Responsibility and control: Fischer's and Ravizzas theory of moral responsibility

Law and Philosophy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 187-213

  Glannon, Walter ^a  

^a AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0033438306     PISSN: 01675249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3505197     Document Type: Review

References (63)

1. The idea of the capacity for reactive attitudes as the basis of attributions of responsibility to persons was developed and defended by P. F. Strawson in his landmark paper, "Freedom and Resentment," Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962), pp. 187-211. R. Jay Wallace offers an insightful defense of the Strawsonian view in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
2. The idea of the capacity for reactive attitudes as the basis of attributions of responsibility to persons was developed and defended by P. F. Strawson in his landmark paper, "Freedom and Resentment," Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962), pp. 187-211. R. Jay Wallace offers an insightful defense of the Strawsonian view in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
3. The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. II, Revised Oxford Translation, Jonathan Barnes, ed. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1109b35-1110b4.
4. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, S.J., Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 277 pp.), Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law.
5. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap Press, 1971), pp. 20-21.
6. The distinction between these two philosophical methods is drawn by Robert Nozick in Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap Press, 1981), especially pp. 1-5.
7. Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), pp. 829-839. Reprinted in The Importance of What We Care About (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 1-10.
8. Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), pp. 829-839. Reprinted in The Importance of What We Care About (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 1-10.
9. See Fischer, "Responsibility and Control," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), pp. 24-40, Introduction to Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 5-50, "Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility," in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 81-106, and The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), and Fischer and Ravizza, "Responsibility and Inevitability," Ethics 101 (1991), pp. 258-278, and Introduction to Fischer and Ravizza, eds., Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 1-41.
10. See Fischer, "Responsibility and Control," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), pp. 24-40, Introduction to Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 5-50, "Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility," in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 81-106, and The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), and Fischer and Ravizza, "Responsibility and Inevitability," Ethics 101 (1991), pp. 258-278, and Introduction to Fischer and Ravizza, eds., Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 1-41.
11. See Fischer, "Responsibility and Control," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), pp. 24-40, Introduction to Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 5-50, "Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility," in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 81-106, and The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), and Fischer and Ravizza, "Responsibility and Inevitability," Ethics 101 (1991), pp. 258-278, and Introduction to Fischer and Ravizza, eds., Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 1-41.
12. See Fischer, "Responsibility and Control," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), pp. 24-40, Introduction to Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 5-50, "Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility," in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 81-106, and The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), and Fischer and Ravizza, "Responsibility and Inevitability," Ethics 101 (1991), pp. 258-278, and Introduction to Fischer and Ravizza, eds., Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 1-41.
13. See Fischer, "Responsibility and Control," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), pp. 24-40, Introduction to Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 5-50, "Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility," in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 81-106, and The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), and Fischer and Ravizza, "Responsibility and Inevitability," Ethics 101 (1991), pp. 258-278, and Introduction to Fischer and Ravizza, eds., Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 1-41.
14. See Fischer, "Responsibility and Control," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), pp. 24-40, Introduction to Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 5-50, "Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility," in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 81-106, and The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), and Fischer and Ravizza, "Responsibility and Inevitability," Ethics 101 (1991), pp. 258-278, and Introduction to Fischer and Ravizza, eds., Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 1-41.
15. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), pp. 5-20. Also in The Importance of What We Care About, pp. 11-25.
16. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), pp. 5-20. Also in The Importance of What We Care About, pp. 11-25.
17. "Three Concepts of Free Action," and "Identification and Wholeheartedness," both in Importance, pp. 54, 168.
18. "Three Concepts of Free Action," and "Identification and Wholeheartedness," both in Importance, pp. 54, 168.
19. See, for example, Irving Thalberg, "Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1978), pp. 211-226, Eleonore Stump, "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will," Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), pp. 395-420, and Alfred Mele, "Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires," Nous 26 (1992), pp. 281-302.
20. See, for example, Irving Thalberg, "Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1978), pp. 211-226, Eleonore Stump, "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will," Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), pp. 395-420, and Alfred Mele, "Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires," Nous 26 (1992), pp. 281-302.
21. See, for example, Irving Thalberg, "Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1978), pp. 211-226, Eleonore Stump, "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will," Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), pp. 395-420, and Alfred Mele, "Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires," Nous 26 (1992), pp. 281-302.
22. "Free Agency," Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), pp. 205-220. Reprinted in Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 96-110.
23. "Free Agency," Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), pp. 205-220. Reprinted in Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 96-110.
24. "Three Concepts of Free Action," in Importance, p. 54.
25. "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme," in Schoeman, pp. 256-286.
26. Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 34.
27. Ibid., p. 94.
28. The most noteworthy presentations of this argument are given by Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 55-105, and Carl Ginet, On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Ch. 5.
29. The most noteworthy presentations of this argument are given by Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 55-105, and Carl Ginet, On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Ch. 5.
30. See especially Ginet, Ch. 5, and Timothy O'Connor, "On the Transfer of Necessity," Nous 27 (1993), pp. 204-218, and Introduction to O'Connor, ed., Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1-10.
31. See especially Ginet, Ch. 5, and Timothy O'Connor, "On the Transfer of Necessity," Nous 27 (1993), pp. 204-218, and Introduction to O'Connor, ed., Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1-10.
32. See especially Ginet, Ch. 5, and Timothy O'Connor, "On the Transfer of Necessity," Nous 27 (1993), pp. 204-218, and Introduction to O'Connor, ed., Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1-10.
33. The focus on propositions being true or states of affairs obtaining independently of individual human agents in the debate on free will is traceable to Aristotle's discussion of the future sea battle in Book IX of the De Interpretatione. While this work is more about fatalism than causal determinism, incompatibilists like van Inwagen emphasize the external abstract objects just mentioned rather than the internal connection between agents' motivational states and their actions in formulating their arguments for free will and responsibility.
34. This argument has been made by Galen Strawson in Freedom and Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Ch. 1, and "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 5-24. Similar arguments have been offered by Martha Klein in Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 49-51, and Robert Kane in "Free Will: The Elusive Ideal," Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 25-60, and The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
35. This argument has been made by Galen Strawson in Freedom and Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Ch. 1, and "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 5-24. Similar arguments have been offered by Martha Klein in Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 49-51, and Robert Kane in "Free Will: The Elusive Ideal," Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 25-60, and The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
36. This argument has been made by Galen Strawson in Freedom and Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Ch. 1, and "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 5-24. Similar arguments have been offered by Martha Klein in Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 49-51, and Robert Kane in "Free Will: The Elusive Ideal," Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 25-60, and The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
37. This argument has been made by Galen Strawson in Freedom and Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Ch. 1, and "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 5-24. Similar arguments have been offered by Martha Klein in Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 49-51, and Robert Kane in "Free Will: The Elusive Ideal," Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 25-60, and The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
38. This argument has been made by Galen Strawson in Freedom and Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Ch. 1, and "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 5-24. Similar arguments have been offered by Martha Klein in Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 49-51, and Robert Kane in "Free Will: The Elusive Ideal," Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 25-60, and The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
39. See also the authors' "The Inevitable," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1992), pp. 388-404, and van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, Ch. 5.
40. See also the authors' "The Inevitable," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1992), pp. 388-404, and van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, Ch. 5.
41. I offer this example and line of reasoning in "Sensitivity and Responsibility for Consequences," Philosophical Studies 87 (1997), pp. 223-233.
42. The idea of tracing goes back to Aristotle's discussion of the drunken man and the difference between acting in and through ignorance in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics. Van Inwagen formulates his version of the tracing principle as follows: "An agent cannot be blamed for a state of affairs unless there was a time at which he could have arranged matters such that that state of affairs not obtain." From "When Is the Will Free?", in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives III (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1989), p. 419.
43. The idea of tracing goes back to Aristotle's discussion of the drunken man and the difference between acting in and through ignorance in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics. Van Inwagen formulates his version of the tracing principle as follows: "An agent cannot be blamed for a state of affairs unless there was a time at which he could have arranged matters such that that state of affairs not obtain." From "When Is the Will Free?", in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives III (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1989), p. 419.
44. See "Responsibility and Inevitability." Fischer first lays out the idea of omissions as negative consequence-universals and a symmetry thesis regarding actions and omissions in "Responsibility, Control, and Omissions," Journal of Ethics 1 (1997), pp. 45-64.
45. See "Responsibility and Inevitability." Fischer first lays out the idea of omissions as negative consequence-universals and a symmetry thesis regarding actions and omissions in "Responsibility, Control, and Omissions," Journal of Ethics 1 (1997), pp. 45-64.
46. For example, Randolph Clarke, "Ability and Responsibility for Omissions," Philosophical Studies 73 (1994), pp. 195-208, Ishtiyaque Haji, "A Riddle Regarding Omissions," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992), pp. 485-502, and Walter Glannon, "Responsibility and the Principle of Possible Action," Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995), pp. 261-274.
47. For example, Randolph Clarke, "Ability and Responsibility for Omissions," Philosophical Studies 73 (1994), pp. 195-208, Ishtiyaque Haji, "A Riddle Regarding Omissions," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992), pp. 485-502, and Walter Glannon, "Responsibility and the Principle of Possible Action," Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995), pp. 261-274.
48. For example, Randolph Clarke, "Ability and Responsibility for Omissions," Philosophical Studies 73 (1994), pp. 195-208, Ishtiyaque Haji, "A Riddle Regarding Omissions," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992), pp. 485-502, and Walter Glannon, "Responsibility and the Principle of Possible Action," Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995), pp. 261-274.
49. I use this example in "Responsibility and the Principle of Possible Action."
50. This issue has been addressed by, among others, H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), Hart and Tony Honore, Causation in the Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), Leo Katz, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), and R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency, and Criminal Liability (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).
51. This issue has been addressed by, among others, H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), Hart and Tony Honore, Causation in the Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), Leo Katz, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), and R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency, and Criminal Liability (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).
52. This issue has been addressed by, among others, H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), Hart and Tony Honore, Causation in the Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), Leo Katz, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), and R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency, and Criminal Liability (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).
53. This issue has been addressed by, among others, H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), Hart and Tony Honore, Causation in the Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), Leo Katz, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), and R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency, and Criminal Liability (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).
54. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N. E. 99, N. Y. Ct. of App., 1928.
55. "The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance," Philosophy & Public Affairs 18 (1989), pp. 53-67.
56. People v. Decina, 2 N. Y. 2d 133, 138 N. E. 2d 799 (1956).
57. Model Penal Code, Official Draft and Revised Commentaries (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1985), sec. 4. 01.
58. See the discussions by Herbert Fingarette, The Meaning of Criminal Insanity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), Robert Schopp, Automatism, Insanity, and the Psychology of Criminal Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially Ch. 6, and Lawrie Reznek, Evil or Ill?: Justifying the Insanity Defense (London: Routledge, 1997), especially pp. 1- 14.
59. See the discussions by Herbert Fingarette, The Meaning of Criminal Insanity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), Robert Schopp, Automatism, Insanity, and the Psychology of Criminal Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially Ch. 6, and Lawrie Reznek, Evil or Ill?: Justifying the Insanity Defense (London: Routledge, 1997), especially pp. 1- 14.
60. See the discussions by Herbert Fingarette, The Meaning of Criminal Insanity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), Robert Schopp, Automatism, Insanity, and the Psychology of Criminal Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially Ch. 6, and Lawrie Reznek, Evil or Ill?: Justifying the Insanity Defense (London: Routledge, 1997), especially pp. 1-14.
61. See Robert Hare, "Performance of Psychopaths on Cognitive Tasks Related to Frontal Lobe Function," Journal of Abnormal Psychology 93 (1984), pp. 133-140, Antonio Damasio et al., "Individuals with Sociopathic Behavior Caused by Frontal Damage Fail to Respond Automatically to Social Stimuli," Behavioral Brain Research 41 (1990), pp. 81-94, and Damasio, Descartes' Error: Reason. Emotion, and the Human Brain (New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994), Ch. 3.
62. See Robert Hare, "Performance of Psychopaths on Cognitive Tasks Related to Frontal Lobe Function," Journal of Abnormal Psychology 93 (1984), pp. 133- 140, Antonio Damasio et al., "Individuals with Sociopathic Behavior Caused by Frontal Damage Fail to Respond Automatically to Social Stimuli," Behavioral Brain Research 41 (1990), pp. 81-94, and Damasio, Descartes' Error: Reason. Emotion, and the Human Brain (New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994), Ch. 3.
63. See Robert Hare, "Performance of Psychopaths on Cognitive Tasks Related to Frontal Lobe Function," Journal of Abnormal Psychology 93 (1984), pp. 133- 140, Antonio Damasio et al., "Individuals with Sociopathic Behavior Caused by Frontal Damage Fail to Respond Automatically to Social Stimuli," Behavioral Brain Research 41 (1990), pp. 81-94, and Damasio, Descartes' Error: Reason. Emotion, and the Human Brain (New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994), Ch. 3.