Skill versus judgement and the architecture of organisations

European Economic Review

Volumn 44, Issue 4-6, 2000, Pages 856-868

  Seabright, Paul ^a,b  

^a CHURCHILL COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Monitoring; Multi task principal agent models; Organisations

Indexed keywords

ARCHITECTURE; ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK;

EID: 0034047982     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00045-3     Document Type: Conference Paper

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