Assessing the risks of conflict in the PRC-ROC enduring rivalry

Pacific Affairs

Volumn 72, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 513-534

  Job, Brian ^a   Laliberté, André ^a   Wallace, Michael D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GEOPOLITICS; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; REGIONAL SECURITY; SECURITY THREAT;

TAIWAN;

EID: 0033498729     PISSN: 0030851X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2672395     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, April 1997).
2. See, for example, Steven Chan and Cal Clark, "The Mainland China-Taiwan Relationship: From Confrontation to Interdependence?" in Tunjen Cheng, Chi I luang and Samuel S. G. Wu, eds., Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Strait (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995), pp. 47-64.
3. See, for example, Gu Weiqun, Conflict of Divided Nations: The Cases of China and Korea (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995) ;Jun Zlian, Ending the Chinese Civil War: Power, Commerce, and Conciliation between Beijing and Taipei (NewYork: St. Martin's Press, 1993); and Jia Qingguo, "The Making of Beijing's Taiwan Policy," in Cheng, Huang and Wu Inherited Rivalry, pp. 97-110.
4. John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United Stales, and Taiwan's Démocratisation (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 127-33; Barton Gellman, "U.S. and China Nearly Came to Blows in '96," Washington Post, 21 June 1998, p. A01.
5. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997/98 (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 176-79 and 193-95.
6. See Robert Jenis, Richard N. Lebow andjanice Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985).
7. See for example, Daniel Geller andj. D. Singer, eds., Nations at War. A Scientific Study of International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
8. Paul R. Hensel, "Interstate Rivalry and tlie Study of Militarized Conflict," in Frank P. Harvey and Ben D. Mor, eds., Conflict in World Politics: Advances in the Study of Crisis, War, and Peace (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 162-204.
9. Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks," American Journal of Political Science, vol. 39, no. 1 (1995), pp. 30-52.
10. Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 2 (1993), p. 148.
11. These particular specifications follow those established by Frank W. Wayman and Daniel M. Jones, as set out in Geller and Singer, Nations at War, p. 152.
12. Kal Holsti, "Wars of the Third Kind," in Kai Holsti, ed., The State, War, and the Stale of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 19-40; and John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
13. Charles S. Gochman and Russell J. Leng, "Realpolitik and (lie Road to War: An Analysis of Attributes and Behavior," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 2 (1983), pp. 151-63;
14. Susan G. Sample, "Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik: A Multivariate Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 35, no. 1 (1998).
15. Goertz and Diehl argue that "political shocks" are associated with die initiation and termination of enduring rivalries in "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries." See also Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, vol. 20, no. 1 (1995), pp. 5-38.
16. Thomas Christensen makes dial point to explain the events leading to the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958. See Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization andSino-American Conflict: 19J7-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 199G).
17. The classic works are Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review, vol. 63, no. 3 (1969), pp. 689-718; and Robert Jems, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
18. See Richard N. Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981 ) ;
19. Jervis, Lebow and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence; Alexander George, Bridging the Cap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Polity (Washington, DG: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993).
20. See the cases studies presented in Lebow, Between Peace and War, and Jack Levy, "The Role of Crisis Mismanagement in the Outbreak of World War I," in Alexander George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 62-102.
21. Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence,"Journal of'Conflict Resolution, vol. 23, no. 1 (1979), pp. 23-35;
22. "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 1 (1982), pp. 37-51; "Racing Redux: The Arms-Escalation Debate Revisited," in Charles Goodman and Alan Ned Sabrowsky, eds., Prisoners of War? Nation-States in the Modem Era (Lexington, VA: Lexington Books, 1990); Susan G. Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 34, no. 1 (1997), pp. 7-22; id., "Military Build-ups."
23. Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation."
24. Sample, "Military Buildups," pp. 20-22; and Paul Diehl and Mark J. Crescenzi, "Reconfiguring the Arms-Race Debate," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 35, no. 1 (1998), pp. 111-18.
25. See Wallace and Job, "Exploring the China-Taiwan Enduring Rivalry."
26. Renmin Ribao. 11 March 1987; BeijingReview, 15-21 August 1988.
27. On Chinese Taiwan policy, see Ji You, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin, ed., Alissik Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power, Canberra . Papers on Strategy and Defence 122 (Canberra: SDSC, RSPAS, Australian National University, 1997), pp. 29-56;
28. Jia Qingguo, "The Making of Beijing's Taiwan Policy," in Cheng, Huang and Wu Inherited Rivalry, pp. 97-100.
29. The gradualist faction would include personalities such as Wang Daohan, Chair of the semiofficial Association for Relations Across the Strait (ARATS), and a series of think tanks such as the Shanghai Institute for International Affairs, to which Chen Qimao is associated, and the Shanghai Association for Taiwan Studies. Wang apparently is included in the policy-making process; Chen, while respected, apparently is not. We are indebted to Jonathan Pollack for clarifying several points in this regard.
30. Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solution," Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 11 (1996), pp. 1055-1066.
31. Beijing Review, 1-7 January 1990; ; South China Morning Post, 19 September 1990.
32. David W. Chen, Taiwan's President Tiptoes around Politics at Cornell," New York Times, 10 June 1995, p. 4.
33. This characterization of the shift in Chinese policy making towards the hard-liners is generally accepted in analyses of the events of 1995 and 1996. See, for instance, Ganer, Face-Off, and Austin, Missile Diplomacy, particularly Gary Klintworth's chapter, "Lessons Learned," pp. 241-62.
34. TaKungPao, 11 March 1996.
35. Chu Yun-han, "Jiang Zemin and the Evolution of Beijing's Policy toward Taiwan," in Tien Hungmao and Chu Yun-han, eds., Jiang Zemin Takes Command: China aer the 15 Communist Party Congress (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1998).
36. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "The Mainland China Factor in Taiwan's 1995 and 1996 Elections: A Secondary Role," in Austin, Missile Diplomacy, pp. 9-28.
37. Richard Fisher.Jr., "China's Missiles Over the Taiwan Strait: A Political and Military Assessment," inJames Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), pp. 167-214.
38. Norman Friedman, "Chinese Military Capacity. Industrial and Operational Weaknesses," in Eric Amett, ed., Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan, and Iran (Oxford: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 74.
39. David J. Singer, "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 2, no. 2 (1958), pp. 90-105. See Geller and Singer, Nations at War, for a comprehensive review of this literature.
40. Hua Di, "Threat Perception and Military Planning in China: Domestic Instability and the Importance of Prestige," in Arnett, Military Capacity, pp. 25-36. See also Jonathan Pollack, who states that the Taiwan Strait issue "provide[s] a focal point and direction for Chinese military planning and defence acquisitions that has been largely absent since the collapse of the Soviet Union." See Jonathan Pollack, "China's Taiwan Strategy. A Point of No Return," The Chinajoumal, no. 36 (1996), pp. 113.
41. See, for instance, Cruz de Castro, "Interactive Naval Development of Three Northeast Asian States," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 17, no. 3 (1995), pp. 319-226; Lin Chong-pin, "The Role of the People's Liberation Army in the Process of Reunification: Exploring the Possibilities," in Richard Yang, ed., China's Military: ThePLA in 1992/93 (Taipei: Chinese Council for Advanced Policy Studies, 1993), pp. 161-79; Michael Klare, "East Asia's Militaries Bulk Up," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 53, no. 1,1997, pp. 5-60.
42. Richard A. Biuinger and Bates Gill, Gearing Up for High-Tech Warfare? Chinese and Taiwanese Defense Modernization and Implications for Military Confrontation Across the Taiwan Strait, 1995-200? (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996) ;
43. Richard A- Bitzinger, "Military Spending and Foreign Military Acquisitions by the PRC and Taiwan," in James Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 73-103.
44. Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) ;
45. Michael D. Wallace and Peter Suedfeld, "Crisis Performance under Stress: The Cognitive Dimension," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 32,. no. 3 (1998), pp. 293-309.
46. Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental NuclearWar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
47. D. Mussington and J. Sislin, "Defining Destabilizing Arms Acquisitions," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 17, no. 2 (1995), pp. 88-90;
48. John Laurance, "A Conceptual Frameworkfor Arms Trade Transparency in Southeast Asia," in Bates Gill andJ.N. Mak, eds., Arms, Transparency, andSecurity in Southeast Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997);
49. Bates Gill, "Defining Legitimate and Unwarranted Military Acquisitions in Southeast Asia," in Bates Gill and J.N. Mak, eds., Arms, Transparency, and Security.
50. See Michael D. Wallace, D. Michael and Lynn I. Sennott, The Risks of Accidental Nuclear Wan A Mathematical Model," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 18, no.4 (1986), pp. 275-29 for a theoretical discussion and detailed mathematical treatment of the issues involved in calculating strategic and tactical warning time.
51. See Richard A. Bitzinger and Bates Gill, Gearing Up for High-Tech Warfare? U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1996.
52. Amett, Military Capacity, and Stanley Weeks and Charles A. Meconis, The Armed Forces of the USA in the Asia-Pacific (New York: Allyn and Unwin, 1999.)
53. For listings of arms orders and deliveries, refer to The Military Balance, 1997/9S, pp. 169-172.
54. Different types of TMD systems are involved. Lower-tier systems are essentially advances on the existing Patriot systems first deployed in the Gulf War. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea already have Patriot sys terns or their equivalent or are in the process of acquiring them. So-called upper-tier sys terns designed for theatre-wide defence include contending U.S. programs, the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system and the Navy Theatre Wide (NTW) system. The deployment of this type of system is at issue at the moment. There are also U.S. plans for a National Missile Defence (NMD) which would be deployed to protect the U.S. homeland from missile attacks in small numbers by "rogue" states. The Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, (CDISS), Lancaster University, provides a good overview. Specific treatment of TMD issues as they concern Northeast Asian security are found in S. E. Speed, Theatre Missile Defence and Northeast Asian Security," Research Note 99/05, (Ottawa: Director of Strategic Analysis, Department of National Defence Canada 1999); and in the "Theatre Missile Defence in Northeast Asia: An Annotated Chronology, 1990-Present," by the East Asia Proliferation Project, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Montercy Institute of International Studies, found at
55. Sec Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: Harpers and CoIIins, 1999).
56. See Thomas Christensen, "China, the US-Japan Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security, vol. 2, no. 4 ( 1999), especially pp. 64-66.
57. The notion of destabilizing offensiv farms race begun by a planned defensive weapons system may seem paradoxical, but it is worth recalling that this is precisely vilial occurred in the cold war arms race in the 1960s and '70s. Then, U.S. and Soviet fears of ballistic missile defence systems led to the competitive development of multiple independent re-entry vehicles for their strategic missiles, increasing preemptive capabilities on both sides and seriously escalating the "armaments-tension spiral."
58. The ROC Air Force has already acquired F-16s, and some of them are equipped with anti-ship missiles, which changes their role from air defense to strike. See Peter Lewis Young, "48 Years Under Threat of Attack: die Armed Forces of Taiwan, " Asian Defense journal, August 1997, pp. 6-13. The ROC Navy is seeking to acquire at least four Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. These ships, equipped for antiaircraft warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and widi anti-ship missiles, would be in effect virtual missile cruisers. In that sense, they would represent another destabilizing factor in the relation between the PRC and the ROC, independently of any TMD capability for the ROC. See David Saw, "Regional Surface Combatants: The Race is on, " Asian Military Review, vol. 7, no. 3 (May 1999), pp. 16-18.
59. Sha Zukang, Director General of Arms Control and Disarmament, PRC, "Some Thoughts on Non-Prolifération," (71"1 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 12 January 1999). See .
60. For the full text of die report, see .