Comparing tax expenditures and direct subsidies: The role of legislative committee structure

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 72, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 421-454

  Dharmapala, Dhammika ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Committees; Interest groups; Legislative bargaining; Subsidies; Tax expenditures

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033147917     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00103-0     Document Type: Article

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