Regulatory policies toward local exchange companies under emerging competition: Guardrails or speed bumps on the information highway?

Information Economics and Policy

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 367-388

  Kaserman, David L ^a   Mayo, John W ^b  

^a AUBURN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY; REGULATORY APPROACH; TELECOMMUNICATIONS;

EID: 0033452055     PISSN: 01676245     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6245(99)00027-X     Document Type: Article

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