The case for Chinese federalism

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 124-137

  Davis, Michael C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033458256     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.1999.0027     Document Type: Review

References (22)

1. The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA), in a landmark decision, recently upheld a generous approach to Basic Law human rights guarantees and asserted the power to review local laws and even examine NPC acts for compliance with Basic Law requirements. (Ng Ka Ling v. The Director of Immigration, Final Appeal No. 14 of 1998, 29 January 1999.) Beijing, however, was angry at the Court's attempt to "put itself above the NPC" and threatened to have the NPC "rectify" the judgment. The Hong Kong government filed an extraordinary motion to "clarify" the judgment on this point. On February 26, the Court granted the motion and restated that it was not putting itself above the NPC and that the NPC was free to "do any act which was in accordance with the Basic Law." This tremendous political pressure exerted on the Court demonstrates Beijing's insecurity about the actions of independent institutions in Hong Kong and raises concerns that judges may become more cautious in the future.
2. The Legislative Council includes 20 legislators directly elected from geographical constituencies, 30 elected by functional constituencies representing various business and professional sectors, and 10 selected by an Election Committee (itself largely chosen by the functional constituencies). In the 2000 election, the Election Committee seats will be reduced to six and the directly elected seats increased to 24. In 2004, the Election Committee seats will be eliminated entirely, leaving 30 directly elected and 30 functional constituency seats. (Hong Kong Basic Law, Annex II.) While the Basic Law, in Annex II, allows for the possibility that full democracy could be implemented after 2007, there is little room for optimism in this regard: Under the Basic Law's electoral framework and the conservative electoral laws enacted by the appointed provincial legislature, the conservative and pro-Beijing legislators and chief executive favored by the current electoral system will be in a position to block such a move. Any change would require a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Council and the approval of the chief executive.
3. The mainland and Taiwan white papers on cross-strait relations published in 1993 and 1994 set forth the basic positions of the respective sides. These positions remain largely intact. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ed., The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order, Legal and Political Considerations (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996) (white papers at 267 and 279).
4. See Arthur Waldron, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," Orbis (Winter 1995): 19; Gerald Segal, "China's Changing Shape," Foreign Affairs 73 (May-June 1994): 43-58.
5. See Arthur Waldron, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," Orbis (Winter 1995): 19; Gerald Segal, "China's Changing Shape," Foreign Affairs 73 (May-June 1994): 43-58.
6. Yasheng Huang notes: "Political scientists tend to be legalistically oriented and define federalism as a system in which divisions of responsibilities and power are specified constitutionally. Economists define federalism in terms of administrative levels at which allocative decisions are made." Yasheng Huang, "Central-Local Relations in China During the Reform Era: The Economic and Institutional Dimensions," World Development 24 (April 1996): 655.
7. Steven Solnick, "The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China," World Politics 48 (January 1996): 209.
8. See Taifeng Shi, "The Influence of Regional Interests in Chinese Judicature," unpublished paper, 1995. See also Andrew Nathan, "China's Constitutionalist Option," Journal of Democracy 7 (October 1996): 43, 50. Attempts to recentralize monetary control and rein in the bank-lending problems have recently resulted in a policy to reduce the number of branches of the People's Bank, China's national bank, from 26 (one in nearly every province) to nine regional banks.
9. See Taifeng Shi, "The Influence of Regional Interests in Chinese Judicature," unpublished paper, 1995. See also Andrew Nathan, "China's Constitutionalist Option," Journal of Democracy 7 (October 1996): 43, 50. Attempts to recentralize monetary control and rein in the bank-lending problems have recently resulted in a policy to reduce the number of branches of the People's Bank, China's national bank, from 26 (one in nearly every province) to nine regional banks.
10. Dali L. Yang, "Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations," in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., China Deconstructs, Politics, Trade and Regionalism (London: Routledge, 1994), 59. In the last couple of years, there has been some effort to recentralize fiscal policy, but local officials have defended their fiscal- and economic-policy autonomy from central intrusion, as they did recently in opposing the imposition of a federal fuel tax that would have reduced regional revenue. This was challenged as a reversal of economic reforms; requiring the regions to go to the center for handouts was said to encourage corruption.
11. Juan Linz, "Democracy, Multinationalism and Federalism," paper presented at the International Political Science Association XVII World Congress, Seoul, 17-22 August 1997; Alfred Stepan, "Toward a New Comparative Analysis of Democracy and Federalism: Demos Constraining and Demos Enabling Federations," paper presented at International Political Science Association, XVII World Congress, Seoul, 17-22 August 1997.
12. Juan Linz, "Democracy, Multinationalism and Federalism," paper presented at the International Political Science Association XVII World Congress, Seoul, 17-22 August 1997; Alfred Stepan, "Toward a New Comparative Analysis of Democracy and Federalism: Demos Constraining and Demos Enabling Federations," paper presented at International Political Science Association, XVII World Congress, Seoul, 17-22 August 1997.
13. Larry Diamond notes that decentralization may enhance the efficacy, quality, and legitimacy of democracy. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming in 1999), ch. 4.
14. Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, "Federalism and Constitutional Design," Journal of Democracy 8 (January 1997): 27, 33.
15. Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, "If Hamilton and Madison Were Merely Lucky, What Hope is There for Russian Federalism," unpublished paper, April 1995.
16. Minxin Pei, "Is China Democratizing?" Foreign Affairs 77 (January-February 1998): 68, 81.
17. Jiaqi Yan, "From a 'Centralized China' to a 'Federal China'" (21 April 1995) (conference paper on file).
18. The most noteworthy and successful recent example of a confederation in practice is the European Union, an example where all of these components are in operation.
19. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration," International Organization 47 (Winter 1993): 41.
20. I have already noted that Hong Kong would fit well in this confederal role. The same may also be said about Macau. If recent overtures between the Dalai Lama and the central government take a positive turn, such a confederal framework might afford a more reliable and less contentious autonomy for Tibet.
21. 8. John Gerald Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Relations 47 (Winter 1993): 139.
22. See Michael C. Davis, "The Price of Rights: Constitutionalism and East Asian Economic Development," Human Rights Quarterly 20 (May 1998): 303.