Efficiency wages and X-inefficiencies

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 99, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 581-596

  Ellingsen, Tore ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031326180     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00082     Document Type: Article

References (40)

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