Multiagent systems challenges and opportunities for decision-theoretic planning

AI Magazine

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 35-43

  Boutilier, Craig ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK; DECISION THEORY;

DECISION-THEORETIC PLANNING; MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS;

STRATEGIC PLANNING;

EID: 0033350339     PISSN: 07384602     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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