Responsibility, control, and omissions

Journal of Ethics

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 45-64

  Fischer, John Martin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Control; Free will; Moral responsibility; Omissions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009207074     PISSN: 13824554     EISSN: 15728609     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1009707919608     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. The case is presented and discussed in J.M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, "Responsibility and Inevitability," Ethics 101 (1991), pp. 258-278.
2. The examples presented in this section are from Fischer and Ravizza, 1991
3. This kind of example is due to C. Ginet.
4. H. Frankfurt, "An Alleged Asymmetry between Actions and Omissions,"Ethics 104 (1994), pp. 620-623, esp. p. 620.
5. For interesting and useful discussions of moral responsibility for omissions, including Frankfurt-type omissions cases, see. I, Haji, "A Riddle Regarding Omissions," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992), pp. 485-502
6. R. Clarke, "Ability and Responsibility for Omissions," Philosophical Studies 73 (1994), pp. 195-208
7. "D. Zimmerman, "Acts, Omissions and 'Semi-compatibilism'," Philosophical Studies 73 (1994), pp. 209-293
8. A. Mclntyre, "Compatibilists Could Have Done Otherwise: Responsibility and Negative Agency," Philosophical Review 103 (1994), pp. 453-488
9. W. Glannon, "Symmetrical Responsibility," Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995), pp. 261-274.
10. Clarke, p. 203.
11. Clarke, pp. 203-204.
12. Mclntyre, 1994.
13. Mclntyre, p. 458.
14. Mclntyre, p. 458.
15. Mclntyre, pp. 465-466.
16. Mclntyre, p. 466.
17. For a parallel distinction between two kinds of control, see M.J. Zimmerman, An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefieid, 1988), pp. 32-34.
18. For this following discussion, see J.M. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will. An Essay on Control (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 132-134.
19. Note that the example would have precisely the same implications if alternative possibilities were ruled out by virtue of the existence of another agent So imagine that the car is a "driver instruction" automobile with dual controls. Although I actually guide the car to the right, we can imagine that the instructor could have intervened and caused the car to go to the right, if I had shown any inclination to cause it to go in some other direction.
20. For an attempt to say what it is for a mechanism to be "the agent's own," see J.M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (manuscript; forthcoming, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
21. For further details, see Fischer and Ravizza, forthcoming.
22. R. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
23. For a development of the relevant notion of normative competence, see Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, forthcoming.
24. Frankfurt, 1969, note 4.
25. This is still only an approximation to an adequate account. For example, it assumes that there is an appropriate range of scenarios in which S recognizes reasons to move his body in way B*. It also assumes that in the alternative possible scenario the agent moves his body in way B* for the relevant reason qua reason, and so forth. I shall here also assume that there is just one. causal sequence leading to the consequence; thus, in this paper I am concerned with cases of "pre-emptive overdetermination" rather than "simultaneous overdetermination." Further, the focus here is on what might be called "action-triggered" consequences. There might also be "omission-triggered" consequences for which an agent might be morally responsible. A more complete theory of responsibility - one which attends to the full range of possible cases- is presented in Fischer and Ravizza Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, forthcoming.
26. These omissions are like Frankfurt's "personal" failures
27. see H. Frankfurt, "What We Are Morally Responsible For," in L.S. Cauman, I. Levi, C. Parsons, and R. Schwartz (eds.), How Many Questions? Essays in Honor of Sidney Morgenbesser (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1982), pp. 321-335.
28. I am indebted to C. Ginet for this suggestion.
29. Mclntyre, pp. 485-486.
30. Mclntyre, pp. 486-487.
31. Mclntyre, p. 486.
32. This paper has greatly benefited from comments by M. Ravizza; it constitutes the basis for part of the chapter on omissions in our forthcoming book, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Also, I have read this paper, and benefited from comments, at the University of California, Riverside, UCLA, USC, and the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. My work on this paper has been supported by a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship for University Teachers.