Pluralism and the hobbesian logic of negative constitutionalism

Political Studies

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 83-99

  Ivison, Duncan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032667678     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00189     Document Type: Article

References (129)

1. 1 For a comprehensive survey of negative constitutionalism see Susan Bander, 'The negative constitution: a critique', Michigan Law Review 88 (1989), 2271-347; also Cass Sunstein, 'Democracy and Shifting Preferences', and John Ferejohn, 'Must Preferences be Respected in a Democracy?' in David Copp, Jean Hampton, John E. Roemer (eds), The Idea of Democracy, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 196-241.
2. 1 For a comprehensive survey of negative constitutionalism see Susan Bander, 'The negative constitution: a critique', Michigan Law Review 88 (1989), 2271-347; also Cass Sunstein, 'Democracy and Shifting Preferences', and John Ferejohn, 'Must Preferences be Respected in a Democracy?' in David Copp, Jean Hampton, John E. Roemer (eds), The Idea of Democracy, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 196-241.
3. 2 P. C. Ordershook, 'Some rules of constitutional design', Social Philisophy and Policy, 10 (1993) p. 202.
4. 3 R. Hardin, 'Why a constitution?', in Bernard Grofman and Donald Whittman (eds), The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York, Agathon, 1989); Ordershook, 'Some Rules of Constitutional Design', pp. 199-202.
5. 3 R. Hardin, 'Why a constitution?', in Bernard Grofman and Donald Whittman (eds), The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York, Agathon, 1989); Ordershook, 'Some Rules of Constitutional Design', pp. 199-202.
6. 4 U. Preuss, Constitutional Revolution: The Link Between Constitutionalism and Progress (New Jersey, Humanities, 1995) p. 18.
7. 5 R. Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution: the separation of powers, rights, and representative democracy', Political Studies 44 (1996) 436-56.
8. 6 R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995) 2-11.
9. 7 Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution', p. 437.
10. 8 For a general discussion see S. Holmes, Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995); Duncan Ivison, The Self at Liberty: Political Argument and the Arts of Government (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997).
11. 8 For a general discussion see S. Holmes, Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995); Duncan Ivison, The Self at Liberty: Political Argument and the Arts of Government (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997).
12. 9 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978) p. 55.
13. 10 Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution', p. 455.
14. 11 The argument for a presumption against intervention can be either foundational or practical, as Ferejohn argues. The former might be rooted in a conception of liberal neutrality towards individuals' preferences and conceptions of the good, whilst the latter might emphasize the risks of empowering fallible state officials and agencies to interfere in the private sphere. See 'Must Preferences be Respected in a Democracy?', p. 241.
15. 12 Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and democracy', p. 2.
16. 13 Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and democracy', pp. 5, 9; also Law's Empire (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 381-9.
17. 13 Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and democracy', pp. 5, 9; also Law's Empire (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 381-9.
18. 14 Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and democracy', pp. 5, 10.
19. 15 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1978) pp. 364-7.
20. 16 Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and democracy', pp. 10-11.
21. 17 Dworkin identifies a particular 'interpretive, reflective attitude' (a 'protestant attitude') that judges, lawyers and citizens should take on in this forum, which is 'responsible for imagining what . . . society's public commitments to principle are'. See Law's Empire, p. 413
22. 18 R. Hardin, One For All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) p. 179. There is also a strong emphasis on Smithian and Humean themes as much as Hobbesian ones; cf. 'Hobbesian political order', Political Theory, 19 (1991), p. 172
23. 18 R. Hardin, One For All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) p. 179. There is also a strong emphasis on Smithian and Humean themes as much as Hobbesian ones; cf. 'Hobbesian political order', Political Theory, 19 (1991), p. 172
24. 19 See C. Taylor, in Amy Gutman (ed.), Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992) pp. 25-73; J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995).
25. 19 See C. Taylor, in Amy Gutman (ed.), Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992) pp. 25-73; J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995).
26. 20 W. Kymlicka, 'Liberalism and the politicization of ethnicity', Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, IV (1991), p. 241; Hardin, One For All, p. 56.
27. 20 W. Kymlicka, 'Liberalism and the politicization of ethnicity', Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, IV (1991), p. 241; Hardin, One For All, p. 56.
28. 21 Kymlicka, 'Liberalism and the politicisation of identity', p. 56-7.
29. 22 R. Hardin 'The morality of law and economics', Law and Philosophy, 11 (1992), 331-84; J. Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 67-94, 133-50; G. Brennan and A. Hamlin, 'Economical constitutions', Political Studies, XLIV (1996), 605-19.
30. 22 R. Hardin 'The morality of law and economics', Law and Philosophy, 11 (1992), 331-84; J. Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 67-94, 133-50; G. Brennan and A. Hamlin, 'Economical constitutions', Political Studies, XLIV (1996), 605-19.
31. 22 R. Hardin 'The morality of law and economics', Law and Philosophy, 11 (1992), 331-84; J. Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 67-94, 133-50; G. Brennan and A. Hamlin, 'Economical constitutions', Political Studies, XLIV (1996), 605-19.
32. 23 Hardin, One for All, pp. 28-71, 223.
33. 24 Hardin, One for All, p. 140.
34. 25 Hardin, One for All, pp. 180, 216, 223; also 49-56; 74-82. People identify with groups not out of some primordial urge but because it is 'rational to do what produces a particular identification and, once one has that identification, it is commonly rational to further the interests determined by that identification', (p. 60; see the examples discussed at pp. 53-6) We gain knowledge and experience of the world in particular settings, and the benefits of familiarity and easy communication are substantial.
35. 26 Hardin, One for All, p. 141; and especially pp. 77, 89-91 on the 'epistemological comforts of home'.
36. 27 M. Oakeshott, 'The Rule of Law', in On History and Other Essays (New York, Barnes and Noble, 1983), pp. 157-64; J. Gray, 'Hobbes and the Modern State' and 'The Politics of Cultural Diversity', in Post-liberalism: Studies in Political Thought (New York, Routledge, 1993).
37. 27 M. Oakeshott, 'The Rule of Law', in On History and Other Essays (New York, Barnes and Noble, 1983), pp. 157-64; J. Gray, 'Hobbes and the Modern State' and 'The Politics of Cultural Diversity', in Post-liberalism: Studies in Political Thought (New York, Routledge, 1993).
38. 28 Gray, 'Hobbes and the Modern State', p. 4.
39. 29 Gray, 'Hobbes and the Modern State', p. 9.
40. 30 'Hobbes and the Modern State', p. 10.
41. 31 'Hobbes and the Modern State', pp. 13-4.
42. 32 Gray, 'The Politics of Cultural Diversity', p. 265, Cf. F. A. Hayek, The Political Order of a Free People (London, Routledge, 1979) p. 135.
43. 32 Gray, 'The Politics of Cultural Diversity', p. 265, Cf. F. A. Hayek, The Political Order of a Free People (London, Routledge, 1979) p. 135.
44. 33 Gray, 'The politics of cultural diversity', pp. 14, 265. This antagonism to group and collective rights, and legal pluralism generally, is present in other essays as well. See n.96 below.
45. 34 John Gray, Enlightenment's Wake; Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age (London, Routledge, 1995), p. 140.
46. 35 Gray, Enlightenment's Wake, pp. 136, 139.
47. 36 Gray, Enlightenment's Wake, p. 140.
48. 37 R. Tuck (ed.), Leviathan (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) ch. 26, p. 183. References to Leviathan henceforth shall be abbreviated to L, followed by chapter and page number.
49. 38 F. Toennies (ed.), The Elements of Law Natural and Politic (London, 1928), pt 1, ch. 14, para 11.
50. 39 L 17, 226.
51. 40 L 26, 314.
52. 41 Hobbes, Elements, 2.10.8.
53. 42 L 46, 700-1.
54. 43 Hobbes is extremely sensitive to the malleability of people's beliefs; see Elements, 2.10.8, and below.
55. 44 See L 26, 313; 29, 367.
56. 45 See L 18 passim. This includes the power to make laws, vet the teaching of doctrines, appoint officers, decide and apply punishments, raise taxes, and oversee economic policy; see L 24 passim; R. Tuck Philosophy and Government: 1572-1651 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 308-9.
57. 46 But not completely so. The laws of nature apply to the sovereign as well. The crucial difference is that this is between the sovereign and God, and not his subjects.
58. 47 T. Hobbes, Ferdinand Toennies (ed.), M. M. Goldsmith, 2nd ed., Behemoth or the Long Parliament, (London, Frank Cass, 1969) 144.
59. 48 L 21, 272; 27, 345-6; 11, 162; 29 passim.
60. 49 L 14, 199; 21, 268-9.
61. 50 L 14, 200; L 17, 223; L 18, 238; L 26, 315; L 26, 334; L 30, 388-9; L 42, 591.
62. 50 L 14, 200; L 17, 223; L 18, 238; L 26, 315; L 26, 334; L 30, 388-9; L 42, 591.
63. 50 L 14, 200; L 17, 223; L 18, 238; L 26, 315; L 26, 334; L 30, 388-9; L 42, 591.
64. 50 L 14, 200; L 17, 223; L 18, 238; L 26, 315; L 26, 334; L 30, 388-9; L 42, 591.
65. 50 L 14, 200; L 17, 223; L 18, 238; L 26, 315; L 26, 334; L 30, 388-9; L 42, 591.
66. 50 L 14, 200; L 17, 223; L 18, 238; L 26, 315; L 26, 334; L 30, 388-9; L 42, 591.
67. 50 L 14, 200; L 17, 223; L 18, 238; L 26, 315; L 26, 334; L 30, 388-9; L 42, 591.
68. 51 L 17, 227.
69. 52 L 30, 388.
70. 53 L 30, 389.
71. 54 L 30, 390-1.
72. 55 L 30, 388.
73. 56 L 21, 270.
74. 57 L 46, 701.
75. 58 L 19, 241-2. The 'temporal good' of the people is defined along reason of state lines in Elements, 2.9.3.
76. 58 L 19, 241-2. The 'temporal good' of the people is defined along reason of state lines in Elements, 2.9.3.
77. 59 Elements, p. 141.
78. 60 L 46, 701.
79. 61 L 21, 264; i.e. the liberty enjoyed in the state of nature - L 13, 184-5.
80. 61 L 21, 264; i.e. the liberty enjoyed in the state of nature - L 13, 184-5.
81. 62 L 21, 264.
82. 63 L 18, 236: L 42-3 passim; 1 47, 709-10. See also Behemoth, pp. 56-9. See N. Malcolm, 'Hobbes and Spinoza', in Jimmy Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 543-4.
83. 63 L 18, 236: L 42-3 passim; 1 47, 709-10. See also Behemoth, pp. 56-9. See N. Malcolm, 'Hobbes and Spinoza', in Jimmy Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 543-4.
84. 63 L 18, 236: L 42-3 passim; 1 47, 709-10. See also Behemoth, pp. 56-9. See N. Malcolm, 'Hobbes and Spinoza', in Jimmy Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 543-4.
85. 63 L 18, 236: L 42-3 passim; 1 47, 709-10. See also Behemoth, pp. 56-9. See N. Malcolm, 'Hobbes and Spinoza', in Jimmy Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 543-4.
86. 64 See Q. Skinner, 'Thomas Hobbes and the proper signification of liberty', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 40 (1990) 135; J. Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1980) pp. 44-8.
87. 64 See Q. Skinner, 'Thomas Hobbes and the proper signification of liberty', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 40 (1990) 135; J. Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1980) pp. 44-8.
88. 65 As even a 'neoclassical' subjective welfarist reading of Hobbes admits; see Ferejohn, 'Must preferences be respected in a democracy?', pp. 236-7.
89. 66 L 19, 131; also L, 29, 221-2.
90. 66 L 19, 131; also L, 29, 221-2.
91. 67 L 14, 99; L 17, 120-1; L 21, 147-8; L 27, 206-7; L 28, 215-16.
92. 67 L 14, 99; L 17, 120-1; L 21, 147-8; L 27, 206-7; L 28, 215-16.
93. 67 L 14, 99; L 17, 120-1; L 21, 147-8; L 27, 206-7; L 28, 215-16.
94. 67 L 14, 99; L 17, 120-1; L 21, 147-8; L 27, 206-7; L 28, 215-16.
95. 67 L 14, 99; L 17, 120-1; L 21, 147-8; L 27, 206-7; L 28, 215-16.
96. 68 L 47, 478.
97. 69 L 18, 125. Also, Behemoth p. 144.
98. 69 L 18, 125. Also, Behemoth p. 144.
99. 70 L 18, 125.
100. 71 L 16, 111.
101. 72 As in J. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 208-20.
102. 73 Cf. D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986).
103. 74 L 17, 120.
104. 75 L 19, 131; the 'understanding is by the flame of Passions, never enlightened but dazzled'.
105. 76 L 30, 232.
106. 77 See also Hobbes, Behemoth, p. 181.
107. 78 L 29, 221.
108. 79 Gray, ' The Politics of Cultural Diversity', p. 265 (emphasis added).
109. 80 L 26, 184-5; L 24, 172. See n. 95 below.
110. 80 L 26, 184-5; L 24, 172. See n. 95 below.
111. 81 Cf. Gray, 'Hobbes and the Modern State', p. 9.
112. 82 Gray, 'Hobbes and the Modern State' pp. 10-11.
113. 83 See L 30, 239. The sovereign also had the right to collect taxes without consent; see L 30, 238-9.
114. 83 See L 30, 239. The sovereign also had the right to collect taxes without consent; see L 30, 238-9.
115. 84 See L 30, 237.
116. 85 Pettit, 'Negative Liberty', p. 28.
117. 86 L 21, 152.
118. 87 Paradoxically, this can be understood as a defence of the freedom of conscience rather than a contradiction of it. Hobbes argues that 'There ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men, but of the World it selfe, working Faith in every one, not always according to the purpose of them that Plant and Water, but of God himself, that giveth the Increase . . . it is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such danger in every little Errour, to require of a man endued with Reason of his own, to follow the Reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men . . .' (L 47, p. 480). This reinforces the point made earlier about the need for Leviathan to police the teaching of doctrines. But as Brett points out, if Hobbesian subjects subject themselves to restraints on their natural liberty and act justly, then they possess virtue, and the rationale for an omniscient sovereign is gone. See Annabel Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature; Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 234.
119. 88 Public choice theorists remain, perhaps, the most sophisticated practitioners of the attempt to decouple government from the delivery of most public goods, in part to 'depoliticize' the process by substituting the distributive power of politicians with that of the market. See Geoffrey Brennan, 'The Contribution of Economics', in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Political Philosophy (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993), especially at pp. 147-54.
120. 89 Again, in his most recent writings, he has changed tack. Gray now castigates contemporary liberalism for 'hollowing out' the political realm, and supplanting politics with 'liberal legalism' (see Gray, Enlightenment's Wake; Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age (London, Routledge, 1995) pp. 6, 76-8).
121. 90 Hardin, One for All, p. 227-8.
122. 91 T. Hobbes, H. Warrender (ed.), De Cive, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1983), 136; L 25, 181-2. The anti-humanist context of this passage is crucial for understanding what Hobbes is doing here (and elsewhere). See Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, Cambridee University Press, 1996), pp. 285-93.
123. 91 T. Hobbes, H. Warrender (ed.), De Cive, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1983), 136; L 25, 181-2. The anti-humanist context of this passage is crucial for understanding what Hobbes is doing here (and elsewhere). See Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, Cambridee University Press, 1996), pp. 285-93.
124. 91 T. Hobbes, H. Warrender (ed.), De Cive, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1983), 136; L 25, 181-2. The anti-humanist context of this passage is crucial for understanding what Hobbes is doing here (and elsewhere). See Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, Cambridee University Press, 1996), pp. 285-93.
125. 92 See Behemoth, pp. 155, 144.
126. 93 Skinner, Reason and Rhetonic, ch. 9-10, and Conclusion.
127. 94 Democracy, if it is justifiable, is just 'a convenient device whose usefulness turns on its contribution to peace and the renewal of valuable forms of common life' (Gray, Enlightenment's Wake, p. 140).
128. 95 See Hobbes's views on civil and political associations or 'Bodies Politique' (discussed in L 22): 'In Bodies Politique, the power of the Representative is alwaies Limited: And that which prescribeth the Limites thereof, is the Power Soveraign' (L 22, 155-6). It follows that Oakeshott's claim that Hobbes's Leviathan is a societas rather than a universitas, where the former is characterized (in part) by the tolerance of associations which are 'eccentric' or 'indifferent to the pursuit of the purposes of the association' and which require no authorization, is also fatally undermined. Cf. On Human Conduct (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975) pp. 201-5.
129. 96 Enligthenment's Wake, p. 140. But compare an earlier essay by Gray, published in the same volume, wherein he argues that a 'stable modus vivendi' (the qualifier is significant) requires a 'common stock of norms and conventions' or even a common culture or nationality (pp. 29, 24). The kind of diversity that is 'incompatible with civil society in Britain is that which rejects the constitutive practices that give it its identity . . . [such as] the rule of law. Cultural traditions that repudiate these practices cannot be objects of toleration for liberal civil society in Britain or anywhere else (p. 25, emphasis added). Any attempt 'to give legal force' to different group views or practices is 'likely further to fragment us, and to evoke intolerance among us' (p. 21).