Auctions: An alternative approach to allocate universal service obligations

Telecommunications Policy

Volumn 22, Issue 8, 1998, Pages 661-669

  Nett, Lorenz ^a  

^a Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste WIK Bad Honnef   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COSTS; ECONOMICS; EFFICIENCY; MARKETING; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES;

TELECOMMUNICATION MARKET; UNIVERSAL SERVICE PROVIDER;

TELECOMMUNICATION;

EID: 0032155533     PISSN: 03085961     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0308-5961(98)00046-9     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Neu, W., Stumpf, U., Nett, L. and Schmidt, F., Costing and financing universal service obligations in a competitive telecommunications environment in the European Union 1997 (19/48356), Study for DG XIII of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Bad Honnef, October 1997.
2. See Schwarz-Schilling, C., Losverfahren zur Vergabe von Verbindungsnetzbetreiberkenn-zahlen und Auskunftsnummem, WIK-Newsletter, 1997 No. 28, Bad Honnef.
3. Neu, W., Stumpf, U., Evaluating compensation requirements by telecommunication universal service providers: a new challenge for regulators. Communications and Strategies, ène Trimestre, 1997, (26), 165-182.
4. Offel, Universal Telecommunication Services, Consultative Document, London, February 1997.
5. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Assessment Criteria for National Schemes for the Costing and Financing of Universal Service in Telecommunications and Guidelines for the Member States on Operation of such Schemes. Brussels, 1996, 27 November, COM(96) 608 final.
6. McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J., Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature, 1987 XXV, 699-307.
7. See Keuter, K. and Nett, L., ERMES-AUCTION in Germany. First simultaneous multiple-round action in the European telecommunications market. Telecommunications Policy, 1997, 21(4), 297-307.
8. Universal service is an obligation rather than a property right which allows to make profits. However, from a conceptional point of view it can be treated in the same way, since the universal service provider receives a compensation for the obligation.
9. Akerlof, G., The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 84, 488-500.
10. See for example Milgrom, P. R., Auction radio spectrum. Presentation for the Bundesminiterium für Post und Telekommunikation, Bonn, 13 May 1996.
11. Keuter, A., Nett, L. and Stumpf, U., Regeln für ds Verfahren zur Versteigerung der ERMES Lizenzen/Frequenzen sowie regionaler ERMES-Frequenzen. WIK-Diskussionsbeitrag, No. 165, Bad Honnef, 1996.
12. Elsenbast, W., Ausschreibung defizitärer Universaldienste im Postbereich. WIK-Diskussionsbeitrag, 1997, No. 176, Bad Honnef.
13. Salant, D., Carrier of Last Resort Sales. Charles River Associates, 1995.
14. Milgrom, P. R., Statement attached to GTE's comments in response to questions of the Federal State Board on universal service. 1996, CC Docket 96-45, Washington, DC.
15. During the auction each participant can decide which bids to make for any of the objects. The bidder thus implicitly calculates for a set of objects he might receive.
16. Amtsblatt 17/96 des Bundesministeriums für Post und Telekommunikation.
17. See Neu, W., Stumpf, U., Nett, L. and Schmidt, F., Costing and financing universal service obligations in a competitive telecommunications environment in the European Union 1997 (96/48356), Study for DG XIII of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Bad Honnef, October 1997.
18. In this case the universal service provider must identify, for example, uneconomic areas and uneconomic customer groups and present explicit calculations to determine universal service costs.