An Efficient Avoided Cost Pricing Rule for Resale of Local Exchange Telephone Services

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 91-107

  Kaserman, David L ^a   Mayo, John W ^b  

^a AUBURN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031539010     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007910531141     Document Type: Article

References (35)

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