The lingering liberal moment: An historical perspective on the global durability of democracy after 1989

Democratization

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 1-41

  Green, Daniel M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRATIZATION; HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE; LIBERALISM; POLITICAL CHANGE;

EID: 0032819380     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510349908403610     Document Type: Article

References (220)

1. On the democratic peace hypothesis, see Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, Vol.80, No.4 (1986), pp.1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principle for a Post Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds.), The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
2. On the democratic peace hypothesis, see Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, Vol.80, No.4 (1986), pp.1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principle for a Post Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds.), The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
3. On the democratic peace hypothesis, see Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, Vol.80, No.4 (1986), pp.1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principle for a Post Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds.), The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
4. On these perspectives, see Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', Comparative Politics, Vol.23, No.1 (1990), pp.1-21; Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, 'Toward Consolidated Democracies', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2 (1996), pp.14-33; and Ron Pagnucco, 'The Comparative Study of Social Movements and Democratization: Political Interaction and Political Process Approaches', in Michael Dobrowski, Isidor Wallimann and Christo Stojanov (eds.), Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Vol.18 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1995) pp.145-83.
5. On these perspectives, see Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', Comparative Politics, Vol.23, No.1 (1990), pp.1-21; Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, 'Toward Consolidated Democracies', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2 (1996), pp.14-33; and Ron Pagnucco, 'The Comparative Study of Social Movements and Democratization: Political Interaction and Political Process Approaches', in Michael Dobrowski, Isidor Wallimann and Christo Stojanov (eds.), Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Vol.18 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1995) pp.145-83.
6. On these perspectives, see Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', Comparative Politics, Vol.23, No.1 (1990), pp.1-21; Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, 'Toward Consolidated Democracies', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2 (1996), pp.14-33; and Ron Pagnucco, 'The Comparative Study of Social Movements and Democratization: Political Interaction and Political Process Approaches', in Michael Dobrowski, Isidor Wallimann and Christo Stojanov (eds.), Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Vol.18 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1995) pp.145-83.
7. Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy without Illusions', Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.1 (1997), pp.85-99; Larry Diamond, 'Is the Third Wave Over?', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.3 (1996), pp.20-37; Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy for the Long Haul', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2 (1996), pp.3-13; J. Mark Ruhl, 'Unlikely Candidates for Democracy: The Role of Structural Context in Democratic Consolidation', Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.31, No.1 (1996), pp.3-23; Philippe Schmitter, 'Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.2 (1994), pp.57-74; Robin Wright, 'Democracy: Challenges and Innovations in the 1990s', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.20, No.3 (1997), pp.23-36.
8. Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy without Illusions', Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.1 (1997), pp.85-99; Larry Diamond, 'Is the Third Wave Over?', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.3 (1996), pp.20-37; Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy for the Long Haul', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2 (1996), pp.3-13; J. Mark Ruhl, 'Unlikely Candidates for Democracy: The Role of Structural Context in Democratic Consolidation', Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.31, No.1 (1996), pp.3-23; Philippe Schmitter, 'Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.2 (1994), pp.57-74; Robin Wright, 'Democracy: Challenges and Innovations in the 1990s', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.20, No.3 (1997), pp.23-36.
9. Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy without Illusions', Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.1 (1997), pp.85-99; Larry Diamond, 'Is the Third Wave Over?', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.3 (1996), pp.20-37; Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy for the Long Haul', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2 (1996), pp.3-13; J. Mark Ruhl, 'Unlikely Candidates for Democracy: The Role of Structural Context in Democratic Consolidation', Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.31, No.1 (1996), pp.3-23; Philippe Schmitter, 'Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.2 (1994), pp.57-74; Robin Wright, 'Democracy: Challenges and Innovations in the 1990s', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.20, No.3 (1997), pp.23-36.
10. Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy without Illusions', Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.1 (1997), pp.85-99; Larry Diamond, 'Is the Third Wave Over?', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.3 (1996), pp.20-37; Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy for the Long Haul', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2 (1996), pp.3-13; J. Mark Ruhl, 'Unlikely Candidates for Democracy: The Role of Structural Context in Democratic Consolidation', Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.31, No.1 (1996), pp.3-23; Philippe Schmitter, 'Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.2 (1994), pp.57-74; Robin Wright, 'Democracy: Challenges and Innovations in the 1990s', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.20, No.3 (1997), pp.23-36.
11. Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy without Illusions', Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.1 (1997), pp.85-99; Larry Diamond, 'Is the Third Wave Over?', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.3 (1996), pp.20-37; Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy for the Long Haul', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2 (1996), pp.3-13; J. Mark Ruhl, 'Unlikely Candidates for Democracy: The Role of Structural Context in Democratic Consolidation', Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.31, No.1 (1996), pp.3-23; Philippe Schmitter, 'Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.2 (1994), pp.57-74; Robin Wright, 'Democracy: Challenges and Innovations in the 1990s', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.20, No.3 (1997), pp.23-36.
12. Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy without Illusions', Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.1 (1997), pp.85-99; Larry Diamond, 'Is the Third Wave Over?', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.3 (1996), pp.20-37; Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy for the Long Haul', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2 (1996), pp.3-13; J. Mark Ruhl, 'Unlikely Candidates for Democracy: The Role of Structural Context in Democratic Consolidation', Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.31, No.1 (1996), pp.3-23; Philippe Schmitter, 'Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.2 (1994), pp.57-74; Robin Wright, 'Democracy: Challenges and Innovations in the 1990s', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.20, No.3 (1997), pp.23-36.
13. Diamond, op. cit., pp.32, 35.
14. Diamond uses the compelling phrase 'death by a thousand subtractions' to describe the possible end of the Third Wave. Ibid., p.33.
15. Another critique of democracy in the 1990s - regarding its subversion from within and without by neo-liberal economic logics - is more telling, with implications for all democracies. In developing countries, the need to press ahead with liberalizing economic reforms in spite of popular resistance has produced what Guillermo O'Donnell calls 'delegative' democracies, in which political leaders are scarcely accountable or accessible between elections. See Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.1 (1994), pp.55-69. In all countries, whole portions of what used to be issues of public control and contestation are cut off by neo-liberalism and the retreat of the state. This is clearly one of the great contradictions facing liberalism at it evolves today; see Richard Falk, 'An Inquiry into the Political Economy of Order', New Political Economy, Vol.1, No.1 (1996), pp.13-26. The inherent contradictions of economic liberalism may provide the seeds of political liberalism's contemporary dominance, though for the moment one finds economic crises producing only deepening liberalization, as the recent experience of East Asia attests. An array of ameliorative reforms popular today, in neo-liberal social welfare programmes, new efforts to end government corruption, the spread of anti-trust legislation and other measures will likely give both economic and political liberalism a longer lease on life.
16. Another critique of democracy in the 1990s - regarding its subversion from within and without by neo-liberal economic logics - is more telling, with implications for all democracies. In developing countries, the need to press ahead with liberalizing economic reforms in spite of popular resistance has produced what Guillermo O'Donnell calls 'delegative' democracies, in which political leaders are scarcely accountable or accessible between elections. See Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.1 (1994), pp.55-69. In all countries, whole portions of what used to be issues of public control and contestation are cut off by neo-liberalism and the retreat of the state. This is clearly one of the great contradictions facing liberalism at it evolves today; see Richard Falk, 'An Inquiry into the Political Economy of Order', New Political Economy, Vol.1, No.1 (1996), pp.13-26. The inherent contradictions of economic liberalism may provide the seeds of political liberalism's contemporary dominance, though for the moment one finds economic crises producing only deepening liberalization, as the recent experience of East Asia attests. An array of ameliorative reforms popular today, in neo-liberal social welfare programmes, new efforts to end government corruption, the spread of anti-trust legislation and other measures will likely give both economic and political liberalism a longer lease on life.
17. On the neglect of international factors in the democratization literature, see Geoffrey Pridham, 'International Influences and Democratic Transition: Problems of Theory and Practice in Linkage Politics', in Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p.1; and Lawrence Whitehead, 'Three International Dimensions of Democratization', in Lawrence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.3-25. The result is a failure to see beyond individual country cases and their details. As Karen Remmer observes of this problem in the transition literature on Latin America: 'The nearly simultaneous breakdown of authoritarianism across Latin America thus ends up being portrayed as the result of multiple distinct and unrelated processes of interaction between particular actors and shifting political conjunctures. The resulting array of complex and often contradictory interpretations of individual transitions establishes no basis for understanding why the political face of the entire region was transformed between 1979 and 1989'. See Karen Remmer, 'External Pressures and Domestic Constraints', in Tom Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p.287. And, as Tony Smith notes, the absence of an historical dimension in studies of what he terms the international origins of democracy is even more glaring. See Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.346-7.
18. On the neglect of international factors in the democratization literature, see Geoffrey Pridham, 'International Influences and Democratic Transition: Problems of Theory and Practice in Linkage Politics', in Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p.1; and Lawrence Whitehead, 'Three International Dimensions of Democratization', in Lawrence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.3-25. The result is a failure to see beyond individual country cases and their details. As Karen Remmer observes of this problem in the transition literature on Latin America: 'The nearly simultaneous breakdown of authoritarianism across Latin America thus ends up being portrayed as the result of multiple distinct and unrelated processes of interaction between particular actors and shifting political conjunctures. The resulting array of complex and often contradictory interpretations of individual transitions establishes no basis for understanding why the political face of the entire region was transformed between 1979 and 1989'. See Karen Remmer, 'External Pressures and Domestic Constraints', in Tom Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p.287. And, as Tony Smith notes, the absence of an historical dimension in studies of what he terms the international origins of democracy is even more glaring. See Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.346-7.
19. On the neglect of international factors in the democratization literature, see Geoffrey Pridham, 'International Influences and Democratic Transition: Problems of Theory and Practice in Linkage Politics', in Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p.1; and Lawrence Whitehead, 'Three International Dimensions of Democratization', in Lawrence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.3-25. The result is a failure to see beyond individual country cases and their details. As Karen Remmer observes of this problem in the transition literature on Latin America: 'The nearly simultaneous breakdown of authoritarianism across Latin America thus ends up being portrayed as the result of multiple distinct and unrelated processes of interaction between particular actors and shifting political conjunctures. The resulting array of complex and often contradictory interpretations of individual transitions establishes no basis for understanding why the political face of the entire region was transformed between 1979 and 1989'. See Karen Remmer, 'External Pressures and Domestic Constraints', in Tom Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p.287. And, as Tony Smith notes, the absence of an historical dimension in studies of what he terms the international origins of democracy is even more glaring. See Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.346-7.
20. On the neglect of international factors in the democratization literature, see Geoffrey Pridham, 'International Influences and Democratic Transition: Problems of Theory and Practice in Linkage Politics', in Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p.1; and Lawrence Whitehead, 'Three International Dimensions of Democratization', in Lawrence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.3-25. The result is a failure to see beyond individual country cases and their details. As Karen Remmer observes of this problem in the transition literature on Latin America: 'The nearly simultaneous breakdown of authoritarianism across Latin America thus ends up being portrayed as the result of multiple distinct and unrelated processes of interaction between particular actors and shifting political conjunctures. The resulting array of complex and often contradictory interpretations of individual transitions establishes no basis for understanding why the political face of the entire region was transformed between 1979 and 1989'. See Karen Remmer, 'External Pressures and Domestic Constraints', in Tom Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p.287. And, as Tony Smith notes, the absence of an historical dimension in studies of what he terms the international origins of democracy is even more glaring. See Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.346-7.
21. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 1991); John Markoff, Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1996).
22. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 1991); John Markoff, Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1996).
23. The term democracy in this study incorporates formalistic democracy or electoralism as basically democratic regime types. Much of the democratization literature today is highly concerned with the quality of democracy and rightly finds many new democracies lacking. I would argue, however, that this understates the great importance of actually achieving a transition to a relatively open polity with regular and relatively free and fair elections. Electoralism is hardly fully-developed democracy, but it is an absolutely crucial step on that path, particularly if one recognizes the new international environment as one with many mechanisms conducive to deepening of democracy after transitions.
24. Adrian Karatnycky, for example, has recently made this argument: 'Over the years, some critics have derided electoral democracy, arguing that the emphasis of US policy on promoting electoral processes results in "donor democracy" ... Yet the record of the last decade's democratic transformations shows that something more profound is occurring around the world. Electoral democracy brings with it pressure for important additional liberties ...While electoral democracies do not ensure respect of the basic rights of their citizens, they offer the best climate in which basic freedoms can thrive.' From Karatnycky, 'Freedom on the March', Freedom Review, Vol.28, No.1 (1997), p.9, 11 (emphasis added). Karatnycky refers mainly to domestic forces which deepen democracy; this article argues that without an international enabling environment, domestic pressures can easily be, and historically have been, ignored by national autocrats.
25. This does not address the question of democracy as externally imposed cultural imperialism - a serious concern but not one explored in this article.
26. Huntington, The Third Wave, pp.40-108.
27. In this way, the 'wave' approach attributes undue importance to countries which might be at the crest or trough of a wave by mere coincidence.
28. Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Democratization around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks', in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (eds.), World Security: Challenges for a New Century, Second Edition (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994) pp.43-62; Robert Latham, The Liberal Moment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); James Richardson, 'Problematic Paradigm: Liberalism and the Global Order', in Joseph A. Camilleri, Anthony P. Jarvis, and Albert J. Paolini (eds.), The State in Transition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp.141-56.
29. Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Democratization around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks', in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (eds.), World Security: Challenges for a New Century, Second Edition (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994) pp.43-62; Robert Latham, The Liberal Moment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); James Richardson, 'Problematic Paradigm: Liberalism and the Global Order', in Joseph A. Camilleri, Anthony P. Jarvis, and Albert J. Paolini (eds.), The State in Transition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp.141-56.
30. Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Democratization around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks', in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (eds.), World Security: Challenges for a New Century, Second Edition (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994) pp.43-62; Robert Latham, The Liberal Moment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); James Richardson, 'Problematic Paradigm: Liberalism and the Global Order', in Joseph A. Camilleri, Anthony P. Jarvis, and Albert J. Paolini (eds.), The State in Transition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp.141-56.
31. Few studies compare all three of these as liberal moments. John Markoff looks at all three, focusing on social movements striving for democracy and their ability to take advantage of war time to do so. He is much less able to account for the reversals closing each moment. See Markoff, op. cit., pp.71-99. Huntington, The Third Wave, does as well, but he spends relatively little time on pre-1974 events, devoting most of his attention to the Third Wave. Tony Smith, in America's Mission, examines all three moments from an American perspective. See also the chapters in Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Paula Bailey Smith (eds.), New European Orders, 1919 and 1991 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
32. Few studies compare all three of these as liberal moments. John Markoff looks at all three, focusing on social movements striving for democracy and their ability to take advantage of war time to do so. He is much less able to account for the reversals closing each moment. See Markoff, op. cit., pp.71-99. Huntington, The Third Wave, does as well, but he spends relatively little time on pre-1974 events, devoting most of his attention to the Third Wave. Tony Smith, in America's Mission, examines all three moments from an American perspective. See also the chapters in Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Paula Bailey Smith (eds.), New European Orders, 1919 and 1991 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
33. Few studies compare all three of these as liberal moments. John Markoff looks at all three, focusing on social movements striving for democracy and their ability to take advantage of war time to do so. He is much less able to account for the reversals closing each moment. See Markoff, op. cit., pp.71-99. Huntington, The Third Wave, does as well, but he spends relatively little time on pre-1974 events, devoting most of his attention to the Third Wave. Tony Smith, in America's Mission, examines all three moments from an American perspective. See also the chapters in Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Paula Bailey Smith (eds.), New European Orders, 1919 and 1991 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
34. Few studies compare all three of these as liberal moments. John Markoff looks at all three, focusing on social movements striving for democracy and their ability to take advantage of war time to do so. He is much less able to account for the reversals closing each moment. See Markoff, op. cit., pp.71-99. Huntington, The Third Wave, does as well, but he spends relatively little time on pre-1974 events, devoting most of his attention to the Third Wave. Tony Smith, in America's Mission, examines all three moments from an American perspective. See also the chapters in Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Paula Bailey Smith (eds.), New European Orders, 1919 and 1991 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
35. A normative-institutionalist approach is now adopted in several literatures which seek to explain order and 'isomorphism' (the similarity of socio-political forms across different world regions) in the modern global system. For example, norms play a major part in sociological institutionalism's explanations of isomorphic change and global homogeneity. See George M. Thomas et al., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications) and Martha Finnemore, 'Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism', International Organization, Vol.50, No.2 (1996), pp.325-47.
36. A normative-institutionalist approach is now adopted in several literatures which seek to explain order and 'isomorphism' (the similarity of socio-political forms across different world regions) in the modern global system. For example, norms play a major part in sociological institutionalism's explanations of isomorphic change and global homogeneity. See George M. Thomas et al., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications) and Martha Finnemore, 'Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism', International Organization, Vol.50, No.2 (1996), pp.325-47.
37. This is an international-systemic theory of national regime choice, arguing that there is an international institutional and cultural structure at that level which guides state-level political outcomes, just as there are societal norms and cultures which shape outcomes in national societies. For other works along these lines, see the chapters in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). For the perspective of international relations theory's 'English School', see David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). See also Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
38. This is an international-systemic theory of national regime choice, arguing that there is an international institutional and cultural structure at that level which guides state-level political outcomes, just as there are societal norms and cultures which shape outcomes in national societies. For other works along these lines, see the chapters in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). For the perspective of international relations theory's 'English School', see David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). See also Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
39. This is an international-systemic theory of national regime choice, arguing that there is an international institutional and cultural structure at that level which guides state-level political outcomes, just as there are societal norms and cultures which shape outcomes in national societies. For other works along these lines, see the chapters in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). For the perspective of international relations theory's 'English School', see David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). See also Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
40. Since norms by definition can be violated, an explanation which relies considerably upon them must be probabilistic. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., p.369. Karen Remmer argues that the largely internalist-modernizationist democratization literature has thus far failed to provide a theory of democratization, especially one which can explain pulses of geographically widespread democratization as in the 1990s. See Remmer, 'New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratization', Comparative Politics, Vol.28, No.1 (1995), pp.103-22, and Remmer, 'External Pressures'. An excellent historical-transnational account of democratization from a social movement perspective is Markoff, Waves of Democracy.
41. Since norms by definition can be violated, an explanation which relies considerably upon them must be probabilistic. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., p.369. Karen Remmer argues that the largely internalist-modernizationist democratization literature has thus far failed to provide a theory of democratization, especially one which can explain pulses of geographically widespread democratization as in the 1990s. See Remmer, 'New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratization', Comparative Politics, Vol.28, No.1 (1995), pp.103-22, and Remmer, 'External Pressures'. An excellent historical-transnational account of democratization from a social movement perspective is Markoff, Waves of Democracy.
42. Since norms by definition can be violated, an explanation which relies considerably upon them must be probabilistic. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), op. cit., p.369. Karen Remmer argues that the largely internalist-modernizationist democratization literature has thus far failed to provide a theory of democratization, especially one which can explain pulses of geographically widespread democratization as in the 1990s. See Remmer, 'New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratization', Comparative Politics, Vol.28, No.1 (1995), pp.103-22, and Remmer, 'External Pressures'. An excellent historical-transnational account of democratization from a social movement perspective is Markoff, Waves of Democracy.
43. For definitional discussions of liberalism, see Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); John A. Hall, Liberalism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); and Latham, The Liberal Moment.
44. For definitional discussions of liberalism, see Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); John A. Hall, Liberalism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); and Latham, The Liberal Moment.
45. For definitional discussions of liberalism, see Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); John A. Hall, Liberalism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); and Latham, The Liberal Moment.
46. Karl and Schmitter; op. cit., Pridham; op. cit., Remmer, 'External Pressures'; and Laurence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
47. Karl and Schmitter; op. cit., Pridham; op. cit., Remmer, 'External Pressures'; and Laurence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
48. Karl and Schmitter; op. cit., Pridham; op. cit., Remmer, 'External Pressures'; and Laurence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
49. Karl and Schmitter; op. cit., Pridham; op. cit., Remmer, 'External Pressures'; and Laurence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
50. On evolving sovereignty norms and their implications, see J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, 'The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations', International Organization, Vol.48, No.1 (1994), pp.107-30; Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the norm of democratic legitimacy and democracy promotion, see Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty; Thomas Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', American Journal of International Law, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.46-91; and Smith, America's Mission. On the strategic-security situation and the national and international political issues at stake in war across history, the literature is truly enormous. Excellent surveys include Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and David Kaiser, Politics and War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). On the current period in historical perspective, one can begin with the articles collected in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy.
51. On evolving sovereignty norms and their implications, see J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, 'The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations', International Organization, Vol.48, No.1 (1994), pp.107-30; Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the norm of democratic legitimacy and democracy promotion, see Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty; Thomas Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', American Journal of International Law, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.46-91; and Smith, America's Mission. On the strategic-security situation and the national and international political issues at stake in war across history, the literature is truly enormous. Excellent surveys include Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and David Kaiser, Politics and War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). On the current period in historical perspective, one can begin with the articles collected in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy.
52. On evolving sovereignty norms and their implications, see J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, 'The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations', International Organization, Vol.48, No.1 (1994), pp.107-30; Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the norm of democratic legitimacy and democracy promotion, see Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty; Thomas Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', American Journal of International Law, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.46-91; and Smith, America's Mission. On the strategic-security situation and the national and international political issues at stake in war across history, the literature is truly enormous. Excellent surveys include Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and David Kaiser, Politics and War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). On the current period in historical perspective, one can begin with the articles collected in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy.
53. On evolving sovereignty norms and their implications, see J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, 'The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations', International Organization, Vol.48, No.1 (1994), pp.107-30; Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the norm of democratic legitimacy and democracy promotion, see Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty; Thomas Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', American Journal of International Law, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.46-91; and Smith, America's Mission. On the strategic-security situation and the national and international political issues at stake in war across history, the literature is truly enormous. Excellent surveys include Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and David Kaiser, Politics and War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). On the current period in historical perspective, one can begin with the articles collected in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy.
54. On evolving sovereignty norms and their implications, see J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, 'The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations', International Organization, Vol.48, No.1 (1994), pp.107-30; Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the norm of democratic legitimacy and democracy promotion, see Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty; Thomas Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', American Journal of International Law, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.46-91; and Smith, America's Mission. On the strategic-security situation and the national and international political issues at stake in war across history, the literature is truly enormous. Excellent surveys include Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and David Kaiser, Politics and War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). On the current period in historical perspective, one can begin with the articles collected in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy.
55. On evolving sovereignty norms and their implications, see J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, 'The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations', International Organization, Vol.48, No.1 (1994), pp.107-30; Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the norm of democratic legitimacy and democracy promotion, see Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty; Thomas Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', American Journal of International Law, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.46-91; and Smith, America's Mission. On the strategic-security situation and the national and international political issues at stake in war across history, the literature is truly enormous. Excellent surveys include Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and David Kaiser, Politics and War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). On the current period in historical perspective, one can begin with the articles collected in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy.
56. On evolving sovereignty norms and their implications, see J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, 'The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations', International Organization, Vol.48, No.1 (1994), pp.107-30; Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the norm of democratic legitimacy and democracy promotion, see Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty; Thomas Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', American Journal of International Law, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.46-91; and Smith, America's Mission. On the strategic-security situation and the national and international political issues at stake in war across history, the literature is truly enormous. Excellent surveys include Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and David Kaiser, Politics and War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). On the current period in historical perspective, one can begin with the articles collected in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy.
57. On evolving sovereignty norms and their implications, see J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, 'The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations', International Organization, Vol.48, No.1 (1994), pp.107-30; Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the norm of democratic legitimacy and democracy promotion, see Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty; Thomas Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', American Journal of International Law, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.46-91; and Smith, America's Mission. On the strategic-security situation and the national and international political issues at stake in war across history, the literature is truly enormous. Excellent surveys include Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and David Kaiser, Politics and War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). On the current period in historical perspective, one can begin with the articles collected in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy.
58. On evolving sovereignty norms and their implications, see J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, 'The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations', International Organization, Vol.48, No.1 (1994), pp.107-30; Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the norm of democratic legitimacy and democracy promotion, see Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty; Thomas Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', American Journal of International Law, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.46-91; and Smith, America's Mission. On the strategic-security situation and the national and international political issues at stake in war across history, the literature is truly enormous. Excellent surveys include Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and David Kaiser, Politics and War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). On the current period in historical perspective, one can begin with the articles collected in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy.
59. As Markoff, Waves of Democracy, points out, we need to think of all democratizations in individual countries as in fact inherently part of a global process that has seen democratic ideas and democratizations spread and retract across polities for over two centuries.
60. As Charles Kindleberger has observed, 'War is a hothouse: it accelerates the growth of some tendencies and hastens the decline of those on the downward path'. See Kindleberger, 'Comments on "The Two Postwar Eras"', American Historical Review, Vol.86, No.2 (1982), p.362. Also see Gregory J. Kasza, 'War and Comparative Politics', Comparative Politics, Vol.28, No.3 (1996), pp.355-73.
61. As Charles Kindleberger has observed, 'War is a hothouse: it accelerates the growth of some tendencies and hastens the decline of those on the downward path'. See Kindleberger, 'Comments on "The Two Postwar Eras"', American Historical Review, Vol.86, No.2 (1982), p.362. Also see Gregory J. Kasza, 'War and Comparative Politics', Comparative Politics, Vol.28, No.3 (1996), pp.355-73.
62. As Charles Kindleberger has observed, 'War is a hothouse: it accelerates the growth of some tendencies and hastens the decline of those on the downward path'. See Kindleberger, 'Comments on "The Two Postwar Eras"', American Historical Review, Vol.86, No.2 (1982), p.362. Also see Gregory J. Kasza, 'War and Comparative Politics', Comparative Politics, Vol.28, No.3 (1996), pp.355-73.
63. On the socio-political impact of World War I, see F. L. Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972); Gregory Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peace-Making, 1918-1919 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967); and Hans A. Schmitt (ed.), Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917-1923 (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1988).
64. On the socio-political impact of World War I, see F. L. Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972); Gregory Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peace-Making, 1918-1919 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967); and Hans A. Schmitt (ed.), Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917-1923 (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1988).
65. On the socio-political impact of World War I, see F. L. Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972); Gregory Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peace-Making, 1918-1919 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967); and Hans A. Schmitt (ed.), Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917-1923 (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1988).
66. On the socio-political impact of World War I, see F. L. Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972); Gregory Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peace-Making, 1918-1919 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967); and Hans A. Schmitt (ed.), Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917-1923 (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1988).
67. G. John Ikenberry, 'Political Structures and Postwar Settlements', in Wells and Smith, New European Orders, pp.1-17.
68. Huntington, The Third Wave, p.33.
69. The new countries were: Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. All had key features of formal democracy early on: constitutions, multi-party elections, parliaments.
70. See the chapters in Schmitt, op. cit. On the American case, see Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979).
71. See the chapters in Schmitt, op. cit. On the American case, see Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979).
72. Leopold Haimson and Charles Tilly (eds.), Strikes, Wars, and Revolutions in an International Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
73. The 1944-47 period as a special moment for comparative politics has received attention of late, particularly with regard to Latin America: see Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (eds.), Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and David Rock (ed.), Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). Further information on democratizations and political change in this period is drawn from Chris Cook and John Paxton, European Political Facts, 1918-1973 (New York: Facts on File, 1975), J.P.D. Dunbabin, The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies (London: Longman, 1994), Pierre de Senarclens, From Yalta to the Iron Curtain (Oxford: Berg, 1995) and other sources.
74. The 1944-47 period as a special moment for comparative politics has received attention of late, particularly with regard to Latin America: see Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (eds.), Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and David Rock (ed.), Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). Further information on democratizations and political change in this period is drawn from Chris Cook and John Paxton, European Political Facts, 1918-1973 (New York: Facts on File, 1975), J.P.D. Dunbabin, The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies (London: Longman, 1994), Pierre de Senarclens, From Yalta to the Iron Curtain (Oxford: Berg, 1995) and other sources.
75. The 1944-47 period as a special moment for comparative politics has received attention of late, particularly with regard to Latin America: see Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (eds.), Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and David Rock (ed.), Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). Further information on democratizations and political change in this period is drawn from Chris Cook and John Paxton, European Political Facts, 1918-1973 (New York: Facts on File, 1975), J.P.D. Dunbabin, The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies (London: Longman, 1994), Pierre de Senarclens, From Yalta to the Iron Curtain (Oxford: Berg, 1995) and other sources.
76. The 1944-47 period as a special moment for comparative politics has received attention of late, particularly with regard to Latin America: see Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (eds.), Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and David Rock (ed.), Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). Further information on democratizations and political change in this period is drawn from Chris Cook and John Paxton, European Political Facts, 1918-1973 (New York: Facts on File, 1975), J.P.D. Dunbabin, The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies (London: Longman, 1994), Pierre de Senarclens, From Yalta to the Iron Curtain (Oxford: Berg, 1995) and other sources.
77. The 1944-47 period as a special moment for comparative politics has received attention of late, particularly with regard to Latin America: see Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (eds.), Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and David Rock (ed.), Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). Further information on democratizations and political change in this period is drawn from Chris Cook and John Paxton, European Political Facts, 1918-1973 (New York: Facts on File, 1975), J.P.D. Dunbabin, The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies (London: Longman, 1994), Pierre de Senarclens, From Yalta to the Iron Curtain (Oxford: Berg, 1995) and other sources.
78. Leslie Bethell, 'From the Second World War to the Cold War: 1944-1954', in Abraham F. Lowenthal (ed.), Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America: Themes and Issues (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p.44. Significant democratization occurred in Cuba, El Salvador and Guatemala in 1944, in Brazil, Panama and Venezuela in 1945, and in Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay in 1946.
79. A basic hypothesis of realist theory in international relations is that states are less able to pursue ideological goals - including the promotion of liberal reforms - when faced with international security threats. See Mark Peceny, 'Two Paths to the Promotion of Democracy During U.S. Military Interventions', International Studies Quarterly, Vol.39, No.2 (1995), pp.371-401. Peceny finds that the US pursued political liberalization reforms in 72 per cent of its interventions that occurred in a low-threat international environment and in only 33 per cent of the interventions in high-threat periods.
80. Space constraints dos not permit a chronological, point-by-point discussion of the events attached to each step for each moment. Nor is each step discrete; steps 4 to 7 all took place roughly concurrently in these two moments, for example.
81. On the development of this norm, see Franck, op. cit.
82. As Wilson observed while on his way to Paris in December 1918, reacting to the tensions of post-war Europe and the threat from left and right: 'Liberalism is the only thing that can save civilization from chaos - from a flood of ultra-radicalism that will swamp the world ... Liberalism must be more liberal than ever before, it must even be radical, if civilization is to escape the typhoon.' Quotation from Lloyd Gardner, Safe for Democracy: The AngloAmerican Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p.1.
83. Seamus Dunn and T.G. Fraser (eds.), Europe and Ethnicity: The First World War and Contemporary Ethnic Conflict (London: Routledge, 1996); and Derek Heater, National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and his Legacy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
84. Seamus Dunn and T.G. Fraser (eds.), Europe and Ethnicity: The First World War and Contemporary Ethnic Conflict (London: Routledge, 1996); and Derek Heater, National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and his Legacy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
85. Kenneth J. Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1976), p.104.
86. Heater, National Self-Determination, pp.28-9.
87. Michael Burns, 'Disturbed Spirits: Minority Rights and New World Orders, 1919 and the 1990s', in Wells and Smith, New European Orders, pp.41-61.
88. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy.
89. William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp.121-33. On the impact of the Atlantic Charter on peoples around the world, see Scott L. Bills, Empire and Cold War: The Roots of US-Third World Antagonism, 1945-1947 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp.8-12.
90. William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp.121-33. On the impact of the Atlantic Charter on peoples around the world, see Scott L. Bills, Empire and Cold War: The Roots of US-Third World Antagonism, 1945-1947 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp.8-12.
91. See Articles 1 and 55 in particular. Burns, 'Disturbed Spirits'; Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe and Roger Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p.111. The move to universal human rights claims was of course more possible now that empire, and the need to maintain official racism, was on the wane.
92. See Articles 1 and 55 in particular. Burns, 'Disturbed Spirits'; Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe and Roger Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p.111. The move to universal human rights claims was of course more possible now that empire, and the need to maintain official racism, was on the wane.
93. Jan Hermann Burgers, 'The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.14, No.4 (1992), pp.447-77. Human rights did not appear in the original Dumbarton Oaks drafts drawn up by the major powers, but were added in San Francisco, where NGOs were invited to attend as consultants.
94. Laurence Whitehead, 'International Aspects of Democratization', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp.12-14.
95. Anti-colonial unrest during and after World War I, against the British in India and Egypt and the Japanese in Korea, brought some concessions: expanded self-rule for India from 1919 and brought formal independence to Egypt in 1922. A new League of Nations mandate system allowed a modicum of independence to countries such as Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.
96. Jackson, Quasi-States.
97. Louis, Imperialism at Bay.
98. India was promised independence. The French colonial Brazzaville Conference of January 1944 promised some decentralization and an expanded role for Africans in colonial administration; the French reluctantly recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon in July 1945. The British committed much greater expenditures for socio-economic development in their colonies in the Colonial Welfare Act of 1945, and after the War the new Labour government's Cohen-Caine Committee in May 1947 went so far as to produce a plan for the independence of British Africa, a plan implemented with unanticipated haste in the next ten years. See Louis, ibid.; Bills, Empire and Cold War; and William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, 'The United States and the Liquidation of British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941-1951', in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (eds.), The Transition of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940-1960 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp.31-55.
99. India was promised independence. The French colonial Brazzaville Conference of January 1944 promised some decentralization and an expanded role for Africans in colonial administration; the French reluctantly recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon in July 1945. The British committed much greater expenditures for socio-economic development in their colonies in the Colonial Welfare Act of 1945, and after the War the new Labour government's Cohen-Caine Committee in May 1947 went so far as to produce a plan for the independence of British Africa, a plan implemented with unanticipated haste in the next ten years. See Louis, ibid.; Bills, Empire and Cold War; and William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, 'The United States and the Liquidation of British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941-1951', in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (eds.), The Transition of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940-1960 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp.31-55.
100. India was promised independence. The French colonial Brazzaville Conference of January 1944 promised some decentralization and an expanded role for Africans in colonial administration; the French reluctantly recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon in July 1945. The British committed much greater expenditures for socio-economic development in their colonies in the Colonial Welfare Act of 1945, and after the War the new Labour government's Cohen-Caine Committee in May 1947 went so far as to produce a plan for the independence of British Africa, a plan implemented with unanticipated haste in the next ten years. See Louis, ibid.; Bills, Empire and Cold War; and William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, 'The United States and the Liquidation of British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941-1951', in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (eds.), The Transition of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940-1960 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp.31-55.
101. Jackson, Quasi-States, pp.102-03.
102. Ibid.
103. There was a global wave of labor and strike activity in late 1918 and early 1919. Serious labour protests erupted in Germany and Austria-Hungary before the war ended, and both Germany and Austria nearly followed Russia into revolution; Hungary was briefly a Soviet republic in 1919, as were Bavaria and other parts of Germany. In January 1919, labour protests also erupted in Buenos Aires, Santiago, Sao Paulo and Lima. See Carsten, op. cit., Haimson, op. cit. and Tilly, op. cit.
104. There was a global wave of labor and strike activity in late 1918 and early 1919. Serious labour protests erupted in Germany and Austria-Hungary before the war ended, and both Germany and Austria nearly followed Russia into revolution; Hungary was briefly a Soviet republic in 1919, as were Bavaria and other parts of Germany. In January 1919, labour protests also erupted in Buenos Aires, Santiago, Sao Paulo and Lima. See Carsten, op. cit., Haimson, op. cit. and Tilly, op. cit.
105. There was a global wave of labor and strike activity in late 1918 and early 1919. Serious labour protests erupted in Germany and Austria-Hungary before the war ended, and both Germany and Austria nearly followed Russia into revolution; Hungary was briefly a Soviet republic in 1919, as were Bavaria and other parts of Germany. In January 1919, labour protests also erupted in Buenos Aires, Santiago, Sao Paulo and Lima. See Carsten, op. cit., Haimson, op. cit. and Tilly, op. cit.
106. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy;
107. Betty Miller Unterberger, 'Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution', in Arthur Link (ed.), Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 1913-1921 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp.49-104.
108. For examples, see the discussions of reforms in the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden in the relevant chapters of Schmitt, Neutral Europe.
109. Bethell, 'From the Second World War'.
110. Much is symbolized by the Yalta meeting in February 1945. Here, the Allied leaders signed a 'Declaration on Liberated Europe' guaranteeing free elections in Eastern Europe, an agreement that was violated just days later.
111. A great deal has been written about both the UN and the League of Nations and only the briefest of descriptions is provided here.
112. See, for example, his rethinking of the Russian revolution as discussed in Unterberger. At the end of the Paris conference, Wilson expressed regret at having ever suggested that all nations had a right to self-determination: 'You do not know the anxieties that I have experienced as a result of the many millions of people having their hopes raised by what I have said.' Quotation from Burns, 'Disturbed Spirits', p.42.
113. David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd and John Redmond, From Versailles to Maastricht: International Organisation in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Gary Ostrower, The League of Nations from 1919 to 1929 (Garden City Park, NY: Avery Publishing, 1996).
114. David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd and John Redmond, From Versailles to Maastricht: International Organisation in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Gary Ostrower, The League of Nations from 1919 to 1929 (Garden City Park, NY: Avery Publishing, 1996).
115. On inter-war arms control diplomacy, see Ostrower; op. cit., and Peter H. Buckingham, International Normalcy: The Open Door Peace with the Former Central Powers, 1921-1929 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1983); Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
116. On inter-war arms control diplomacy, see Ostrower; op. cit., and Peter H. Buckingham, International Normalcy: The Open Door Peace with the Former Central Powers, 1921-1929 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1983); Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
117. On inter-war arms control diplomacy, see Ostrower; op. cit., and Peter H. Buckingham, International Normalcy: The Open Door Peace with the Former Central Powers, 1921-1929 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1983); Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
118. Abba Eban has recently restated the argument that the international effort to establish a working collective security mechanism was, as in 1919, simply made too soon. See Abba Eban, 'The UN Idea Revisited', Foreign Affairs, Vol.74, No.4 (1995).
119. On this so-called 'doctrine of impotence', see Tom Farer and Felice Gaer, 'The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning', in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), United Nations: Divided World (Second edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p.273.
120. David P. Forsythe, 'The United Nations, Democracy, and the Americas', in Tom Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty, pp.111-12.
121. Michael Barnett, 'The United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty', Global Governance, Vol.1, No.1 (1995), pp.84-6.
122. Mayer, op. cit. and Unterberger, op. cit.
123. Mayer, op. cit. and Unterberger, op. cit.
124. For a recent analysis, see Maarten Pereboom, Democracies at the Turning Point: Britain, France and the End of the Postwar Order, 1928-1933 (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1995).
125. Esmonde M. Robertson, Mussolini as Empire-Builder (London: Macmillan Press, 1977).
126. Ibid.
127. Luebbert; op. cit., and Antony Polonsky, The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe since 1918 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).
128. Luebbert; op. cit., and Antony Polonsky, The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe since 1918 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).
129. Fascism was criticized by liberals from the outset, but often admired by moderates and conservatives, as a potential source of order and national progress. See Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p.123. Ceplair explains the paralysis of anti-fascism in later years as follows: 'It stemmed in large part from the double-bind position in which Fascism placed people during the post-World War I period. On the one hand, the rallying cry against Fascism was that it would unleash a war; on the other hand, it was obvious to any average informed citizen that only war could effectively stop the spread of Fascism. The citizens of France, Great Britain, and the United States and the leaders of the Soviet Union chose to postpone war as long as possible.' From Larry Ceplair, Under the Shadow of War: Fascism, Anti-Fascism, and Marxists, 1918-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p.7.
130. Fascism was criticized by liberals from the outset, but often admired by moderates and conservatives, as a potential source of order and national progress. See Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p.123. Ceplair explains the paralysis of anti-fascism in later years as follows: 'It stemmed in large part from the double-bind position in which Fascism placed people during the post-World War I period. On the one hand, the rallying cry against Fascism was that it would unleash a war; on the other hand, it was obvious to any average informed citizen that only war could effectively stop the spread of Fascism. The citizens of France, Great Britain, and the United States and the leaders of the Soviet Union chose to postpone war as long as possible.' From Larry Ceplair, Under the Shadow of War: Fascism, Anti-Fascism, and Marxists, 1918-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p.7.
131. Paul W. Drake, 'From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912-1932', in Abraham F. Lowenthal (ed.), Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America: Themes and Issues (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p.23.
132. Smith, America's Mission, p.121.
133. Japan had tried to obtain recognition of racial equality in the League of Nations Charter negotiations, for example, but was denied by the machinations of countries nervous about the race question in their own countries - the US, Australia, New Zealand, and others. Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), Ch.3.
134. This account differs from that of Huntington who finds, based on the country-count of democracies, that the reverse wave began in the late 1950s or 1962, in Peru. See Huntington, The Third Wave, p.19.
135. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p.201.
136. For example, between October 1946 and January 1947, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland all held rigged elections which secured Communist Party control and marked the beginning of totalitarianism. See de Senarclens, op. cit.
137. Fred L. Block, The Origins of International Economic Disorder (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
138. Fred L. Block, The Origins of International Economic Disorder (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
139. Bethell, 'From the Second World War', p.63.
140. Ibid., p.56.
141. Derek H. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919-1929 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977); Block, op. cit., pp.12-31; and Sontag, op. cit.
142. Derek H. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919-1929 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977); Block, op. cit., pp.12-31; and Sontag, op. cit.
143. Derek H. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919-1929 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977); Block, op. cit., pp.12-31; and Sontag, op. cit.
144. On the 'decartelization' of Japan and Germany, see Smith, America's Mission, pp.160-66.
145. Block, op. cit., and Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe (London: Longman, 1991), pp.13-22.
146. Block, op. cit., and Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe (London: Longman, 1991), pp.13-22.
147. Tony Smith makes this point strongly with regard to Japan and Germany; Smith, pp.146-7.
148. For one characterization of the increasingly integrated Western order that emerged, see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The Logic of the West', World Policy Journal, Vol.10, No.1 (1993/94), pp.17-25.
149. On the latter, see Carl Gershman, 'The United States and the World Democratic Revolution', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.12, No.1 (1989).
150. For example: the Iceland Summit in 1986 (which some argue was the first 'end' of the cold war); Mikhail Gorbachev's institution of competitive elections for Communist Party posts in the USSR in 1988; the Polish government's negotiations with Solidarity ending in April 1989 with an agreement on elections for a parliament.
151. Karatnycky, op. cit.
152. Among others, see Matthew Evangelista, 'Internal and External Constraints on Grand Strategy: The Soviet Case', in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.), The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.154-78; Raymond L. Garthoff, 'Why Did the Cold War Arise and Why Did It End?', in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.127-36; Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas Do Not Float freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War', in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp.187-222.
153. Among others, see Matthew Evangelista, 'Internal and External Constraints on Grand Strategy: The Soviet Case', in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.), The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.154-78; Raymond L. Garthoff, 'Why Did the Cold War Arise and Why Did It End?', in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.127-36; Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas Do Not Float freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War', in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp.187-222.
154. Among others, see Matthew Evangelista, 'Internal and External Constraints on Grand Strategy: The Soviet Case', in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.), The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.154-78; Raymond L. Garthoff, 'Why Did the Cold War Arise and Why Did It End?', in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.127-36; Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas Do Not Float freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War', in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp.187-222.
155. Philip G. Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics (London: Sage, 1990); Stephen R. Gill, 'Neo-liberalism and the Shift Towards a US-centered Transnational Hegemony', in Henk Overbeek (ed.), Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy (London: Routledge, 1993), pp.246-82.
156. Philip G. Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics (London: Sage, 1990); Stephen R. Gill, 'Neo-liberalism and the Shift Towards a US-centered Transnational Hegemony', in Henk Overbeek (ed.), Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy (London: Routledge, 1993), pp.246-82.
157. Remmer, 'External Pressures', p.289.
158. The concept of international society is most fully developed by the English School of international relations theory. For a recent elaboration, see the chapters in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds.), International Society after the Cold War (London: Macmillan, 1996).
159. Deudney and Ikenberry, op. cit.
160. Robert Jervis, 'A Usable Past for the Future', in Hogan (ed.), op. cit., pp.257-8.
161. Doyle; op. cit.; also James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era', International Organization, Vol.46, No.2 (1992), pp.467-91; and Jervis.
162. Doyle; op. cit.; also James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era', International Organization, Vol.46, No.2 (1992), pp.467-91; and Jervis.
163. Michael Desch, 'War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?', International Organization, Vol.50, No.2 (1996), pp.237-68.
164. Deudney and Ikenberry, op. cit. On the argument that Russia has now essentially joined this civilization, see Cynthia Freeland, 'From Empire to Nation-State', Financial Times (10 July 1997).
165. Deudney and Ikenberry, op. cit. On the argument that Russia has now essentially joined this civilization, see Cynthia Freeland, 'From Empire to Nation-State', Financial Times (10 July 1997).
166. Janne E. Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994).
167. On the argument that the advent of peace internationally or regionally allows a minimal state and is conducive to democracy, a reversal of the causal arrows in the 'democratic peace' theory, see Layne, op. cit., pp.326-7; and William R. Thompson, 'Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart before the Horse', International Organization, Vol.50, No.1 (1996), pp.141-74.
168. On the argument that the advent of peace internationally or regionally allows a minimal state and is conducive to democracy, a reversal of the causal arrows in the 'democratic peace' theory, see Layne, op. cit., pp.326-7; and William R. Thompson, 'Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart before the Horse', International Organization, Vol.50, No.1 (1996), pp.141-74.
169. Barnett, op. cit.
170. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.163-9; also Dunn and Fraser (eds.), op. cit.
171. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.163-9; also Dunn and Fraser (eds.), op. cit.
172. Alexander J. Motyl, 'The Modernity of Nationalism: Nations, States and Nation-States in the Contemporary World', Journal of International Affairs, Vol.45, No.2 (1992), pp.307-23.
173. On the tense but often constructive relationship between nationalism and democracy, see Ghia Nodia, 'Nationalism and Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol.3, No.4, (1992), pp.3-22; and Will Kymlicka, 'Modernity and Minority Nationalism', Ethics and International Affairs, Vol.11, (1997), pp.171-6.
174. On the tense but often constructive relationship between nationalism and democracy, see Ghia Nodia, 'Nationalism and Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol.3, No.4, (1992), pp.3-22; and Will Kymlicka, 'Modernity and Minority Nationalism', Ethics and International Affairs, Vol.11, (1997), pp.171-6.
175. Heater, op. cit., pp.209-10.
176. Breaking a ten-year hiatus of no such activity, 14 new UN peacekeeping operations to restore order and protect basic human rights were launched in 1988-92 alone.
177. Huntington highlights the Helsinki process after 1975 in raising human rights expectations in the Soviet bloc. See Huntington, The Third Wave, pp.89-91. The UN-sponsored International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were negotiated in the 1950s, but only opened to signature in 1966, and finally took legal effect for signatories in 1976. See David P. Forsythe, 'The UN and Human Rights at Fifty: An Incremental but Incomplete Revolution', Global Governance, Vol.1, No.3 (1995), p.298.
178. Huntington highlights the Helsinki process after 1975 in raising human rights expectations in the Soviet bloc. See Huntington, The Third Wave, pp.89-91. The UN-sponsored International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were negotiated in the 1950s, but only opened to signature in 1966, and finally took legal effect for signatories in 1976. See David P. Forsythe, 'The UN and Human Rights at Fifty: An Incremental but Incomplete Revolution', Global Governance, Vol.1, No.3 (1995), p.298.
179. Kathryn Sikkink, 'The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe', in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.155-6.
180. UN work in various human rights areas is nicely summarized in the annual volumes of A Global Agenda: Issues before the United Nations, produced under the auspices of the United Nations Association of the United States of America and published by University Press of America (Lanham, MD).
181. David J. Scheffer, 'International Judicial Intervention', Foreign Policy, No.102, (1996), pp.34-51.
182. Sovereignty is also of course being transformed by globalization and expanding regionalism - the European Union, Mercosur and the North American Free Trade Agreement are all post-cold war phenomena - and the development of supranational organizations such as the European Union.
183. Jackson, op. cit.; also Barnett, op. cit.
184. Jackson, op. cit.; also Barnett, op. cit.
185. Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, 'State Sovereignty and International Intervention: Reflections on the Present and Prospects for the Future', in Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp.252-6.
186. Barnett, 'The United Nations'.
187. Address at the University of Bordeaux. UN Press Release SG/GM/4560, 24 April 1991. Quotation from Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, 'Introduction: International Intervention, State Sovereignty, and the Future of International Society', in Lyons and Mastanduno (eds.), p.2.
188. Franck, op. cit., p.48.
189. On the positive contribution of political conditionality to democratization, see Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, 'The International Donor Community: Conditioned Aid and the Promotion and Defense of Democracy', in Tom Farer (ed.), pp.169-86. One examination of its weaknesses and problems of inconsistent application is Gordon Crawford, 'Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency', Democratization, Vol.4, No.3 (1997), pp.69-108. Also relevant is Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1996).
190. On the positive contribution of political conditionality to democratization, see Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, 'The International Donor Community: Conditioned Aid and the Promotion and Defense of Democracy', in Tom Farer (ed.), pp.169-86. One examination of its weaknesses and problems of inconsistent application is Gordon Crawford, 'Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency', Democratization, Vol.4, No.3 (1997), pp.69-108. Also relevant is Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1996).
191. On the positive contribution of political conditionality to democratization, see Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, 'The International Donor Community: Conditioned Aid and the Promotion and Defense of Democracy', in Tom Farer (ed.), pp.169-86. One examination of its weaknesses and problems of inconsistent application is Gordon Crawford, 'Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency', Democratization, Vol.4, No.3 (1997), pp.69-108. Also relevant is Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1996).
192. Franck, op. cit., pp.64-5.
193. For example, at its General Assembly in Paraguay in June 1990, the Organisation of American States (OAS) established a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) which has been active monitoring elections and building civil society in several countries. At its next meeting in June 1991 it adopted the Santiago Commitment to Democracy which explicitly stated that governments would henceforth be judged and held accountable, by an automatic meeting of the OAS Permanent Council to take place within ten days of an incident, for any 'sudden or irregular interruption' of constitutional, democratic governance.
194. Acevedo and Grossman describe the sea-change after the cold war thus: 'The combined impact of OAS legal developments and OAS actions concerning democracy stands in stark contrast to its prior practice, which was dominated by the principle of nonintervention. In the new situation, neither friends nor foes of democracy can ignore the regional dimension'. From Domingo Acevedo and Claudio Grossman, 'The Organization of American States and the Protection of Democracy', in Tom Farer (ed.), p.147. Also see Richard J. Bloomfield, 'Making the Western Hemisphere Safe for Democracy? The OAS Defense-of-Democracy Regime', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.17, No.2 (1994), pp.157-69.
195. Acevedo and Grossman describe the sea-change after the cold war thus: 'The combined impact of OAS legal developments and OAS actions concerning democracy stands in stark contrast to its prior practice, which was dominated by the principle of nonintervention. In the new situation, neither friends nor foes of democracy can ignore the regional dimension'. From Domingo Acevedo and Claudio Grossman, 'The Organization of American States and the Protection of Democracy', in Tom Farer (ed.), p.147. Also see Richard J. Bloomfield, 'Making the Western Hemisphere Safe for Democracy? The OAS Defense-of-Democracy Regime', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.17, No.2 (1994), pp.157-69.
196. Karl and Schmitter, 'Democratization', p.46.
197. See the articles on The Rise of Election Monitoring' in Journal of Democracy, Vol.8, No.3 (July 1997). The UN alone received requests for electoral assistance from 52 countries in the period from January 1992 to June 1994. See Jose Alvarez, 'Legal Issues', in John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson (eds.), A Global Agenda: Issues before the United Nations, 1995-96 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), p.262.
198. See the articles on The Rise of Election Monitoring' in Journal of Democracy, Vol.8, No.3 (July 1997). The UN alone received requests for electoral assistance from 52 countries in the period from January 1992 to June 1994. See Jose Alvarez, 'Legal Issues', in John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson (eds.), A Global Agenda: Issues before the United Nations, 1995-96 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), p.262.
199. Kevin F.F. Quigley, For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997).
200. Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy', Democratization, Vol.4, No.3 (1997), pp.128-30.
201. Franck, op. cit.
202. Diamond has suggested that NAFTA could have a similar effect in the Americas. Larry Diamond, 'Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation', in Farer (ed.), op. cit., p.103. Deepening economic integration raises other problems, of course. On the danger of the de-democratization of life inside the European Union, see Pierre Manent, 'Democracy Without Nations?', Journal of Democracy, Vol.8, No.2 (1997), pp.92-102.
203. Diamond has suggested that NAFTA could have a similar effect in the Americas. Larry Diamond, 'Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation', in Farer (ed.), op. cit., p.103. Deepening economic integration raises other problems, of course. On the danger of the de-democratization of life inside the European Union, see Pierre Manent, 'Democracy Without Nations?', Journal of Democracy, Vol.8, No.2 (1997), pp.92-102.
204. Giuseppe Di Palma, 'Why Democracy Can Work in Eastern Europe', Journal of Democracy, Vol.2, No.1 (1991).
205. Weiss, Forsythe and Coate (1994), op. cit.; James K. Oliver and Joann Kingsley, 'Multilateralism Abandoned? The US, the UN and Peace Operations after the Cold War'. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada, March 17, 1997.
206. Weiss, Forsythe and Coate (1994), op. cit.; James K. Oliver and Joann Kingsley, 'Multilateralism Abandoned? The US, the UN and Peace Operations after the Cold War'. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada, March 17, 1997.
207. Bhaskar Menon, 'Making and Keeping the Peace', in John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson (eds.), A Global Agenda: Issues before the United Nations, 1996-97 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996), pp.2-4.
208. See Robert Graham, 'France Pressed to Produce an Ethical Foreign Policy', Financial Times (21 Oct. 1997), p.3.
209. Most recently Fareed Zakaria, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.6 (1997), pp.22-43.
210. Backsliding also tends to take place in those geographic areas most shielded from the influences of the current moment; in areas of turmoil and collapsing-state conflict (the Caucasus, former Soviet Central Asia, Yugoslavia/the Balkans), or where the local hegemon is somewhat illiberal (France in Francophone Africa). France has supported a number of dubious democrats in its former colonies, as in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Togo, for example.
211. Karatnycky, op. cit., pp.12-13, also notes the regional pressures brought to bear upon Belarus and Nigeria.
212. Crawford, op. cit.
213. The case of Sierra Leone, where the elected government of Ahmed Kabbah was overthrown by a military junta led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma in May 1997, is a perfect example of this. Since the coup, the military government has been subject to unrelenting external pressures, including a near total trade blockade implemented by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), total suspension of foreign aid and numerous other sanctions imposed by developed countries, and an ECOWAS military intervention and aerial bombings by Nigeria in September and October. A UN-brokered agreement of 23 October 1997 set 22 April 1998 as the deadline for the restoration of Kabbah. When it became clear that Koroma would not cooperate, his junta was forcibly ousted by an ECOWAS military operation in mid-February, and President Kabbah was returned to power.
214. We need more of a comparative-historical understanding of the power of diplomatic pressures - for and against democracy. Yet, as Tony Smith has noted, this is something that is just beginning to be studied (mostly with regard to the US and Latin America).
215. On modernity as liberal, see Latham, op. cit.
216. These are raised by the democratic peace literature; also see Desch, op. cit.
217. On the relative dearth of writing on war's effect on politics, see Kasza, op. cit.
218. See Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992);
219. Charles Tilly, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Thed Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.169-91.
220. Democratization, Vol.6, No.2, Summer 1999, pp.42-69