they simultaneously serve as ministers of the central government or provincial Party secretaries.
14. Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 October 1997, p. 24.
15. For example, Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP"; and Xiaowei Zang, "Ethnic representation in the current Chinese leadership," The China Quarterly, No. 153 (March 1998), pp. 107-127.
16. For example, Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP"; and Xiaowei Zang, "Ethnic representation in the current Chinese leadership," The China Quarterly, No. 153 (March 1998), pp. 107-127.
17. One exception is Ruth Cherrington, "Generational issues in China: a case study of the 1980s generation of young intellectuals," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 48, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 302-320.
18. Additional biographical data come mainly from Renmin ribao, Zhonghua yingcai (China's Talents, Beijing), China News Analysis (Hong Kong), Mingbao (Hong Kong), China Directory (Tokyo), Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies of Chinese Communism, Taibei), and Shijie ribao.
19. Additional biographical data come mainly from Renmin ribao, Zhonghua yingcai (China's Talents, Beijing), China News Analysis (Hong Kong), Mingbao (Hong Kong), China Directory (Tokyo), Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies of Chinese Communism, Taibei), and Shijie ribao.
20. Additional biographical data come mainly from Renmin ribao, Zhonghua yingcai (China's Talents, Beijing), China News Analysis (Hong Kong), Mingbao (Hong Kong), China Directory (Tokyo), Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies of Chinese Communism, Taibei), and Shijie ribao.
21. Additional biographical data come mainly from Renmin ribao, Zhonghua yingcai (China's Talents, Beijing), China News Analysis (Hong Kong), Mingbao (Hong Kong), China Directory (Tokyo), Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies of Chinese Communism, Taibei), and Shijie ribao.
22. Additional biographical data come mainly from Renmin ribao, Zhonghua yingcai (China's Talents, Beijing), China News Analysis (Hong Kong), Mingbao (Hong Kong), China Directory (Tokyo), Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies of Chinese Communism, Taibei), and Shijie ribao.
23. Additional biographical data come mainly from Renmin ribao, Zhonghua yingcai (China's Talents, Beijing), China News Analysis (Hong Kong), Mingbao (Hong Kong), China Directory (Tokyo), Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies of Chinese Communism, Taibei), and Shijie ribao.
24. William Strauss and Neil Howe, Generations: The History of America's Future 1582-2069 (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1992), p. 59.
25. Ibid. pp. 60-61.
26. Carol Lee Hamrin, "Perspectives on generational change in China," unpublished scope paper for the workshop organized by The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, June 1993, p. 1.
27. Many scholars define the formative years of personal growth as between 17 and 25. See Michael Yahuda, "Political generations in China," The China Quarterly, No. 80 (December 1979), p, 795; Marvin Rintala, "Generations: political generations," in The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968); and Rodolfo Garza and David Vaughan, "The political socialization of Chicano elites: a generational approach," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 65 (June 1984), pp. 290-307.
28. Many scholars define the formative years of personal growth as between 17 and 25. See Michael Yahuda, "Political generations in China," The China Quarterly, No. 80 (December 1979), p, 795; Marvin Rintala, "Generations: political generations," in The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968); and Rodolfo Garza and David Vaughan, "The political socialization of Chicano elites: a generational approach," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 65 (June 1984), pp. 290-307.
29. Many scholars define the formative years of personal growth as between 17 and 25. See Michael Yahuda, "Political generations in China," The China Quarterly, No. 80 (December 1979), p, 795; Marvin Rintala, "Generations: political generations," in The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968); and Rodolfo Garza and David Vaughan, "The political socialization of Chicano elites: a generational approach," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 65 (June 1984), pp. 290-307.
30. Karl Mannheim uses the term "location" to refer to the concept of generation in terms of a single age group, and the term "actuality" to refer to the importance of the collective social and political experience of various age groups. See Karl Mannheim, "Consciousness of class and consciousness of generation," in Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology of Knowledge (London: RKP, 1952); and Pat McNeill, "The changing generation gap," New Statesman & Society, Vol. 1, No. 16, (23 September 1988), p. 30.
31. Karl Mannheim uses the term "location" to refer to the concept of generation in terms of a single age group, and the term "actuality" to refer to the importance of the collective social and political experience of various age groups. See Karl Mannheim, "Consciousness of class and consciousness of generation," in Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology of Knowledge (London: RKP, 1952); and Pat McNeill, "The changing generation gap," New Statesman & Society, Vol. 1, No. 16, (23 September 1988), p. 30.
32. Cherrington, "Generational issues in China," p. 304.
33. Mannheim, Essays on Sociology of Knowledge, p. 298.
34. This certainly differs from Seweryn Bialer's definition of elite generation. He argues that "elite generation is an age group whose membership is homogeneous with respect to a particular life experience at a similar point in its development." See Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 100.
35. At present, the reform generation, or the fifth generation of leaders, has not emerged as a significant elite group on both the central and provincial levels, although the formative years of a handful of leaders in this study occurred during the reform era.
36. Yahuda, "Political generations in China." Also, Carol Lee Hamrin categorizes four political generations: "Revolutionary Elders" (70s and 80s) whose coming of age was most influenced by anti-imperialism and civil war in the 1920s and 1930s; "Patriotic Leaders (50s and 60s) most influenced by the anti-Japanese and anti-American wars and the adoption of the Soviet model; "Rebel Adults" (30s and 40s) shaped by the Cultural Revolution and rural exile, and seeking new ideals and values; and "Open Youth" (teens and 20s) raised with weak transitional values during the reform era. See Hamrin, "Perspectives on generational change in China," p. 2.
37. Yahuda, "Political generations in China." Also, Carol Lee Hamrin categorizes four political generations: "Revolutionary Elders" (70s and 80s) whose coming of age was most influenced by anti-imperialism and civil war in the 1920s and 1930s; "Patriotic Leaders (50s and 60s) most influenced by the anti-Japanese and anti-American wars and the adoption of the Soviet model; "Rebel Adults" (30s and 40s) shaped by the Cultural Revolution and rural exile, and seeking new ideals and values; and "Open Youth" (teens and 20s) raised with weak transitional values during the reform era. See Hamrin, "Perspectives on generational change in China," p. 2.
38. Yahuda, "Political generations in China," p. 795.
39. For studies of some members of this generation leadership, see David M. Lampton, Paths to Power: Elite Mobility in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1986); and John Israel and Donald Klein, Rebels and Bureaucrats: China's December 9ers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
40. For studies of some members of this generation leadership, see David M. Lampton, Paths to Power: Elite Mobility in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1986); and John Israel and Donald Klein, Rebels and Bureaucrats: China's December 9ers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
41. Cherrington, "Generational issues in China," p. 304.
42. For the average age distribution of the 15th Central Committee of the CCP and its Politburo, see Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP," pp. 252 and 254.
43. A discussion of the "lost generation" is found in Marthe Engelborghs-Bertels, "The new man or a lost generation? Education in the Four Modernizations program of the PRC," Issues and Studies, Vol. 21, No. 9 (September 1985), pp. 87-118; Yahuda, "Political generations in China," pp. 802-804; and C. Montgomery Broaded, "The lost and found generation: cohort succession in Chinese higher education," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 23, (January 1990), pp. 77-95.
44. A discussion of the "lost generation" is found in Marthe Engelborghs-Bertels, "The new man or a lost generation? Education in the Four Modernizations program of the PRC," Issues and Studies, Vol. 21, No. 9 (September 1985), pp. 87-118; Yahuda, "Political generations in China," pp. 802-804; and C. Montgomery Broaded, "The lost and found generation: cohort succession in Chinese higher education," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 23, (January 1990), pp. 77-95.
45. A discussion of the "lost generation" is found in Marthe Engelborghs-Bertels, "The new man or a lost generation? Education in the Four Modernizations program of the PRC," Issues and Studies, Vol. 21, No. 9 (September 1985), pp. 87-118; Yahuda, "Political generations in China," pp. 802-804; and C. Montgomery Broaded, "The lost and found generation: cohort succession in Chinese higher education," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 23, (January 1990), pp. 77-95.
46. Yahuda, "Political generations in China," p. 802.
47. For a discussion of the contrasting subgroups of post-communist leadership in Russia, see David Lane, "Transition under Eltsin: the nomenklatura and political elite circulation," Political Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5 (December 1997), p. 874.
48. For a detailed discussion, see Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping: familiar fealties and technocratic trends," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 8 (August 1993), pp. 757-786; and Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP," pp. 255-56.
49. For a detailed discussion, see Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping: familiar fealties and technocratic trends," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 8 (August 1993), pp. 757-786; and Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP," pp. 255-56.
50. For the close relationship between Jiang and Chen, see Gao Xin, Jiang Zemin de muliao (Jiang Zemin's Counsellors), 4th ed. (Hong Kong: Mingjing chubanshe, 1997), pp. 204-205; it is also widely known in Shanghai where Jiang served as Party secretary and Chen served as his deputy in the late 1980s.
51. For earlier discussion of the origins of the CCP leaders, see Franklin W. Houn, "The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: a study of elite," American Political Science Review, Vol. 51 (June 1957); Jurgen Domes, "The Ninth CCP Central Committee in statistical perspective," Current Scene (Hong Kong), Vol. 9, No. 2 (1969); Robert Scalapino (ed.), Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); and Paul Wong, China's Higher Leadership in the Socialist Transition (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 190-203.
52. For earlier discussion of the origins of the CCP leaders, see Franklin W. Houn, "The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: a study of elite," American Political Science Review, Vol. 51 (June 1957); Jurgen Domes, "The Ninth CCP Central Committee in statistical perspective," Current Scene (Hong Kong), Vol. 9, No. 2 (1969); Robert Scalapino (ed.), Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); and Paul Wong, China's Higher Leadership in the Socialist Transition (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 190-203.
53. For earlier discussion of the origins of the CCP leaders, see Franklin W. Houn, "The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: a study of elite," American Political Science Review, Vol. 51 (June 1957); Jurgen Domes, "The Ninth CCP Central Committee in statistical perspective," Current Scene (Hong Kong), Vol. 9, No. 2 (1969); Robert Scalapino (ed.), Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); and Paul Wong, China's Higher Leadership in the Socialist Transition (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 190-203.
54. For earlier discussion of the origins of the CCP leaders, see Franklin W. Houn, "The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: a study of elite," American Political Science Review, Vol. 51 (June 1957); Jurgen Domes, "The Ninth CCP Central Committee in statistical perspective," Current Scene (Hong Kong), Vol. 9, No. 2 (1969); Robert Scalapino (ed.), Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); and Paul Wong, China's Higher Leadership in the Socialist Transition (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 190-203.
55. See Li and White, "The army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping," pp. 766-67; Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP," pp. 246-47.
56. See Li and White, "The army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping," pp. 766-67; Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP," pp. 246-47.
57. China News Analysis, Nos. 1615-16 (1-15 August 1998), pp. 15-19.
58. China News Analysis, No. 1607 (1 April 1998), pp. 4-6.
59. See Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP," pp. 246-47; and Zang Xiaowei, "The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: technocracy or political technocracy," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 8 (August 1993), p. 795.
60. See Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP," pp. 246-47; and Zang Xiaowei, "The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: technocracy or political technocracy," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 8 (August 1993), p. 795.
61. Ying-mao Kau, "The urban bureaucratic elites in Communist China: a case study of Wuhan, 1949-1965," in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), Communist Chinese Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 227.
62. Cheng Li and David Bachman, "Localism, elitism and immobilism: elite formation and social change in post-Mao China," World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 1 (October 1989), pp. 64-94.
63. China News Analysis, Nos. 1613-14 (1-15 July 1998), p. 15.
64. For a discussion of the conflict between the central authorities and Cantonese officials regarding the selection of Guangdong's top leaders, see Shijie ribao, 17 September 1997, p. 2; and Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP," p. 247.
65. For a discussion of the conflict between the central authorities and Cantonese officials regarding the selection of Guangdong's top leaders, see Shijie ribao, 17 September 1997, p. 2; and Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP," p. 247.
66. For an overview of the rise of technocrats in post-Mao China, see Cheng Li, Chinese Technocrats: Their Social Origins, Ideological Attributes, and Political Behavior (forthcoming).
67. For a discussion of the Chinese students in the West, see Jia Hao, "Dui dangqian woguo liuxue renyuan zhuangkuang de fenxi he jidian jianyi" ("Analysis of Chinese study abroad and some recommendations"), Shehui kexue (Social Science), No. 6 (1997), pp. 58-62.
68. Mingbao, 11 September 1998, p. 1; and Shijie ribao, 11 February 1998, p. A12.
69. Mingbao, 11 September 1998, p. 1; and Shijie ribao, 11 February 1998, p. A12.
70. Li and Bachman, "Localism, elitism and immobilism," p. 69.
71. Most studies of technocrats in Latin America and Asia have identified those trained economists as technocrats. See, for example, Patricio Silva, "Technocrats and politics in Chile: from the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks," Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (May 1991), pp. 385-410; Marshall Edward Dimock, The Japanese Technocracy: Management and Government in Japan (New York: Walker/Weatherhill, 1968); Laurence D. Stifel, "Technocrats and modernization in Thailand," Asian Survey, December 1976, pp. 1184-96; and Peter Smith, "Leadership and change, intellectuals and technocrats in Mexico," in Roderic Camp (ed.), Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Ten Years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 101-117.
72. Most studies of technocrats in Latin America and Asia have identified those trained economists as technocrats. See, for example, Patricio Silva, "Technocrats and politics in Chile: from the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks," Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (May 1991), pp. 385-410; Marshall Edward Dimock, The Japanese Technocracy: Management and Government in Japan (New York: Walker/Weatherhill, 1968); Laurence D. Stifel, "Technocrats and modernization in Thailand," Asian Survey, December 1976, pp. 1184-96; and Peter Smith, "Leadership and change, intellectuals and technocrats in Mexico," in Roderic Camp (ed.), Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Ten Years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 101-117.
73. Most studies of technocrats in Latin America and Asia have identified those trained economists as technocrats. See, for example, Patricio Silva, "Technocrats and politics in Chile: from the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks," Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (May 1991), pp. 385-410; Marshall Edward Dimock, The Japanese Technocracy: Management and Government in Japan (New York: Walker/Weatherhill, 1968); Laurence D. Stifel, "Technocrats and modernization in Thailand," Asian Survey, December 1976, pp. 1184-96; and Peter Smith, "Leadership and change, intellectuals and technocrats in Mexico," in Roderic Camp (ed.), Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Ten Years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 101-117.
74. Most studies of technocrats in Latin America and Asia have identified those trained economists as technocrats. See, for example, Patricio Silva, "Technocrats and politics in Chile: from the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks," Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (May 1991), pp. 385-410; Marshall Edward Dimock, The Japanese Technocracy: Management and Government in Japan (New York: Walker/Weatherhill, 1968); Laurence D. Stifel, "Technocrats and modernization in Thailand," Asian Survey, December 1976, pp. 1184-96; and Peter Smith, "Leadership and change, intellectuals and technocrats in Mexico," in Roderic Camp (ed.), Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Ten Years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 101-117.
75. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), p. 236; and Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats: The Changing Cadre System in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 268.
76. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), p. 236; and Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats: The Changing Cadre System in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 268.
77. Hong Yung Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee: rehabilitated cadres and technocrats," Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 6 (June 1983), pp. 673-691; and Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 365.
78. Hong Yung Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee: rehabilitated cadres and technocrats," Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 6 (June 1983), pp. 673-691; and Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 365.
79. Edward S. Steinfeld, "The Asian financial crisis: Beijing's year of reckoning," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 1998), p. 44.
80. As C. Montgomery Broaded pointed out, three primary factors were taken into account in college admission: class background, the individual's own political performance and measures of academic achievement. Because only about 1-2% of college-age young people could attend higher education institutions during the first few decades of the PRC, applicants with political influence, especially children of high-ranking officials, might "actively intervene in the process to ensure a favorable outcome." See Broaded, "The lost and found generation," p. 80.
81. Ibid. p. 77.
82. In 1998, five vice-governors were actually nominated by delegates of the provincial People's Congress and they defeated candidates appointed by the Party. Renmin ribao, 3 August 1998, p. 1.
83. Ibid.
84. Erik Echholm, "Chinese book on political reform stirs hopes for more debate," The New York Times, 25 August 1998, p. 3.
85. For example, Li and Bachman, "Localism, elitism and immobilism," pp. 77-79; and Li and White, "The army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping," pp. 774-75.
86. For example, Li and Bachman, "Localism, elitism and immobilism," pp. 77-79; and Li and White, "The army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping," pp. 774-75.
87. For a discussion of the role of mishu, see Wei Li and Lucian W. Pye, "The ubiquitous role of the mishu in Chinese politics," The China Quarterly, No. 132 (December 1992), pp. 913-936.
88. Compared to the study of Chinese mayors, the percentage of those who have had experience in economic planning declined 14.1% to 4.0%. Li and Bachman, "Localism, elitism and immobilism," p. 78.
89. Andrew G. Walder, "Career mobility and the communist political order," American Sociological Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (June 1995), pp. 309-328.
90. Ibid. p. 312.
91. For a discussion of school ties of military elites, especially the role of the National Defence University, see Shu Zhan et al., "Guofang daxue, jiangjun de yaolan" ("The National Defence University: the cradle of generals"), Zhonghua yingcai, No. 171 (August 1997), pp. 40-42. Since its founding in 1985, the NDU has graduated a total of 5,000 military officers. They have occupied some of the most important leadership positions in the PLA; also see Li and White, "The army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping," pp. 782-84.
92. For a discussion of school ties of military elites, especially the role of the National Defence University, see Shu Zhan et al., "Guofang daxue, jiangjun de yaolan" ("The National Defence University: the cradle of generals"), Zhonghua yingcai, No. 171 (August 1997), pp. 40-42. Since its founding in 1985, the NDU has graduated a total of 5,000 military officers. They have occupied some of the most important leadership positions in the PLA; also see Li and White, "The army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping," pp. 782-84.
93. For a discussion on the Qinghua network, see Cheng Li, "University networks and the rise of Qinghua graduates in China's leadership," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 32 (July 1994), pp. 1-32.
94. Shijie ribao, 19 March 1998, p. A8.
95. When Jiang Nanxiang was first appointed executive vice-president of the Central Party School (CPS) under Wang Zhen, Jiang brought a few Qinghua cadres with him. These Qinghua graduates occupied many top administrative posts at the CPS such as provost and deputy Party secretaries of the school. In the early 1980s, the CPS admitted about 800 young and middle-aged cadres to its post-graduate programme. After two years of study, almost all of them were assigned by central authorities to provincial-ministerial leadership positions. See: Qinghua daxue Jiang Nanxiang jinian wenji bianji xiaozu (Editorial group for the commemorative collection of Jiang Nanxiang at Qinghua University), Jiang Nanxiang jinian wenji (A Commemorative Collection of Jiang Nanxiang) (Beijing: Qinghua University Press, 1990), pp. 398-421 . Many leaders in this study pool, such as Li Haifeng, vice-governor of Hebei province, were graduates of this programme .
96. For a detailed discussion of Jiang's idea of the "red engineers," see Xin qinghua (New Qinghua), 30 April 1989, p. 4; Zhongguo gaodeng jiaoyu xuehui and qinghua daxue (comp.), Jiang Nanxiang wenji (Collected Work of Jiang Nanxiang) (Beijing: Qinghua University Press, 1998); and Renmin ribao, 7 May 1998, p. 11.
97. For a detailed discussion of Jiang's idea of the "red engineers," see Xin qinghua (New Qinghua), 30 April 1989, p. 4; Zhongguo gaodeng jiaoyu xuehui and qinghua daxue (comp.), Jiang Nanxiang wenji (Collected Work of Jiang Nanxiang) (Beijing: Qinghua University Press, 1998); and Renmin ribao, 7 May 1998, p. 11.
98. For a detailed discussion of Jiang's idea of the "red engineers," see Xin qinghua (New Qinghua), 30 April 1989, p. 4; Zhongguo gaodeng jiaoyu xuehui and qinghua daxue (comp.), Jiang Nanxiang wenji (Collected Work of Jiang Nanxiang) (Beijing: Qinghua University Press, 1998); and Renmin ribao, 7 May 1998, p. 11.
99. According to Teng Teng, then a mid-level cadre at Qinghua and vice-chair of China's State Education Commission in the late 1980s, Jiang himself examined the profile of each candidate and made the final decisions. The first meeting of political counsellors was even held at Jiang's home. A Commemorative Collection of Jiang Nanxiang, pp. 148-49.
100. For a full discussion of the Qinghua network under Jiang, see Cheng Li, "University networks and the rise of Qinghua graduates in China's leadership."
101. A Commemorative Collection of Jiang Nanxiang, pp. 148-151.
102. "Hu Jintao: Communist Party 'golden boy'," Agence France Presse, 15 March 1998.
103. Cheng Li, "University networks and the rise of Qinghua graduates in China's leadership," pp. 1-30.
104. See Qinghua Shanghai xiaoyou tongxun lu (Address Book of Qinghua Alumni in Shanghai) (1986), and Qinghua daxue Guangzhou diqu xiaoyou tongxun lu (Address Book of Qinghua Alumni in the Guangzhou Area (April 1988).
105. See Qinghua Shanghai xiaoyou tongxun lu (Address Book of Qinghua Alumni in Shanghai) (1986), and Qinghua daxue Guangzhou diqu xiaoyou tongxun lu (Address Book of Qinghua Alumni in the Guangzhou Area (April 1988).
106. On the Internet at the following address: http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/.
107. They were Zhu Rongji (mayor and Party secretary), Huang Ju (executive vice-mayor and deputy Party secretary), Wu Bangguo (deputy Party secretary), and Yi Tianzeng (vice-mayor).
108. Wenhui bao (Wenhui Daily), 8 September 1998, p. 1.
109. For example, Jae-Ho Chung, "The politics of prerogatives in socialism: the case of Taizidang in China," Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 58-76.
110. For a discussion of the opposition to nepotism in the selection of the 15th CC members, see Li and White, "The 15th Central Committee of the CCP," pp. 258-262.
111. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "All the president's men," South China Morning Post, 18 March 1998, p. 1; Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, "Strong opposition as Jiang man gets top law job," South China Morning Post, 18 March 1998, p. 1; and Shijie ribao, 20 March 1998, p. A9.
112. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "All the president's men," South China Morning Post, 18 March 1998, p. 1; Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, "Strong opposition as Jiang man gets top law job," South China Morning Post, 18 March 1998, p. 1; and Shijie ribao, 20 March 1998, p. A9.
113. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "All the president's men," South China Morning Post, 18 March 1998, p. 1; Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, "Strong opposition as Jiang man gets top law job," South China Morning Post, 18 March 1998, p. 1; and Shijie ribao, 20 March 1998, p. A9.
114. Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: from mobilizers to managers," Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 4 (April 1988), pp. 371-399.
115. For a discussion of the Long March and its legacy, see Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove, 1961); Harrison E. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story (London: Macmillan, 1985); and Daniel Wright, "A walk into the past: hiking the Long March," The ICWA Letters, July 1998.
116. For a discussion of the Long March and its legacy, see Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove, 1961); Harrison E. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story (London: Macmillan, 1985); and Daniel Wright, "A walk into the past: hiking the Long March," The ICWA Letters, July 1998.
117. For a discussion of the Long March and its legacy, see Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove, 1961); Harrison E. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story (London: Macmillan, 1985); and Daniel Wright, "A walk into the past: hiking the Long March," The ICWA Letters, July 1998.
118. Cherrington, "Generational issues in China," p. 303.
119. Private savings of Shanghai residents, for example, increased from 3 billion yuan in 1980 to 237 billion in 1998, a 79-fold increase in 18 years. Nation-wide, the figure totalled 5.1 trillion renminbi (about US $615 billion). Shanghai tongji gongbao (Shanghai statistics report), February 1999.
120. Bialer, Stalin's Successors, p. 101.
121. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 65.
122. For a full discussion of functional need of elites in a society, see Fred Chwan Hong Lee's dissertation, "The recruitment of elites in the Republic of China: a case study in the social utility of education," University of Oregon, 1983, pp. 1-2.