Economical constitutions

Political Studies

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 605-619

  Brennan, Geoffrey ^a   Hamlin, Alan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0041113813     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00603.x     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. We shall take for granted the general importance of the constitutional perspective in this chapter. We offer arguments in support of this view in G. Brennan and A. P. Hamlin 'Constitutional political economy: the political philosophy of Homo economicus?', Journal of Political Philosophy, 3, 3 (1995), 280-303. For related recent arguments which do not derive from an economic perspective see S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan (eds), A New Constitutionalism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993).
2. We shall take for granted the general importance of the constitutional perspective in this chapter. We offer arguments in support of this view in G. Brennan and A. P. Hamlin 'Constitutional political economy: the political philosophy of Homo economicus?', Journal of Political Philosophy, 3, 3 (1995), 280-303. For related recent arguments which do not derive from an economic perspective see S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan (eds), A New Constitutionalism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993).
3. Of course, an economical approach to constitutional design may involve an economic constitution, as in G. Brennan and J. M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980), but equally an economic constitution may derive from non-economical arguments.
4. For further details of the points to be made in the next few paragraphs see Brennan and Hamlin, 'Constitutional political economy' and references therein.
5. Conceptual agreement here is intended to reflect the idea that the contractarian criterion picks out those arrangements which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed and voluntary general agreement. See T. M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and utilitarianism' in A. K. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).
6. For a discussion of alternative forms of methodological individualism which identifies the mild form relevant here see A. P. Hamlin and P. Pettit 'The normative analysis of the state' in A. P. Hamlin and P. Pettit (eds), The Good Polity (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989).
7. See the discussions by Richard Bellamy and Stephen Elkin elsewhere in this collection.
8. For a survey of economical models of the election process see P. J. Coughlin, 'Majority rule and election models', Journal of Economic Surveys, 3 (1990), 157-88. For an example of the analysis of a political institution in a principal-agent framework see B. R. Weingast, 'The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal-agent perspective', Public Choice, 44 (1984), 147-92.
9. For a survey of economical models of the election process see P. J. Coughlin, 'Majority rule and election models', Journal of Economic Surveys, 3 (1990), 157-88. For an example of the analysis of a political institution in a principal-agent framework see B. R. Weingast, 'The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal-agent perspective', Public Choice, 44 (1984), 147-92.
10. G. Brennan and A. P. Hamlin, 'A revisionist view of the separation of powers', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6 (1994), 345-68.
11. For discussion of alternative visions of political process and their implications see G. Brennan and A. P. Hamlin, 'Rationalizing parliamentary process', Australian Journal of Political Science, 28 (1993), 443-57.
12. In Brennan and Hamlin, 'Constitutional political economy' and G. Brennan and A. P. Hamlin, 'Economizing on virtue', Constitutional Political Economy, 6 (1995), 35-56, we have provided the beginnings of an analysis of such screening mechanisms in the constitutional setting.
13. In Brennan and Hamlin, 'Constitutional political economy' and G. Brennan and A. P. Hamlin, 'Economizing on virtue', Constitutional Political Economy, 6 (1995), 35-56, we have provided the beginnings of an analysis of such screening mechanisms in the constitutional setting.
14. Brennan and Hamlin, 'Economizing on virtue', although the primary theme of that discussion concerns the possible feedback effects from institutional design to individual motivation - the possibility that institutions may undermine virtue.
15. F. A. von Hayek, 'The use of knowledge in society', American Economic Review, 35 (1945), 519-30.
16. K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New Haven, Yale University Press, rev. ed., 1963); A. K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco, Holden-Day, 1970). For a collection of major contributions to the social choice literature see, C. K. Rowley (ed.), Social Choice Theory, 3 Vols (Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1993).
17. K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New Haven, Yale University Press, rev. ed., 1963); A. K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco, Holden-Day, 1970). For a collection of major contributions to the social choice literature see, C. K. Rowley (ed.), Social Choice Theory, 3 Vols (Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1993).
18. K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New Haven, Yale University Press, rev. ed., 1963); A. K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco, Holden-Day, 1970). For a collection of major contributions to the social choice literature see, C. K. Rowley (ed.), Social Choice Theory, 3 Vols (Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1993).