The price of rights: constitutionalism and East Asian economic development

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 303-337

  Davis, Michael C ^a  

^a CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSTITUTIONALISM; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; HUMAN RIGHTS; SOCIAL DIVERSIFICATION;

(EAST); ASIA;

EID: 0031783987     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.1998.0014     Document Type: Article

References (162)

1. The benefit of colleagues and friends who are willing to contribute their time is always greatly appreciated. In this regard, I would like to thank Jean-Marie Henckaerts for inviting me to present an earlier version of this paper on a panel at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association held in Seoul in August 1997. I would also like to thank Richard Baum, Sophie Courtemanch, Thomas Eldert, Winnie Kwok, Thomas Wong, and especially Victoria Hui. I would further like to thank my teachers Bruce Ackerman, Guido Calabresi, and Anthony Kronman, who helped shape my interest in constitutional theory.
2. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 250-51 (Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
3. See Bilahari Kausikan, Governance That Works, 8 J. DEMOCRACY 24, 31 (1997); Margaret Ng, Why Asia Needs Democracy, 8 J. DEMOCRACY 10, 20 (1997) (responding to Kausikan); see also The Bangkok Declaration, Declaration of the Ministers and Representatives of Asian States, Bangkok, 29 Mar.-2 Apr. 1993 (reflecting the view of Asian officialdom on human rights, produced during the Asian intergovernmental conference on human rights).
4. See Bilahari Kausikan, Governance That Works, 8 J. DEMOCRACY 24, 31 (1997); Margaret Ng, Why Asia Needs Democracy, 8 J. DEMOCRACY 10, 20 (1997) (responding to Kausikan); see also The Bangkok Declaration, Declaration of the Ministers and Representatives of Asian States, Bangkok, 29 Mar.-2 Apr. 1993 (reflecting the view of Asian officialdom on human rights, produced during the Asian intergovernmental conference on human rights).
5. In relating human rights to constitutionalism, this article takes a process view of human rights that sees the constitutional process discussed herein as constitutive of a commitment to human rights. One may argue that human rights, as internationally understood, are conceivable without constitutional institutions, but this has not practically been the case.
6. The present analysis adopts no particular definition of economic development, recognizing that while in the early stages this may be narrowly focused on gross domestic product (GDP) as an indicator, in later stages it may be expected to encompass other social welfare indicators such as education, improved working conditions, infrastructure, etc. See Amartya Sen, Development: Which Way Now?, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 7 (Kenneth P. Jameson & Charles K. Wilbur eds., 6th ed. 1996).
7. Id. See also Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Political Regimes and Economic Growth, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 51 (1993). Assessing the literature on the economic growth/ democracy debate they conclude "that social scientists know surprisingly little: our guess is that political institutions do matter for growth, but thinking in terms of regimes does not seem to capture the relevant differences." Id.
8. While it is too early to judge, the economic crisis that developed around the East Asian region in late 1997 may expose more forcefully the dark side of the East Asian type of authoritarian developmentalism. See Reality Hits Japan, THE ECONOMIST, 29 Nov. 1997, at 15; South Korea: The End of the Miracle, THE ECONOMIST, 29 Nov. 1997, at 21. The type of official interference associated with the East Asian authoritarian model may be exposed as one source of bad economic judgments. This includes vestiges of cronyism and corruption that have persisted in these economies from the authoritarian past.
9. While it is too early to judge, the economic crisis that developed around the East Asian region in late 1997 may expose more forcefully the dark side of the East Asian type of authoritarian developmentalism. See Reality Hits Japan, THE ECONOMIST, 29 Nov. 1997, at 15; South Korea: The End of the Miracle, THE ECONOMIST, 29 Nov. 1997, at 21. The type of official interference associated with the East Asian authoritarian model may be exposed as one source of bad economic judgments. This includes vestiges of cronyism and corruption that have persisted in these economies from the authoritarian past.
10. See RICHARD H. MITCHELL, POLITICAL BRIBERY IN JAPAN 109-32 (1996);
11. Thomas Omestad, Bye-Bye to Bribes: The Industrial World Takes Aim at Official Corruption, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 22 Dec. 1997, at 39. It seems likely that a form of crony capitalism may be blamed for the poor economic performance of Japanese and Korean companies that are experiencing difficulties. The Korean people's verdict on this is evident in the election of opposition leader Kim Dae-jung on 19 December 1997.
12. See Kate Wiltrout, Victorious Kim in Pledge to Work with IMF, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 20 Dec. 1997, at 1.
13. See Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567, 572 (1993).
14. See, e.g., THRAINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 279 (1990). Rent-seeking is best understood as "attempts by individuals to increase their personal wealth while at the same time making a negative contribution to the net wealth of their community." Id. This is commonly manifest in pork-barrel demands for social and economic benefits and in the predatory demands of cronyism and corruption. A part of the thesis of this article is that the latter form of rent-seeking has proven to be particularly problematic in relation to East Asian economic development.
15. One must acknowledge that, in some instances where a large degree of inclusion of various social forces has been achieved (such as under a form of corporatist authoritarianism as is evident in Singapore), authoritarianism may enjoy a sustained degree of success. Carrying out indefinitely such a degree of connectedness and public tolerance would seem very unlikely in larger economically developed societies with complex social structures and stratifications. On the other side of the coin, it is likely true that some developers will not be able to set up a successful authoritarian developmental model, or, if they do so, its usefulness quickly may be eclipsed by the conditions caused by rapid development.
16. While not the focus of the present discussion, it is important to note that the impetus for an authoritarian regime to relinquish or risk losing power through democratization may come from the top down if the regime is confident (Taiwan) or from bottom-up pressure in a more disruptive process if it is not confident (South Korea, Philippines). Usually there will be a bit of both pressures operating at once. See discussion infra secs. II.B.1, II.B.3; infra note 66.
17. For purposes of this discussion, it is important to note that while constitutionalism, as here defined, includes democracy, democracy does not always incorporate constitutionalism. Nonconstitutional democracy or democracy with a lesser commitment to constitutionalism may include, for example, direct democracy, a plebiscitarian democracy (in effect, election without serious commitment to constitutional norms), or even some forms of corporatist democracy (sometimes evident in European practice). A similar point may be made about human rights: while constitutionalism may be essential to a vigorous commitment to human rights, it is not coterminous. Constitutionalism performs political functions beyond the provision of basic human rights.
18. While the instrumental role of constitutionalism as a "venue" for resolving important contentions and allowing representation and empowerment is emphasized in the context of economic development, the importance of many constitutional values as ends in themselves should not be deprecated. This is another important aspect to keep in mind in respect of the choice of regime type.
19. See Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate Over Human Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. (forthcoming 1998).
20. WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1992).
21. See Paul Krugman, The Myth of Asia's Miracle, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 62 (noting that the characterization of this growth process as a miracle has been challenged).
22. Speech by Datuk Seri Mahathir bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, at the Europe-East Asia Economic Forum, Hong Kong, (14 Oct. 1992), quoted in Jose Maria Maravall, The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage, in ECONOMIC REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 13, 13-14 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1995).
23. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 1925-1975 (1982) [hereinafter JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE]; Chalmers Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 136, 142, 144 (Frederic C. Deyo ed., 1987) [hereinafter Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance] (noting that this system relies on a relatively isolated bureaucracy that can function "technocratically" - reigning is separated from ruling); ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 25 (1990).
24. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 1925- 1975 (1982) [hereinafter JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE]; Chalmers Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 136, 142, 144 (Frederic C. Deyo ed., 1987) [hereinafter Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance] (noting that this system relies on a relatively isolated bureaucracy that can function "technocratically" - reigning is separated from ruling); ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 25 (1990).
25. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 1925- 1975 (1982) [hereinafter JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE]; Chalmers Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 136, 142, 144 (Frederic C. Deyo ed., 1987) [hereinafter Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance] (noting that this system relies on a relatively isolated bureaucracy that can function "technocratically" - reigning is separated from ruling); ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 25 (1990).
26. See JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE, supra note 18, at 51-52; Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance, supra note 18, at 143; Peter Evans, The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change, in THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT: INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS, DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS, AND THE STATE 139, 152 (Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman eds., 1992); STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY: THE POLITICS OF GROWTH IN THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES (1990); WADE, supra note 18.
27. See JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE, supra note 18, at 51-52; Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance, supra note 18, at 143; Peter Evans, The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change, in THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT: INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS, DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS, AND THE STATE 139, 152 (Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman eds., 1992); STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY: THE POLITICS OF GROWTH IN THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES (1990); WADE, supra note 18.
28. See JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE, supra note 18, at 51-52; Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance, supra note 18, at 143; Peter Evans, The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change, in THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT: INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS, DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS, AND THE STATE 139, 152 (Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman eds., 1992); STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY: THE POLITICS OF GROWTH IN THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES (1990); WADE, supra note 18.
29. See JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE, supra note 18, at 51-52; Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance, supra note 18, at 143; Peter Evans, The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change, in THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT: INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS, DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS, AND THE STATE 139, 152 (Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman eds., 1992); STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY: THE POLITICS OF GROWTH IN THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES (1990); WADE, supra note 18.
30. See Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance, supra note 18, at 158-59.
31. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE, supra note 18, at 19. Politically, a "plan-rational" system will be marked by bureaucratic disputes and factional infighting while a "market-rational" system will tend toward parliamentary contest. See id. at 22-23. Johnson identifies four elements of Japan's developmental state: (1) a small, inexpensive, but elite bureaucracy; (2) a political system that gives scope to the bureaucracy; (3) perfection of market conforming methods of state intervention; and (4) maintenance of MITI as a pilot organization. Id. at 315-19.
32. See Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance, supra note 18, at 137. Relying on structural arguments, Johnson gives little credit to claims about the Japanese developmental model based on cultural values and practices, i.e., to claims that Japanese success be attributed to the alleged unique Japanese cultural capacity for cooperation. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE, supra note 18, at 8.
33. See Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance, supra note 18, at 137. Relying on structural arguments, Johnson gives little credit to claims about the Japanese developmental model based on cultural values and practices, i.e., to claims that Japanese success be attributed to the alleged unique Japanese cultural capacity for cooperation. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE, supra note 18, at 8.
34. Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance, supra note 18, at 143.
35. Id. at 140.
36. See generally id.; WADE, supra note 18; HAGGARD, supra note 19.
37. See HAGGARD, supra note 19, at 1. While ISI emphasizes protecting local markets (substituting locally produced goods for imported goods), the ELG strategy targets very high levels of productivity of certain goods for competition in the world market. Competitive advantage may initially depend on low labor costs and later on technological achievement. Many East Asian NICs have combined ELG and ISI strategies.
38. See WADE, supra note 18, at 26; HAGGARD, supra note 19, at 43, 259-62. In the vision of the East Asian model, authoritarian politics may insure an autonomous (yet embedded) technocratic bureaucracy and a form of corporatist control over the clientelistic claims of the private sector without surrendering to the incoherent absolutist domination of the predatory state. See Evans, supra note 19, at 154; WADE, supra note 18, at 26-27; HAGGARD, supra note 19, at 263-64.
39. See Evans, supra note 19, at 154.
40. In the Hong Kong case this may be especially disingenuous because there is little evidence that Hong Kong's historically laissez-faire ELG model employed many of the strategies implicated by the Asian model. Though Hong Kong employed ELG and had a substantial social welfare base of support for competitively low wages, as well as infrastructural support for development, there was little evidence of the micro-level planning tactics characteristic of the East Asian model. See Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism in Hong Kong: Politics Versus Economics, 18 J. INT'L ECON. L. 157 (1997).
41. See Shuhe Li & Peng Lian, On Market-Preserving Authoritarianism: An Institutional Analysis of Growth Miracles (8 Mar. 1996) (conference paper on file with author).
42. Olson, supra note 8, at 569. Olson argued that authoritarian regimes, embodying a "stationary bandit" with an "encompassing interest," were superior to Hobbesian "roving bandits;" minimal order is better than no order. Id. at 567-68.
43. See Li & Lian, supra note 30, at 11 (arguing that the classic liberal minimalist government under a free market system may suffer from too little start-up capital, insufficiently large markets, and too much transaction costs); see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) . This leads to the need for a strong state and an oligarchy to achieve what Evans calls "embeddedness." See PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION 9-10 (1995).
44. See Li & Lian, supra note 30, at 11 (arguing that the classic liberal minimalist government under a free market system may suffer from too little start-up capital, insufficiently large markets, and too much transaction costs); see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) . This leads to the need for a strong state and an oligarchy to achieve what Evans calls "embeddedness." See PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION 9-10 (1995).
45. See Li & Lian, supra note 30, at 18. Li and Lian never actually argue against democracy and development, confining their argument to the merits of their model. Can we really rely on a dictator only to "check and coordinate," or will the system ultimately be swamped by the particularistic claims of the dictator's coalition? Almost all of the Asian countries Li and Lian cite as examples have moved on to multiparty democracy.
46. See Jon Elster, Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea, 71 PUB. ADMIN. 169, 199-201 (1993). Elster notes that the strength of the dictator is also his weakness: "He is unable to make himself unable to interfere with the legal system whenever it seems expedient." Id. at 173 (citing JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS 199-200 (1989)).
47. Olson, supra note 8, at 572.
48. See id. 37. See Maravall, supra note 17, at 14.
49. See id. at 15.
50. See Adam Przeworski et al., What Makes Democracies Endure?, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 39 (1996) . Taking an opposing tack, Gerald Scully, who surveyed 115 countries from 1960 to 1980, argues that human rights and the rule of law improved the growth rate of economies: that open societies with rights, the rule of law, private property, and market allocation grew at three times the rate and were two and one-half times as efficient as societies in which these rights were largely proscribed. GERALD W. SCULLY, CONTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 12-14, 183-84 (1992). See also Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959).
51. See Adam Przeworski et al., What Makes Democracies Endure?, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 39 (1996) . Taking an opposing tack, Gerald Scully, who surveyed 115 countries from 1960 to 1980, argues that human rights and the rule of law improved the growth rate of economies: that open societies with rights, the rule of law, private property, and market allocation grew at three times the rate and were two and one-half times as efficient as societies in which these rights were largely proscribed. GERALD W. SCULLY, CONTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 12-14, 183-84 (1992). See also Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959).
52. See Adam Przeworski et al., What Makes Democracies Endure?, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 39 (1996) . Taking an opposing tack, Gerald Scully, who surveyed 115 countries from 1960 to 1980, argues that human rights and the rule of law improved the growth rate of economies: that open societies with rights, the rule of law, private property, and market allocation grew at three times the rate and were two and one-half times as efficient as societies in which these rights were largely proscribed. GERALD W. SCULLY, CONTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 12-14, 183-84 (1992). See also Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959).
53. See Adam Przeworski et al., What Makes Democracies Endure?, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 39 (1996) . Taking an opposing tack, Gerald Scully, who surveyed 115 countries from 1960 to 1980, argues that human rights and the rule of law improved the growth rate of economies: that open societies with rights, the rule of law, private property, and market allocation grew at three times the rate and were two and one-half times as efficient as societies in which these rights were largely proscribed. GERALD W. SCULLY, CONTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 12-14, 183-84 (1992). See also Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959).
54. See Przeworski et al., supra note 39, at 43 (noting that the absence of historical experience with democratic institutions was no hindrance because statistically such experience may also be matched with overthrow experience).
55. Id. at 44-49. Even the notion of democratic consolidation is questioned, because the level of development and not time seems to be the relevant factor. They also argue that parliamentary systems seem to have a longer shelf life than presidential systems. Id. However, given that the presidential systems where often associated with former military regimes, a critic might argue that this should read: stable systems are more stable than unstable systems.
56. Id. at 49.
57. DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER ET AL., CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY (1992).
58. Id. at vii.
59. Id. at 1 ("[T]he unrestrained operation of the market for capital and labor constitutes the material base of democracy.").
60. Id. at 7. Three types of power operate on this process: class power, civil society, and transnational forces. See id. at 5-6. The first two of these reflect domestic demands and alignments.
61. See id. at 7-8, 50, 57-58. This is a very different vision from one that just sees politics as congruent with the market; rather, it is contradictions in capitalism that produce interest in democracy. See id. at 7. "Capitalist development furthers the growth of civil society - by increasing the level of urbanization, by bringing workers together in factories, by improving the means of communication and transportation, by raising the level of literacy." Id. at 6. Civil society, in their conception, "is the totality of social institutions and associations, both formal and informal, that are not strictly production-related nor governmental or familial in character." Id.
62. Id. at 10, 42. Here they adopt Robert Dahl's notion of polyarchy. ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY, PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971). This notion of polyarchy allows for sharing of power, protection of civil liberties, redistributional claims, and symbolic participation. See RUESCHEMEYER ET AL., supra note 43, at 42. In the context of demoralization, I believe subordinate classes should be understood to include any category of people or association outside the elite coalition that is empowered by the regime, not just as class in the strict Marxist sense. This might include religious and ethnic groupings, as well as working class and middle class labor, professional, social, and business association and identities.
63. RUECHEMEYER ET AL., supra note 43, at 41, 65-70. Foreshadowing the second part of this article, they essentially import constitutionalism to accomplish this. Such democracy must include: regular elections with universal suffrage, responsiveness of government apparatus to parliament, and the protection of free speech and rights. See id. at 43-44.
64. See The Asian Miracle: Is It Over?, THE ECONOMIST, 1 Mar. 1997, at 23. There is every likelihood that at some stage, with increased local costs and global competition, the pace of economic growth will slow and various forms of economic restructuring will be required. Indeed, as the recent economic crisis demonstrates, the pace of growth has slowed in all of East Asia's so-called miracle economies. See id.
65. See Hagen Koo & Eun Mee Kim, The Developmental State and Capital Accumulation in South Korea, in STATES AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC RIM 121, 121-49 (Richard P. Appelbaum & Jeffrey Henderson eds., 1992); see also RUESCHEMEYER ET AL., supra note 43.
66. See Koo & Kim, supra note 51, at 144-45. This ruling coalition was decidedly narrower in South Korea than in the Japanese prototype. It did not include the larger base of a popular well-organized political party, such as that encompassed in Japan's ruling coalition (the Liberal Democratic Party and its supporters). As a result, the elite coalition in South Korea employed a much more repressive policy, produced more extreme corruption, and engendered a militant response, especially from students and labor.
67. See id. at 145.
68. See id.; see also RUESCHEMEYER ET AL., supra note 43.
69. See Steven V. Brull & Catherine Keumhyun Lee, Why Seoul is Seething, BUS. WK., 27 Jan. 1997, at 44-46 (noting that the legislation at issue would have restricted labor organizing and undermined the lifetime employment system; the attempt to pass it sparked massive labor demonstrations); Union Threatens Renewed Strikes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 10 Mar. 1997, at 11 (reporting that President Kim Young Sam ultimately accepted the resignation of his entire cabinet and that a new labor law was negotiated with the opposition parties).
70. See Kate Wiltrout, Kim Leads Knife-edge Korea Poll, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 19 Dec. 1997, at 1.
71. See Koo & Kim, supra note 51, at 145.
72. These recent policies do not include political reforms. At this stage, one should be cautious about this comparison with South Korea. While the state-owned enterprises (SOE) do encompass the heavy industry sector in China, there are other reforming sectors where, unlike South Korea, the trend is toward dispersal, rather than concentration, of economic activity. The historical Chinese emphasis on workers' rights may likewise check any tendency toward labor militancy. These differences are important. Nevertheless, creating new channels of subordinate class representation ought to be of concern.
73. See Jasper Becker, Crisis of State Firms Pushes to the Fore, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 9 Mar. 1997 (Money), at 4; Sheel Kohli, Mainland Wins Support Over Breakthrough Reform Plans, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 7 Mar. 1997 (Business), at 16.
74. See Jasper Becker, Crisis of State Firms Pushes to the Fore, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 9 Mar. 1997 (Money), at 4; Sheel Kohli, Mainland Wins Support Over Breakthrough Reform Plans, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 7 Mar. 1997 (Business), at 16.
75. Rural communities may be burdened in a number of ways: they may be taxed in the form of supplying labor for state projects; they may be required to supply a percentage of their produce at state controlled prices; and they often experience an inadequate record of payment by the bankrupt state sector for the goods they supply. See Growing Pains, THE ECONOMIST, 18 Mar. 1995, at 21-23 (special edition: A Survey of China); Carl Goldstein et al., Get Off Our Backs, FAR E. ECON. REV., 15 July 1993, at 68, 68-70.
76. Rural communities may be burdened in a number of ways: they may be taxed in the form of supplying labor for state projects; they may be required to supply a percentage of their produce at state controlled prices; and they often experience an inadequate record of payment by the bankrupt state sector for the goods they supply. See Growing Pains, THE ECONOMIST, 18 Mar. 1995, at 21-23 (special edition: A Survey of China); Carl Goldstein et al., Get Off Our Backs, FAR E. ECON. REV., 15 July 1993, at 68, 68-70.
77. See THOMAS B. GOLD, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE 56-73 (1986).
78. See id. at 74-97.
79. See id. at 87-100.
80. See id. at 100-103.
81. See id. at 89.
82. It is important to note that, with significant pressure from below, a confident regime in Taiwan embraced the reform process in a top-down pattern. Here again, the question of unification became a divisive issue that has favored the KMT position of maintaining the status quo. With enormous expansion of investments in the mainland in the 1990s, public awareness of mainland conditions has expanded at the same time that government control of economic activities has contracted. Contrary to the situation in South Korea, less governmental control of information about the mainland has resulted in a greater spirit of independence in Taiwan and thus more confidence.
83. See Brull & Keumhyun Lee, supra note 55.
84. See Manuel Castells, Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head: A Comparative Analysis of the State, Economy, and Society in the Asian Pacific Rim, in STATES AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC RIM, supra note 51, at 33, 35-49. These variations suggest that the so-called Asian miracle (if miraculous at all) should be understood in the plural as miracles.
85. This article omits discussion of the important ways in which the politics of identity have been manipulated to justify authoritarian practices. Castells describes this geopolitical sense of identity as a "nationalist project of self-affirmation of cultural/political identity in the world system." Id. at 58. Economic development becomes the means to both legitimacy and identity. For the divided states of Korea and Taiwan/China, comparison with the other side is crucial to the identity project, while for smaller states, a sense of vulnerability to geopolitical pressures may be manipulated to secure the importance of the regime in power. China invokes both the politics of the Taiwan Strait and geopolitical humiliation in its politics of nationalism. In each of these cases, economic development, at all costs, is the avenue to salvation.
86. See Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 3 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985); EVANS, supra note 32.
87. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 32, at 3-4; HENDRIK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS: AN ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS CHANGE (1994) (asserting that the economic importance of law and the state in the development of trade has long been recognized). In this regard, trade law even predates the modern state in the "law merchant" of the middle ages.
88. EVANS, supra note 32, at 12. See Jeffrey Henderson & Richard P. Appelbaum, Situating the State in the East Asian Development Process, in STATES AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC RIM, supra note 51, at 1, 5; Evans, supra note 19, at 141, 145.
89. See Thomas M. Callaghy, Political Passions and Economic Interests: Economic Reform and Political Structure in Africa, in HEMMED IN: RESPONSES TO AFRICA'S ECONOMIC DECLINE 463, 472-73 (Thomas M. Callaghy & John Ravenhill eds., 1993) (claiming that authoritarianism makes insulation of bureaucrats possible and noting a range of techniques that are employed to do so: repressing opposition groups via direct coercion, states of emergency internal or external exile of opponents, corporatist control mechanisms, formal and informal political pacts, cooptation via patronage, emasculation of legislative bodies, rule by decrees, etc.).
90. See id. at 467, 470.
91. See id. at 477-79; see also WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 192 (1989).
92. For example, are the current economic problems of Russia caused by liberalization or the failure to liberalize earlier?
93. See Callaghy, supra note 73, at 469, 472.
94. Robert Bates and Anne Krueger, in a study of eight countries, found little evidence to support either the insulated technocrat argument or interest group initiated reform. Rather than interests shaping policy, policy activists tend to shape interests, with organized interests more likely supporting the status quo than reform. Political reformers are more likely to appeal to ideology than interests, and a key determinate of such political behavior is the shape of institutions. See Robert H. Bates & Anne O. Krueger, Generalizations Arising from the Country Studies, in POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS IN ECONOMIC REFORM POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM EIGHT COUNTRIES 444, 458-59 (Robert H. Bates & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1993).
95. See Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Four New Institutionalisms (1994) (conference paper on file with author). "[P]olitical scientists tend to reserve the term 'institutions' for the rules, procedures or norms closely associated with organizational relations and to treat 'institutional explanations' as an alternative to 'cultural explanations' because they conceptualize the latter in more traditional terms of shared attitudes or values." Id. at 12.
96. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 179 (1993) (concluding, in a landmark book that compares Northern and Southern Italy, that the South is largely a victim of the past absence of certain social institutions and thus offers a pessimistic prognosis of its chances for successful democratization).
97. Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, in STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 14 (Sven Steinmo et al. eds., 1992).
98. See id. at 6-7, 10-11.
99. Stephen D. Krasner, Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics, 16 COMP. POL. 223, 240 (1984). Krasner's notion of institutional stasis introduces a higher degree of path dependency and institutional inertia than his argument can bear, emphasizing that once institutional choices have been made, they cannot be taken back - a branching tree argument. Id. This fails to acknowledge the dynamic role of institutions during normal politics, which is discussed in relation to the constitutional process below.
100. In some respects, those dangers come down to those recognized by Hayek from his pre-war experience with national socialism. HAYEK, supra note 32.
101. In this respect, participation is both an avenue to empowerment and a form of empowerment.
102. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 252.
103. With reference to human rights in non-Western societies, linguistic attempts to deal with such uncertainty may also be considered at a more cognitive or intersubjective level. See Eliza Lee, Human Rights and Non-Western Values, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 72 (Michael C. Davis ed., 1995).
104. This analysis presumes that politics and economics are intricately related. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977). Accordingly, the empowerment of constitutionalism is both economic and political in nature. Constitutionalism addresses many personal, social, and political needs that extend beyond the economic activity discussed in this article.
105. The argument here is not that constitutional democracy is a cure-all, but rather that, in the context of substantial development, it increases the likelihood that corruption and other difficulties will be exposed and addressed. Even with success in this regard, there are many classic market based problems that will reoccur, e.g., economic cycles, inflation and deflation, recession, property market fluctuations, currency problems, and budgetary problems.
106. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 226 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
107. See Id. at 228, 231.
108. Id. at 239 (quoting 1 JOHN STUART MILL, ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND SOCIETY 299-300 (J.M. Robson ed., 1977)).
109. See generally id.; Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364 (1996); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); CONSTITUTION MAKING IN EASTERN EUROPE (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1993).
110. See generally id.; Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364 (1996); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); CONSTITUTION MAKING IN EASTERN EUROPE (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1993).
111. Joan M. Nelson, Linkages Between Politics and Economics, in ECONOMIC REFORM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 45, 51 . Echoing the above arguments, both Joan Nelson and Moisés Naím emphasize this need to bring the state back in and develop its institutions in the second stage of development. Id. at 45-58; Moisés Naím, Latin America: The Second Stage of Reform, in ECONOMIC REFORM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 28, 28-44.
112. Joan M. Nelson, Linkages Between Politics and Economics, in ECONOMIC REFORM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 45, 51 . Echoing the above arguments, both Joan Nelson and Moisés Naím emphasize this need to bring the state back in and develop its institutions in the second stage of development. Id. at 45-58; Moisés Naím, Latin America: The Second Stage of Reform, in ECONOMIC REFORM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 28, 28-44.
113. See Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner, Introduction, in ECONOMIC REFORM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at ix, xix.
114. See SCULLY, supra note 39.
115. See Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 14, 19 (1996).
116. Id.
117. See Jon Elster, Ulysses Revisted: Precommitment and Constitutionalism (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
118. Guillermo O'Donnell, while favoring constitutional democracy as the best option, worries that when the fit with democratic institutions is not good, there may emerge a "ceasaristic, plebiscitarian executive" that feels it is empowered to govern the country as it deems fit; then, normal political institutions, including the legislature, the judiciary, and various regulatory and administrative agencies, are viewed as hindrances placed in the way of proper discharge of duties the voters have delegated. Guillermo O'Donnell, Illusions About Consolidation, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 34, 39-40 (1996).
119. See Maravall, supra note 17, at 18 (worrying that type of "decisionismo" characteristic of plebiscitarian democracy may not override only legal intitutions, but also the kind of social welfare, educational, and infrastructural institutions that are conductive to development). He argues that generating opportunities to discuss these issues may make people more accepting of economic reforms, both undermining corruption and cronyism and encouraging public trust. Id. at 24. The absence of a constitutional venue for such discussions may mean that countries do not address important issues until they reach a crisis stage.
120. See Elster, supra note 93, at 364.
121. Id. at 374.
122. In post-authoritarian South Korea and Taiwan (the constitutional conference here only incurred a democratic amendment process, not a new constitution), capitalist-oriented forces associated with the old regime initially prevailed, running on their record of economic success. See, e.g., Hagen Koo, The State, Minjung, and the Working Class in South Korea, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA 131, 131-62 (Hagen Koo ed., 1993); JAUSHIEH JOSEPH WU, TAIWAN'S DEMOCRATIZATION: FORCES BEHIND THE NEW MOMENTUM (1995). In the Hong Kong Basic Law drafting and initiating process, orchestrated by mainland China, the issue of economic success maintenance has been a central theme of the pro-China business elite. See Davis, supra note 29.
123. In post-authoritarian South Korea and Taiwan (the constitutional conference here only incurred a democratic amendment process, not a new constitution), capitalist-oriented forces associated with the old regime initially prevailed, running on their record of economic success. See, e.g., Hagen Koo, The State, Minjung, and the Working Class in South Korea, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA 131, 131-62 (Hagen Koo ed., 1993); JAUSHIEH JOSEPH WU, TAIWAN'S DEMOCRATIZATION: FORCES BEHIND THE NEW MOMENTUM (1995). In the Hong Kong Basic Law drafting and initiating process, orchestrated by mainland China, the issue of economic success maintenance has been a central theme of the pro-China business elite. See Davis, supra note 29.
124. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971); Mauro Cappelletti, The "Mighty Problem" of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 409 (1980).
125. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971); Mauro Cappelletti, The "Mighty Problem" of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 409 (1980).
126. See CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, supra note 105, at 97-98; Cappelletti, The "Mighty Problem" of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis, supra note 105, at 439.
127. See CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, supra note 105, at 97-98; Cappelletti, The "Mighty Problem" of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis, supra note 105, at 439.
128. China has so-called legislative review, which in practical terms means no review. P.R.C. CONST. ch. 1, § 1, art. 67, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 35, 49-50 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992). See generally R. RANDLE EDWARDS ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (1986). Malaysia's common law system of review has been rendered largely dysfunctional by threats to judicial independence, while Indonesia lacks review. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MALAYSIA: ASSAULT ON THE JUDICIARY (1989); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BROKEN LAWS, BROKEN BODIES: TORTURE AND THE RIGHT TO REDRESS IN INDONESIA (1993).
129. China has so-called legislative review, which in practical terms means no review. P.R.C. CONST. ch. 1, § 1, art. 67, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 35, 49- 50 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992). See generally R. RANDLE EDWARDS ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (1986). Malaysia's common law system of review has been rendered largely dysfunctional by threats to judicial independence, while Indonesia lacks review. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MALAYSIA: ASSAULT ON THE JUDICIARY (1989); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BROKEN LAWS, BROKEN BODIES: TORTURE AND THE RIGHT TO REDRESS IN INDONESIA (1993).
130. China has so-called legislative review, which in practical terms means no review. P.R.C. CONST. ch. 1, § 1, art. 67, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 35, 49- 50 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992). See generally R. RANDLE EDWARDS ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (1986). Malaysia's common law system of review has been rendered largely dysfunctional by threats to judicial independence, while Indonesia lacks review. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MALAYSIA: ASSAULT ON THE JUDICIARY (1989); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BROKEN LAWS, BROKEN BODIES: TORTURE AND THE RIGHT TO REDRESS IN INDONESIA (1993).
131. China has so-called legislative review, which in practical terms means no review. P.R.C. CONST. ch. 1, § 1, art. 67, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 35, 49- 50 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992). See generally R. RANDLE EDWARDS ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (1986). Malaysia's common law system of review has been rendered largely dysfunctional by threats to judicial independence, while Indonesia lacks review. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MALAYSIA: ASSAULT ON THE JUDICIARY (1989); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BROKEN LAWS, BROKEN BODIES: TORTURE AND THE RIGHT TO REDRESS IN INDONESIA (1993).
132. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-83 (2d ed. 1986) (alluding to Bickel's "passive virtues"). For Bickel, the Court is informed by principle, but takes full account of expediency as well, as the elected branches react to judicial determinations with new enactments. Id. These enactments are informed by public processes and debate. In time, judicial appointments to courts of constitutional decision are also informed by such public debate. Judges thought to be sympathetic to majoritarian views on issues ranging from the death penalty and abortion to freedom of expression and ethnicity may take office.
133. Krasner, supra note 83, at 240.
134. ACKERMAN, supra note 93, at 17-23, 266-94.
135. See Aung San Suu Kyi, Transcending the Clash of Cultures: Freedom, Development, and Human Worth, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 11, 13 (1995).
136. It is never explained how the contemporary hard-line totalitarian or military regimes that are already in place are culturally more acceptable. This claim, while seemingly cultural, becomes both cultural and economic when the regime promotes recent economic successes and imports the notion that the local culture is by nature more industrious and less troubled by dissension than Western alternatives. As noted above, the cultural aspect of this claim is handled in a companion paper. See Davis, supra note 14.
137. See Giovanni Sartori, How Far Can Free Government Travel?, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 101 (1995).
138. Id. at 102. Sartori divides democracy into two components: "'demo-protection,' meaning the protection of a people from tyranny, and . . . 'demo-power,' meaning the implementation of popular rule," and concludes that the former element travels better than the latter. Id.
139. Id. at 103. "Individuals seek to avoid bodily harm . . . in a communitarian setting just as much as in an atomistic one." Id.
140. See id. at 102.
141. See Li & Lian, supra note 30.
142. RUESCHEMEYER ET AL., supra note 43, at 50.
143. See Nelson, supra note 94.
144. See Christopher A. Ford, The Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3, 29-36 (1996).
145. Id. at 3.
146. This Japanese constitution is viewed as a neutral borrowing here only in terms of Japanese reaction in carrying it out; it is of course true that the occupying US forces at the end of World War II were reacting to wartime and pre-war conditions in offering up this model. It is also important to note that at the same time, there has been a strong reactive element in the peace provisions of the Japanese Constitution. Due to the wartime experience, there has been a substantial degree of public opposition to the militarist tendencies sometimes evident in Japanese governmental policies.
147. RUESCHEMEYER ET AL., supra note 43, at 50.
148. Jang Jip Choi, Political Cleavages in South Korea, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA, supra note 104, at 13, 18, 28.
149. Id. at 44.
150. See id. at 40.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 30. Hagen Koo, in a similar vane, argues that the character of the authoritarian state in South Korea shaped the form and content of the country's political struggles. Koo identifies four such characteristics: bureaucratic authoritarianism, economic development policies favoring capital concentration, anticommunist security-oriented ideology of the state, and the dependent character of the Korean state. See Koo, supra note 104.
153. Other common examples of reactive contraint imposed in post-authotiarian democratic contitutions include the requirement of term limits for elected heads of government and the establishment of independent corruption-figthing bodies. The former is evident in the Philippines and South Korea, both of which experienced long periods of authoritarian rule by ostensibly elected leaders. Adherence to such term limits then becomes a measure of contitutional success. The prototype of an independent corruption-figthing body is the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption.
154. Nelson, supra note 94.
155. See Stephan Haggard & Chung-in Moon, The State, Politics, and Economic Development in Postwar South Korea, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA, supra note 104, at 51, 53.
156. Id. at 58. Under these conditions, organizations like MITI in Japan and the Economic Planning Board in South Korea were better able to initiate policies of reform.
157. Diamond & Plattner, supra note 95, at xxi. The Hong Kong Basic Law even reflects an example where an attempt to emulate successful historic practice has resulted in a constitutional requirement that government expenditure be limited by revenue.
158. Id.
159. The Sino-British Joint Declaration over Hong Kong reflects a noteworthy example where the copying of elaborate authoritarian colonial features is explicitly provided for by international agreement. The way this has fundamentally shaped constitutional discourse and structures of elaboration in Hong Kong is striking. See Davis, supra note 29, at 157.
160. It is interesting to note that this conceptualization may be rooted in the special zones that foreigners seized in China in the late colonial period.
161. See Yan Jiaqi, From a "Centralized China" to a "Federal China" (21 Apr. 1995) (conference paper on file with author).
162. While this article has largely set aside the question of early development, it has raised the question whether the authoritarian model represents a viable option for East Asia's late developers who are still at the earliest stages of development. Rapid change and economic development in the surrounding region may quickly envelop these societies, confronting them at an earlier stage with important political demands and the need to consider constitutional solutions. This is not a claim that constitutional democracies under difficult early developmental conditions will not collapse. (Collapse is, unfortunately, a risk for both authoritarian and democratic regimes.) This is, rather, an attempt to engender appreciation of important constitutional characteristics that may improve the chances of successful democratic development.