The inevitable

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 70, Issue 4, 1992, Pages 388-404

  Martin Fischer, John ^a   Ravizza, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84963223970     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: 14716828     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048409212345271     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Here we focus on a few salient alternative approaches. For a more comprehensive discussion of the full range of theories of moral responsibility for consequences, see J.M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, ‘Responsibility for Consequences' in J. Coleman and A. Buchanan (eds). In Harm's Way: Essays in Honour of Joel Feinberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 1993).
2. We have presented versions of this theory in J. M. Fischer, ‘Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in F. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 81-106; and J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, ’Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 1991 pp. 258-278; and 1992 (forthcoming).
3. R. Heinaman, ‘Incompatibilism Without the Principle of Alternative Possibilities’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 1986 pp. 266-276. Heinaman's discussion of responsibility for consequence-universals is one strand among various interesting strands of discussion.
4. P. van Inwagen, ‘Ability and Responsibility’, The Philosophical Review 87 1978 pp. 201-224. van Inwagen is a proponent of the traditional view that associates moral responsibility with alternative possibilities; specifically, van Inwagen holds that in order to be morally responsible for a consequence of what one does, one must have been able (at some relevant time) to prevent that consequence from obtaining.
5. We introduce this example in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, ‘Responsibility and Inevitability’.
6. H. G. Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, The Journal of Philosophy 66 1969 pp. 828-839; and ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, The Journal of Philosophy 68 1971 pp. 5-20.
7. Ibid., p. 271.
8. We introduce this example in Fischer and Ravizza, ‘Responsibility and Inevitability’. A similar example was originally suggested to us by David Widerker.
9. The example is borrowed from G. Mellema, ‘On Being Fully Responsible’, American Philosophical Quarterly 21 1984 pp. 189-194, esp. p. 190.
10. Fischer, ‘Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility’. See also, M. Ravizza,”Is Responsiveness Sufficient For Responsibility?', (typescript, University of California, Riverside), and Fischer and Ravizza, ‘Responsibility and Inevitability’.
11. mems about me cases discussed abovc, let us taKe a moment. to discuss a few p. See Fischer and Ravizza, ‘Responsibility and Inevitability’.
12. Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, fn. 4.
13. Given his acceptance of (I), this is further evidence that Heinaman cannot embrace (II).