The uncertain future of the Italian welfare state

West European Politics

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 231-249

  Ferrera, Maurizio ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0009870162     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402389708425183     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Commission of the European Communities, Social Protection in Europe (Luxemburg 1995).
2. In 1992 total tax revenues amounted to 42.4 per cent of GDP, as against an EU average of 41.4 per cent.
3. There is a statutory limit of two years, which can however be extended de facto through discretionary measures.
4. In the public sector the contributory requirement used to be much lower: only 20 years. These privileges were phased out by the Dini reform in 1995, but with a very gradual schedule.
5. According to some recent estimates, irregular workers represent 25 per cent of all active workers. ISTAT, Collana d'Informazione, Rome, No.2 (1994).
6. M. Ferrera 'The Southern Model of Welfare in Social Europe, in Journal of European Social Policy 6/1 (1996) pp. 17-37.
7. For a more detailed discussion of the demographic imbalance of the Italian and, more generally Southern European welfare state, see F. Castles and M. Ferrera, 'Home Ownership and the Welfare State: is Southern Europe Different?', Southern European Society and Politics 1/2 (1996) pp.163-85. On poverty and social exclusion in Italy, see N. Negri and C. Saraceno, La lotto contro la povertà (Bologna: Il Mulino 1996).
8. For a more detailed discussion of the demographic imbalance of the Italian and, more generally Southern European welfare state, see F. Castles and M. Ferrera, 'Home Ownership and the Welfare State: is Southern Europe Different?', Southern European Society and Politics 1/2 (1996) pp.163-85. On poverty and social exclusion in Italy, see N. Negri and C. Saraceno, La lotto contro la povertà (Bologna: Il Mulino 1996).
9. M. Ferrera, 'Italy', in P. Flora (ed.), Growth to Limits The European Welfare States since World War Two (Berlin/NY: De Gruyter 1986) pp.385-482.
10. G. France, Constrained Governance and the Evolution of the Italian National Health Service Since 1980, paper presented at the ECPR Workshop on 'Beyond the Health Care State', Oslo, 29 March-3 April 1996.
11. M. Ferrera, EC Citizens and Social Protection (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities 1993).
12. U. Ascoli (ed.) Welfare state all'italiana (Bari: Laterza 1984).
13. For a detailed reconstruction of the politics of welfare expansion in Italy, see Ferrera, 'Italy' (note 8), and Modelli di Solidarietà (Bologna: Il Mulino 1993).
14. F. Gerelli and A. Majocchi (eds.) Il deficit pubblico: origine e problemi (Milan: Franco Angeli 1994).
15. Commission of the European Communities, Social Protection in Europe.
16. Ferrera, 'Southern Model' (note 6).
17. A more detailed outline of developments in the healthcare sector is contained in M. Ferrera, 'The Rise and Fall of Democratic Universalism', Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law 20/3 (1995), pp.275-302.
18. By 1996 the percentage had increased to 50 per cent, one of the highest in Europe.
19. Own calculations based on Eurostat, Social Protection Expenditures and Receipts 1980-1993 (Luxemburg 1995).
20. These figures have been drawn from the newspaper Il Sole-24 Ore, 21 March 1996.
21. Gerelli and Majocchi, Il deficit pubblico (note 13).
22. See note 9.
23. Other important measures were passed on the financing of local government and the functioning of the civil service.
24. According to the new rules the basis of calculation of benefits will no longer be related to earnings but to past contributions. The total amount of contributions paid during working life will be divided by a 'conversion coefficient' ranging from 4.719 per cent (at the age of 57) to 6.13 per cent (at 65). This coefficient will be reviewed every ten years and potentially adjusted in line with demographic and economic development. The rate of contribution payable will be reviewed annually on the basis of changes in GDP. The pension itself will be inflation-proofed and a state-financed social allowance will continue to be paid to those not eligible for a contributory benefit. The system will remain pay-as-you-go but actuarial criteria will in the future govern the determination of benefits.
25. For a critical review of the effects of the 1995 pension reform see F. Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, Pensioni e risanamento della finanza pubblica (Bologna: Il Mulino 1996).
26. See for instance the pioneering research by H. Wilensky, The New Corporatism: Centralization and The Welfare State (London: Sage 1976) and R. M. Coughlin, Ideology Public Opinion and Welfare Policy (Berkeley, CA: Inst. of Int. Studies 1980).
27. See for instance the pioneering research by H. Wilensky, The New Corporatism: Centralization and The Welfare State (London: Sage 1976) and R. M. Coughlin, Ideology Public Opinion and Welfare Policy (Berkeley, CA: Inst. of Int. Studies 1980).
28. Tartassati is another popular metaphor which started to circulate during the 1980s and which can be translated as 'the tax harassed'. It refers to all those categories which, for various reasons (including the technical impossibility of evading taxes on their incomes), the tax burden is especially heavy.
29. The data for 1992 are drawn from a comprehensive Eurobarometer survey on social protection. According to this survey, the degree of welfare 'minimalism' tended to be significantly higher in Italy than in the other EC countries (Ferrera, EC Citizens and Social Protection, note 10). With respect to the original source, the data included in Table 1 are slightly different: some statistical corrections have been made to neutralise differences in definitions.
30. For a more detailed illustration of the data mentioned in this section, see M. Ferrera and A. Piazzini, 'Una rivolta fiscale alle porte?', Political Trend, 6 (April 1996) pp.15-25.