Measuring parliamentary deviation

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 87-101

  Colomer, Josep M ^a  

^a CSIC   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030305022     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00669.x     Document Type: Article

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