The politics of Central Bank independence in Russia

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 50, Issue 7, 1998, Pages 1157-1182

  Tompson, William ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Banking; Financial system; Geopolitics; Independence; Russian Federation

Indexed keywords

BANKING; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; GEOPOLITICS; INDEPENDENCE;

RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 0032461798     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139808412589     Document Type: Article

References (230)

1. John B. Goodman, 'The Politics of Central Bank Independence', Comparative Politics, 23, 3, April 1991, pp. 329-330.
2. References to this literature are provided in the section on the political determinants of central bank independence (CBI); see notes 16-25 below.
3. For two exceptions to this rule, see Maxwell J. Fry, Central Bank Relations with their Governments in Some Developing Countries, IFGWP-95-10 (International Finance Group, University of Birmingham, October 1995); and Maxwell J. Fry Assessing Central Banking Independence: Do Actions Speak Louder than Words?, IFGWP-96-01 (International Finance Group, University of Birmingham, January 1996).
4. For two exceptions to this rule, see Maxwell J. Fry, Central Bank Relations with their Governments in Some Developing Countries, IFGWP-95-10 (International Finance Group, University of Birmingham, October 1995); and Maxwell J. Fry Assessing Central Banking Independence: Do Actions Speak Louder than Words?, IFGWP-96-01 (International Finance Group, University of Birmingham, January 1996).
5. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile - views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
6. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile - views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
7. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile - views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
8. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile - views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
9. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile - views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
10. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile - views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
11. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile - views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
12. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile - views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
13. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile -views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
14. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile - views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
15. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile - views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
16. For an excellent recent overview of the debate concerning the desirability of CBI, see Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (Princeton, Special Papers in Economics No. 19, May 1996). The main theoretical rationales underlying advocacy of CBI may be found in, inter alia, Finn Kydland & Edward Prescott, 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economics, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; James Buchanan & Richard M. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit (New York, Academic Press, 1977), esp. at pp. 117-118; Guillermo Calvo, 'On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy', Econometrica, 46, 1978, pp. 1411-1428; Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5, 1981, pp. 1-17; Robert J. Barro & David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp. 101-121; S. D. Allen, 'The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18, 1986, pp. 57-98; and Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8, April 1989, pp. 55-98. For more sceptical - though not necessarily hostile - views of the value of CBI, sec, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1985, pp. 1169-1180; A. Blake & P. Westaway, 'Should the Bank of England Be Independent?', National Institute Economic Review, February 1993, pp. 72-80; and Guy Debelle, Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch? (Washington, IMF Working Paper WP/96/1, January 1996). For a recent attempt to address criticisms of CBI, see Nigel Healcy et al., The Political Economy of Independent Central Banking (University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in European Economic Studies 94/1, April 1994).
17. Eijffinger & De Haan, pp. 54-55; Adam Posen, 'Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There is No Institutional Fix for Polities', in Richard O'Brien (ed.), Finance and the International Economy, volume 7 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993). See also Alex Cukierman et al., 'Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes', World Bank Economic Review, 6, 3, 1992, p. 382; and J. B. de Long & Lawrence Summers, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Long-run Growth', Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 4th quarter 1992. Bowles and White do note that scholarly proponents of CBI are less likely to take the case as proved than policy makers and financial journalists. Paul Bowles & Gordon White, 'Central Bank Independence: A Political Economy Approach', Journal of Development Studies, 31, 2, December 1994, pp. 238-239.
18. Eijffinger & De Haan, pp. 54-55; Adam Posen, 'Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There is No Institutional Fix for Polities', in Richard O'Brien (ed.), Finance and the International Economy, volume 7 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993). See also Alex Cukierman et al., 'Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes', World Bank Economic Review, 6, 3, 1992, p. 382; and J. B. de Long & Lawrence Summers, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Long-run Growth', Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 4th quarter 1992. Bowles and White do note that scholarly proponents of CBI are less likely to take the case as proved than policy makers and financial journalists. Paul Bowles & Gordon White, 'Central Bank Independence: A Political Economy Approach', Journal of Development Studies, 31, 2, December 1994, pp. 238-239.
19. Eijffinger & De Haan, pp. 54-55; Adam Posen, 'Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There is No Institutional Fix for Polities', in Richard O'Brien (ed.), Finance and the International Economy, volume 7 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993). See also Alex Cukierman et al., 'Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes', World Bank Economic Review, 6, 3, 1992, p. 382; and J. B. de Long & Lawrence Summers, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Long-run Growth', Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 4th quarter 1992. Bowles and White do note that scholarly proponents of CBI are less likely to take the case as proved than policy makers and financial journalists. Paul Bowles & Gordon White, 'Central Bank Independence: A Political Economy Approach', Journal of Development Studies, 31, 2, December 1994, pp. 238-239.
20. Eijffinger & De Haan, pp. 54-55; Adam Posen, 'Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There is No Institutional Fix for Polities', in Richard O'Brien (ed.), Finance and the International Economy, volume 7 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993). See also Alex Cukierman et al., 'Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes', World Bank Economic Review, 6, 3, 1992, p. 382; and J. B. de Long & Lawrence Summers, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Long-run Growth', Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 4th quarter 1992. Bowles and White do note that scholarly proponents of CBI are less likely to take the case as proved than policy makers and financial journalists. Paul Bowles & Gordon White, 'Central Bank Independence: A Political Economy Approach', Journal of Development Studies, 31, 2, December 1994, pp. 238-239.
21. Eijffinger & De Haan, pp. 54-55; Adam Posen, 'Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There is No Institutional Fix for Polities', in Richard O'Brien (ed.), Finance and the International Economy, volume 7 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993). See also Alex Cukierman et al., 'Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes', World Bank Economic Review, 6, 3, 1992, p. 382; and J. B. de Long & Lawrence Summers, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Long-run Growth', Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 4th quarter 1992. Bowles and White do note that scholarly proponents of CBI are less likely to take the case as proved than policy makers and financial journalists. Paul Bowles & Gordon White, 'Central Bank Independence: A Political Economy Approach', Journal of Development Studies, 31, 2, December 1994, pp. 238-239.
22. See Goodman, pp. 329-330; and Donate Masciandro, 'Designing a Central Bank: Social Player, Monetary Agent or Banking Agent', Open Economies Review, 6, 4, October 1995, pp. 401-403.
23. See Goodman, pp. 329-330; and Donate Masciandro, 'Designing a Central Bank: Social Player, Monetary Agent or Banking Agent', Open Economies Review, 6, 4, October 1995, pp. 401-403.
24. These are the categories employed by Rolf H. Hasse, The European Central Bank: Perspectives for the Further Development of the European Monetary System (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Foundation, 1990).
25. Eijffinger & De Haan, pp. 2-3, 22-24; and Goodman, pp. 330-331.
26. I. Kryuchkova, 'Nezavisimost' tsentral'nykh bankov: opyt razvitykh stran', Voprosy ekonomiki, 1995, 11, p. 123.
27. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 'How Independent Should a Central Bank Be?', in Jeffrey C. Fuhrer (ed.), Goals, Guidelines and Constraints Facing Policymakers: Proceedings of a Conference Held in Falmouth, Massachusetts (Boston, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1994), p. 197. A currency board would be an example of a bank lacking instrumental freedom, while a bank working to a statutory inflation target may have freedom with respect to instruments but not goals.
28. Eijffinger & De Haan, p. 2; Masciandro, p. 404.
29. Jon Elster, 'Constitutional Courts and Central Banks: Suicide Prevention or Suicide Pact?', East European Constitutional Review, 3, 3-4, Summer-Fall 1994, p. 69.
30. John T. Woolley, Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 13.
31. Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1992), pp. 393-394.
32. Bowles & White, p. 240. They view autonomy as a scalar concept, while defining independence as full autonomy such as that enjoyed by the Bundesbank.
33. Douglass C. North & Barry Weingast, 'Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England', Journal of Economic History, 49, 4, December 1989, pp. 803-832.
34. Goodman, p. 330.
35. The argument here is about government credibility, which depends on more than the scale of anticipated borrowing. Attempts to show that CBI increases with governments' borrowing needs have found no significant relationship. Eijffnger & De Haan, p. 44; Alex Cukierman, 'Commitment, Delegation, Political Influence and Central Bank Independence', in J. Onno De Beaufort Wijnholds et al. (eds), A Framework for Monetary Stability (London, Kluwer, 1994), pp. 55-74. Nor is the existing stock of government debt (which Fry finds to be negatively correlated with CBI) at issue: governments which are already in debt have an incentive to subordinate the monetary authority to the fiscal authority, but this is not necessarily the case with those intending to go into debt. Tests of other economic variables, such as unemployment (using estimates of NAIRU), have shown nothing (Eijffinger & De Haan, pp. 43-44).
36. King Banaian, Leroy O. Laney & Thomas D Willett, 'Central Bank Independence: An International Comparison', in Eugenia Toma & Mark Toma (eds), Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives and Monetary Policy (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), p. 203.
37. Goodman, p. 331.
38. See Kryuchkova, pp. 127-128.
39. Goodman, p. 333.
40. Eijffinger & De Haan, pp. 44-45.
41. Cukierman, 'Commitment, Delegation', p. 65; see also Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, pp. 445-448.
42. Cukierman, 'Commitment, Delegation', p. 65; see also Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, pp. 445-448.
43. Many of these same considerations apply equally in other transforming economies.
44. Goodman, pp. 333-334;
45. Goodman, pp. 333-334; Dwight Semler, 'Focus: The Politics of Central Banking: Introduction', East European Constitutional Review, 3, 3-4, Summer-Fall 1994, p. 50; John T. Woolley, 'Central Banks and Inflation', in Leon N. Lindberg & Charles S. Maier (eds), The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 338; and Gerald A. Epstein & Juliet B. Schor, 'Macroeconomic Policy in the Rise and Fall of the Golden Age', in Stephen Marglin & Juliet B. Schor (eds), The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 128.
46. Goodman, pp. 333-334; Dwight Semler, 'Focus: The Politics of Central Banking: Introduction', East European Constitutional Review, 3, 3-4, Summer-Fall 1994, p. 50; John T. Woolley, 'Central Banks and Inflation', in Leon N. Lindberg & Charles S. Maier (eds), The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 338; and Gerald A. Epstein & Juliet B. Schor, 'Macroeconomic Policy in the Rise and Fall of the Golden Age', in Stephen Marglin & Juliet B. Schor (eds), The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 128.
47. Goodman, pp. 333-334; Dwight Semler, 'Focus: The Politics of Central Banking: Introduction', East European Constitutional Review, 3, 3-4, Summer-Fall 1994, p. 50; John T. Woolley, 'Central Banks and Inflation', in Leon N. Lindberg & Charles S. Maier (eds), The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 338; and Gerald A. Epstein & Juliet B. Schor, 'Macroeconomic Policy in the Rise and Fall of the Golden Age', in Stephen Marglin & Juliet B. Schor (eds), The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 128.
48. Bowles & White, pp. 246-247, raise concerns about the danger of 'regulatory capture' of the central bank by the financial sector. Posen (pp. 47-49) goes so far as to see the emergence of an independent central bank as the result of conflict between the financial sector and the government. There is little or no evidence to support the related hypothesis that central bank independence is favoured where the central bank is also charged with the supervision of financial institutions; see Charles A. E. Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, 'Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Authorities', paper presented at the Conference on Prudential Regulation, Supervision and Monetary Policy, Bocconi University, Milan, 1993, cited in Eiffingeer & De Haan, p. 46.
49. Posen, pp. 47-54.
50. William Tompson, 'Old Habits Die Hard: Fiscal Imperatives, State Regulation and the Role of Russia's Banks', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 7, November 1997, pp. 1174-1176; Joel Hellman, 'Russia Adjusts to Stability', Transition, 17 May 1996, pp. 6-10.
51. William Tompson, 'Old Habits Die Hard: Fiscal Imperatives, State Regulation and the Role of Russia's Banks', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 7, November 1997, pp. 1174-1176; Joel Hellman, 'Russia Adjusts to Stability', Transition, 17 May 1996, pp. 6-10.
52. Goodman, pp. 333-334.
53. Goodman, pp. 333, 339-340.
54. Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, pp. 448-449.
55. Eijffinger & De Haan, p. 50.
56. Bowles & White, pp. 248-249.
57. Semler, pp. 50-51.
58. In case the reader is confused by the constitutional references, it should be noted that the clauses of some articles are designated by numbers and those of others by letters.
59. B. Topornin et al. (eds), Konstitutsiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Kommentarii (Moscow, 1994), p. 378.
60. RIA-Novosti, 12 June 1997; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; Segodnya, 3 July 1997; Pravda-5, 4 July 1997.
61. RIA-Novosti, 12 June 1997; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; Segodnya, 3 July 1997; Pravda-5, 4 July 1997.
62. RIA-Novosti, 12 June 1997; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; Segodnya, 3 July 1997; Pravda-5, 4 July 1997.
63. Izvestiya, 16 November 1996; Finansovye izvestiya, 12 December 1996.
64. Izvestiya, 16 November 1996; Finansovye izvestiya, 12 December 1996.
65. Izvestiya, 16 November 1996.
66. The text of the law may be found in Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 18, 1 May 1995, st. 1593.
67. Fierce political battles were fought over the selection of an auditor in 1997, triggering calls to reform the procedures for making the choice. See Segodnya, 12 September 1997; and Finansovye izvestiya, 28 October 1997 and 25 November 1997.
68. Fierce political battles were fought over the selection of an auditor in 1997, triggering calls to reform the procedures for making the choice. See Segodnya, 12 September 1997; and Finansovye izvestiya, 28 October 1997 and 25 November 1997.
69. RIA-Novosti, 9 June 1997; Segodnya, 17 June 1997; Alena Galan, 'Duma stiraet litso rossiiskogo rublya', Kommersant", 23, 1 July 1997, pp. 42-43; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', Kommersant", 31, 2 September 1997, pp. 41-46. On the February 1997 law see Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 9, 3 March 1997, st. 1028; and Kommersant" -Daily, 21 February 1997.
70. RIA-Novosti, 9 June 1997; Segodnya, 17 June 1997; Alena Galan, 'Duma stiraet litso rossiiskogo rublya', Kommersant", 23, 1 July 1997, pp. 42-43; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', Kommersant", 31, 2 September 1997, pp. 41-46. On the February 1997 law see Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 9, 3 March 1997, st. 1028; and Kommersant" -Daily, 21 February 1997.
71. RIA-Novosti, 9 June 1997; Segodnya, 17 June 1997; Alena Galan, 'Duma stiraet litso rossiiskogo rublya', Kommersant", 23, 1 July 1997, pp. 42-43; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', Kommersant", 31, 2 September 1997, pp. 41-46. On the February 1997 law see Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 9, 3 March 1997, st. 1028; and Kommersant" -Daily, 21 February 1997.
72. RIA-Novosti, 9 June 1997; Segodnya, 17 June 1997; Alena Galan, 'Duma stiraet litso rossiiskogo rublya', Kommersant", 23, 1 July 1997, pp. 42-43; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', Kommersant", 31, 2 September 1997, pp. 41-46. On the February 1997 law see Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 9, 3 March 1997, st. 1028; and Kommersant" -Daily, 21 February 1997.
73. RIA-Novosti, 9 June 1997; Segodnya, 17 June 1997; Alena Galan, 'Duma stiraet litso rossiiskogo rublya', Kommersant", 23, 1 July 1997, pp. 42-43; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', Kommersant", 31, 2 September 1997, pp. 41-46. On the February 1997 law see Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 9, 3 March 1997, st. 1028; and Kommersant" -Daily, 21 February 1997.
74. Interview with Boris Fedorov, 26 November 1997. The bank also faces a conflict of interest in being both the banking sector's regulator and the effective owner of the two largest commercial banks. On the implications of this state of affairs, see William Tompson, 'Russia's Ministry of Cash: Sberbank in Transition', Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, 10, 2, June 1998, pp. 129-151.
75. A finance ministry official claimed to the author that his ministry was at times reliant on the IMF for data on monetary aggregates, because the TsBR refused to provide them. However, a former IMF official active in Russia at the time stated that he did not know of any such episodes and indicated that, while there were real tensions between the bank and the ministry, any problems with the ministry's access to monetary data were exceptional rather than routine and probably owed more to bureaucratic inefficiency than ill will.
76. Kryuchkova, p. 123.
77. The discussion of policy formation which follows is based on the conversations with Khandruev, Smenkovsky, Stepanov and Afanas'ev referred to above.
78. The poslanie is provided for by the constitution (article 84.c).
79. Higher than expected inflation increased nominal revenue, but expenditure can be held to nominal levels, thus making for real cuts in spending. This was particularly important in the original draft of the 1998 budget, since the low inflation target provided a cushion which would make budget fulfilment possible even if the projected 2% real GDP growth failed to materialise.
80. Boris G. Fedorov, 'Kreditno-denezhnaya politika i funktsii Tsentral'nogo banka Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Konstitutsionnoe pravo: Vostochnoevropeiskoe obozrenie, 3, 3-4, Summer-Fall 1994, p. 36. The same article appeared in English in the East European Constitutional Review, 3, 3-4, Summer-Fall 1994
81. Boris G. Fedorov, 'Kreditno-denezhnaya politika i funktsii Tsentral'nogo banka Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Konstitutsionnoe pravo: Vostochnoevropeiskoe obozrenie, 3, 3-4, Summer-Fall 1994, p. 36. The same article appeared in English in the East European Constitutional Review, 3, 3-4, Summer-Fall 1994
82. Posen, p. 40.
83. These include Chairman Sergei Dubinin, First Deputy Chairman Sergei Aleksashenko, Deputy Chairman Denis Kiselev and others. With respect to Dubinin's 'reformist credentials', it is important to recall that Dubinin, now often seen as 'Chernomyrdin's man', initially came to prominence in the finance ministry under Fedorov and was seen as a Fedorov protégé. In any case, the TsBR chief is now best viewed as an independent figure.
84. This is also Starostenkova's view.
85. According to Afanas'ev, the finance ministry was chiefly occupied with monetary policy, which one would expect to be the central bank's responsibility; the economics ministry was concerned with financing the state budget - in principle, the finance ministry's major task; and the TsBR strove to support industry, the job of the economics ministry. Fedorov, 'Kreditno-denezhnaya politika', p. 41, has also observed that the finance ministry looked more like an independent central bank in 1992-93 than the TsBR, which resembled an officially registered industrial or agrarian lobby. The same point is made by Brigitte Granvillc, The Success of Russian Economic Reforms (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 29.
86. According to Afanas'ev, the finance ministry was chiefly occupied with monetary policy, which one would expect to be the central bank's responsibility; the economics ministry was concerned with financing the state budget - in principle, the finance ministry's major task; and the TsBR strove to support industry, the job of the economics ministry. Fedorov, 'Kreditno-denezhnaya politika', p. 41, has also observed that the finance ministry looked more like an independent central bank in 1992-93 than the TsBR, which resembled an officially registered industrial or agrarian lobby. The same point is made by Brigitte Granvillc, The Success of Russian Economic Reforms (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 29.
87. Fedorov gave prominence to IMF assistance in his interview: see also Boris G. Fyodorov & Andrei Kazmin, '1993: The First Experience of the Russian Financial and Monetary Stabilisation Policy', in Anders Åslund (ed.), Economic Transformation in Russia (London, Pinter, 1994), p. 27.
88. Rumours to this effect were reported at the time; Segodnya, 30 October 1993.
89. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 September 1993. The memory of this episode may explain in part the TsBR's determination to maintain its own security service (okhrana) in the face of pressure from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to abolish the bank's okhrana and rely on the militia; Russkii telegraf, 28 March 1998.
90. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 September 1993. The memory of this episode may explain in part the TsBR's determination to maintain its own security service (okhrana) in the face of pressure from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to abolish the bank's okhrana and rely on the militia; Russkii telegraf, 28 March 1998.
91. The TsBR officials interviewed all expressed opposition to any subordination of the bank to MinFin. This was also the position of leading TsBR officials early in the transition; Izvestiya, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993.
92. Finansovye izvestiya, 12 December 1996.
93. Georgii Matyukhin in 1992, Viktor Gerashchenko in 1994 and Tat'yana Paramonova in 1995; mid-1997 also witnessed much speculation about the possible removal of Sergei Dubinin.
94. See articles 83.a, 83.b and 103.a (on the prime minister), and articles 83.g and 103.v (on the central bank chairman). El'tsin complied with this procedure after the October 1994 ruble crisis, when he asked the Duma to remove Gerashchenko (Izvestiya, 13 October 1994 and 15 October 1994); in the end, Gerashchenko resigned and the request was withdrawn.
95. Topornin et al., p. 459.
96. Kommersant" -Daily, 21 February 1997.
97. Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997. The bill in question was passed by the SF in April 1998 and is at the time of writing (June 1998) in the State Duma. It is discussed at greater length below.
98. The chairman may also leave office early on grounds of medical incapacity, personal request or a criminal conviction.
99. Segodnya, 17 May 1994.
100. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 May 1994.
101. Kommersant" -Daily, 28 January 1995.
102. Conversations with Afanas'ev and Starostenkova.
103. Fry, Central Bank Relations, p. 22.
104. Segodnya, 20 August 1997 and 12 September 1997; Trud, 28 October 1997.
105. Segodnya, 20 August 1997 and 12 September 1997; Trud, 28 October 1997.
106. Russkii telegraf, 17 October 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 17 October 1997.
107. Russkii telegraf, 17 October 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 17 October 1997.
108. Segodnya, 21 October 1997.
109. Segodnya, 6 September 1995. The statute on the NBS was only approved in April 1997, roughly two years after the law on the central bank came into force (and two- and-a-half years after an earlier presidential decree ordering its formation - see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 October 1994); it appears that the first NBS meeting took place on 24 April 1997. For information on the composition of the NBS and its activities, see the TsBR's web site (http://www.cbr.ru). Russkii telegraf, 17 October 1997.
110. Segodnya, 6 September 1995. The statute on the NBS was only approved in April 1997, roughly two years after the law on the central bank came into force (and two- and-a-half years after an earlier presidential decree ordering its formation - see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 October 1994); it appears that the first NBS meeting took place on 24 April 1997. For information on the composition of the NBS and its activities, see the TsBR's web site (http://www.cbr.ru). Russkii telegraf, 17 October 1997.
111. Segodnya, 6 September 1995. The statute on the NBS was only approved in April 1997, roughly two years after the law on the central bank came into force (and two- and-a-half years after an earlier presidential decree ordering its formation - see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 October 1994); it appears that the first NBS meeting took place on 24 April 1997. For information on the composition of the NBS and its activities, see the TsBR's web site (http://www.cbr.ru). Russkii telegraf, 17 October 1997.
112. Conversation with Afanas'ev.
113. See, for example, proposals in the State Duma for massive monetary emissions based on the view that the M2:GDP ratio is too low, as well as bankers' proposals for softer money (often based on similar assertions about the M2 : GDP ratio) and for lowering the reserve requirements of banks which lend to industry rather than the government-even though such activities increase the risks that mandatory reserves are meant to insure against. Izvestiya, 21 March 1992; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 9 April 1992; Segodnya, 2 June 1997.
114. See, for example, proposals in the State Duma for massive monetary emissions based on the view that the M2:GDP ratio is too low, as well as bankers' proposals for softer money (often based on similar assertions about the M2 : GDP ratio) and for lowering the reserve requirements of banks which lend to industry rather than the government-even though such activities increase the risks that mandatory reserves are meant to insure against. Izvestiya, 21 March 1992; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 9 April 1992; Segodnya, 2 June 1997.
115. See, for example, proposals in the State Duma for massive monetary emissions based on the view that the M2:GDP ratio is too low, as well as bankers' proposals for softer money (often based on similar assertions about the M2 : GDP ratio) and for lowering the reserve requirements of banks which lend to industry rather than the government-even though such activities increase the risks that mandatory reserves are meant to insure against. Izvestiya, 21 March 1992; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 9 April 1992; Segodnya, 2 June 1997.
116. For the text of the 1990 law, see Vedomosti S"ezda narodnykh deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo soveta RSFSR, 27, 6 December 1990, st. 355. Personnel issues are covered by article 37.
117. Tsentral'nyi bank Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Tekushchie tendentsii v denezhno-kreditnoi sfere, 8(54), 1997, p. 19.
118. This issue first erupted in the spring of 1995, when the TsBR resisted pressure to transfer its shares to the State Property Committee; for an extended discussion of the battles over the state banks, see Tompson, 'Russia's Ministry of Cash'.
119. Izvestiya, 11 March 1998. See also 'Banki nevidimogo fronta', Kommersant", 35, 30 September 1997, pp. 41-42; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 September 1997, 25 September 1997 and 31 October 1997; Delovoi mir, 25 September 1997 and 8 October 1997; RIA-Novosti, 30 October 1997; Finansovye izvestiya, 4 November 1997; Russkii telegraf, 26 December 1997.
120. Izvestiya, 11 March 1998. See also 'Banki nevidimogo fronta', Kommersant", 35, 30 September 1997, pp. 41-42; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 September 1997, 25 September 1997 and 31 October 1997; Delovoi mir, 25 September 1997 and 8 October 1997; RIA-Novosti, 30 October 1997; Finansovye izvestiya, 4 November 1997; Russkii telegraf, 26 December 1997.
121. Izvestiya, 11 March 1998. See also 'Banki nevidimogo fronta', Kommersant", 35, 30 September 1997, pp. 41-42; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 September 1997, 25 September 1997 and 31 October 1997; Delovoi mir, 25 September 1997 and 8 October 1997; RIA-Novosti, 30 October 1997; Finansovye izvestiya, 4 November 1997; Russkii telegraf, 26 December 1997.
122. Izvestiya, 11 March 1998. See also 'Banki nevidimogo fronta', Kommersant", 35, 30 September 1997, pp. 41-42; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 September 1997, 25 September 1997 and 31 October 1997; Delovoi mir, 25 September 1997 and 8 October 1997; RIA-Novosti, 30 October 1997; Finansovye izvestiya, 4 November 1997; Russkii telegraf, 26 December 1997.
123. Izvestiya, 11 March 1998. See also 'Banki nevidimogo fronta', Kommersant", 35, 30 September 1997, pp. 41-42; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 September 1997, 25 September 1997 and 31 October 1997; Delovoi mir, 25 September 1997 and 8 October 1997; RIA-Novosti, 30 October 1997; Finansovye izvestiya, 4 November 1997; Russkii telegraf, 26 December 1997.
124. Izvestiya, 11 March 1998. See also 'Banki nevidimogo fronta', Kommersant", 35, 30 September 1997, pp. 41-42; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 September 1997, 25 September 1997 and 31 October 1997; Delovoi mir, 25 September 1997 and 8 October 1997; RIA-Novosti, 30 October 1997; Finansovye izvestiya, 4 November 1997; Russkii telegraf, 26 December 1997.
125. Argumenty i fakty, 29 October 1997; Ekspert, 17 November 1997.
126. Argumenty i fakty, 29 October 1997; Ekspert, 17 November 1997.
127. Segodnya, 24 April 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 1 May 1998; Russkii telegraf, 21 May 1998. Ironically, the TsBR-controlled VTB is widely reckoned to be the most likely purchaser of the Donaubank shares.
128. Segodnya, 24 April 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 1 May 1998; Russkii telegraf, 21 May 1998. Ironically, the TsBR-controlled VTB is widely reckoned to be the most likely purchaser of the Donaubank shares.
129. Segodnya, 24 April 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 1 May 1998; Russkii telegraf, 21 May 1998. Ironically, the TsBR-controlled VTB is widely reckoned to be the most likely purchaser of the Donaubank shares.
130. See, for example, Segodnya, 3 October 1995, and the complaints cited in Galan, pp. 42-43.
131. Criticism of the bank's secrecy has been common since 1992; for examples, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 May 1992; Izvestiya, 15 May 1992, 19 May 1992, and 4 December 1997; Segodnya, 6 July 1993, 9 October 1993, 12 October 1993, 20 July 1995, 3 October 1995 and 21 October 1997; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', Kommersant", 31, 2 September 1997, p. 46; and 'Kassovaya bor'ba', p. 45.
132. Criticism of the bank's secrecy has been common since 1992; for examples, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 May 1992; Izvestiya, 15 May 1992, 19 May 1992, and 4 December 1997; Segodnya, 6 July 1993, 9 October 1993, 12 October 1993, 20 July 1995, 3 October 1995 and 21 October 1997; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', Kommersant", 31, 2 September 1997, p. 46; and 'Kassovaya bor'ba', p. 45.
133. Criticism of the bank's secrecy has been common since 1992; for examples, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 May 1992; Izvestiya, 15 May 1992, 19 May 1992, and 4 December 1997; Segodnya, 6 July 1993, 9 October 1993, 12 October 1993, 20 July 1995, 3 October 1995 and 21 October 1997; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', Kommersant", 31, 2 September 1997, p. 46; and 'Kassovaya bor'ba', p. 45.
134. Criticism of the bank's secrecy has been common since 1992; for examples, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 May 1992; Izvestiya, 15 May 1992, 19 May 1992, and 4 December 1997; Segodnya, 6 July 1993, 9 October 1993, 12 October 1993, 20 July 1995, 3 October 1995 and 21 October 1997; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', Kommersant", 31, 2 September 1997, p. 46; and 'Kassovaya bor'ba', p. 45.
135. Criticism of the bank's secrecy has been common since 1992; for examples, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 May 1992; Izvestiya, 15 May 1992, 19 May 1992, and 4 December 1997; Segodnya, 6 July 1993, 9 October 1993, 12 October 1993, 20 July 1995, 3 October 1995 and 21 October 1997; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', Kommersant", 31, 2 September 1997, p. 46; and 'Kassovaya bor'ba', p. 45.
136. Kommersant" -Daily, 21 February 1997.
137. Segodnya, 12 September 1997.
138. Kommersant" -Daily, 22 April 1998; Ekho Moskvy, 23 April 1998.
139. Kommersant" -Daily, 22 April 1998; Ekho Moskvy, 23 April 1998.
140. Vladimir Stupin, 'Traditsionnye blyuda dumskoi kukhni', Kommersant", 44, 2 December 1997, p. 66; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', pp. 44-46; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', p. 46; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; Segodnya, 7 June 1996, 11 June 1996 and 17 June 1996.
141. Vladimir Stupin, 'Traditsionnye blyuda dumskoi kukhni', Kommersant", 44, 2 December 1997, p. 66; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', pp. 44-46; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', p. 46; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; Segodnya, 7 June 1996, 11 June 1996 and 17 June 1996.
142. Vladimir Stupin, 'Traditsionnye blyuda dumskoi kukhni', Kommersant", 44, 2 December 1997, p. 66; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', pp. 44-46; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', p. 46; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; Segodnya, 7 June 1996, 11 June 1996 and 17 June 1996.
143. Vladimir Stupin, 'Traditsionnye blyuda dumskoi kukhni', Kommersant", 44, 2 December 1997, p. 66; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', pp. 44-46; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', p. 46; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; Segodnya, 7 June 1996, 11 June 1996 and 17 June 1996.
144. Vladimir Stupin, 'Traditsionnye blyuda dumskoi kukhni', Kommersant", 44, 2 December 1997, p. 66; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', pp. 44-46; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', p. 46; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; Segodnya, 7 June 1996, 11 June 1996 and 17 June 1996.
145. Vladimir Stupin, 'Traditsionnye blyuda dumskoi kukhni', Kommersant", 44, 2 December 1997, p. 66; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', pp. 44-46; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', p. 46; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; Segodnya, 7 June 1996, 11 June 1996 and 17 June 1996.
146. Vladimir Stupin, 'Traditsionnye blyuda dumskoi kukhni', Kommersant", 44, 2 December 1997, p. 66; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; 'Kassovaya bor'ba', pp. 44-46; 'Ssudnaya oshibka', p. 46; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; Segodnya, 7 June 1996, 11 June 1996 and 17 June 1996.
147. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; Izvestiya, April 1, 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 2 April 1998; Segodnya, 2 April 1998; Russkii telegraf, 2 April 1998. For Glaz'ev's own views on the matter, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 April 1998; for other relatively sympathetic commentaries, see also Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 April 1998 and 7 May 1998; and Trud, 5 May 1998.
148. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; Izvestiya, April 1, 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 2 April 1998; Segodnya, 2 April 1998; Russkii telegraf, 2 April 1998. For Glaz'ev's own views on the matter, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 April 1998; for other relatively sympathetic commentaries, see also Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 April 1998 and 7 May 1998; and Trud, 5 May 1998.
149. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; Izvestiya, April 1, 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 2 April 1998; Segodnya, 2 April 1998; Russkii telegraf, 2 April 1998. For Glaz'ev's own views on the matter, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 April 1998; for other relatively sympathetic commentaries, see also Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 April 1998 and 7 May 1998; and Trud, 5 May 1998.
150. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; Izvestiya, April 1, 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 2 April 1998; Segodnya, 2 April 1998; Russkii telegraf, 2 April 1998. For Glaz'ev's own views on the matter, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 April 1998; for other relatively sympathetic commentaries, see also Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 April 1998 and 7 May 1998; and Trud, 5 May 1998.
151. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; Izvestiya, April 1, 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 2 April 1998; Segodnya, 2 April 1998; Russkii telegraf, 2 April 1998. For Glaz'ev's own views on the matter, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 April 1998; for other relatively sympathetic commentaries, see also Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 April 1998 and 7 May 1998; and Trud, 5 May 1998.
152. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; Izvestiya, April 1, 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 2 April 1998; Segodnya, 2 April 1998; Russkii telegraf, 2 April 1998. For Glaz'ev's own views on the matter, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 April 1998; for other relatively sympathetic commentaries, see also Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 April 1998 and 7 May 1998; and Trud, 5 May 1998.
153. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; Izvestiya, April 1, 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 2 April 1998; Segodnya, 2 April 1998; Russkii telegraf, 2 April 1998. For Glaz'ev's own views on the matter, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 April 1998; for other relatively sympathetic commentaries, see also Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 April 1998 and 7 May 1998; and Trud, 5 May 1998.
154. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; Izvestiya, April 1, 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 2 April 1998; Segodnya, 2 April 1998; Russkii telegraf, 2 April 1998. For Glaz'ev's own views on the matter, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 April 1998; for other relatively sympathetic commentaries, see also Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 April 1998 and 7 May 1998; and Trud, 5 May 1998.
155. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 19 November 1997; Izvestiya, April 1, 1998; Kommersant" -Daily, 2 April 1998; Segodnya, 2 April 1998; Russkii telegraf, 2 April 1998. For Glaz'ev's own views on the matter, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 April 1998; for other relatively sympathetic commentaries, see also Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 April 1998 and 7 May 1998; and Trud, 5 May 1998.
156. Segodnya, 2 and 14 April 1998; Finansovye izvestiya, 7 April 1998 and 28 May 1998; Russkii telegraf, 9 April 1998.
157. Segodnya, 2 and 14 April 1998; Finansovye izvestiya, 7 April 1998 and 28 May 1998; Russkii telegraf, 9 April 1998.
158. Segodnya, 2 and 14 April 1998; Finansovye izvestiya, 7 April 1998 and 28 May 1998; Russkii telegraf, 9 April 1998.
159. Pravda-5, 24 June 1997.
160. Galan, p. 43; Segodnya, 12 September 1997 and 21 October 1997.
161. Izvestiya, 10 April 1997.
162. Kommersant" -Daily, 6 June 1996 and 11 June 1996; Segodnya, 11 June 1996.
163. Kommersant" -Daily, 6 June 1996 and 11 June 1996; Segodnya, 11 June 1996.
164. Segodnya, 11 June 1996.
165. See, inter alia, Granville, Success; Åslund (ed.), Transformation; and Alfred Steinherr & Daniel Gros, Winds of Change: Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe (London, Longman, 1995), chapter 14.
166. See, inter alia, Granville, Success; Åslund (ed.), Transformation; and Alfred Steinherr & Daniel Gros, Winds of Change: Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe (London, Longman, 1995), chapter 14.
167. See, inter alia, Granville, Success; Åslund (ed.), Transformation; and Alfred Steinherr & Daniel Gros, Winds of Change: Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe (London, Longman, 1995), chapter 14.
168. This was also the view of one of the bank's leading critics at the time, Jeffrey Sachs; see Jeffrey Sachs, 'Prospects for Monetary Stabilisation in Russia', in Åslund (ed.). p. 48.
169. On the bank's first chairman, Georgii Matyukhin, see Izvestiya, 15 May 1992, 19 May 1992 and 2 June 1992; Fedorov, pp. 40-41; on Gerashchenko, see Moskovskie novosti, 20 September 1992 and notes 107 and 108 below. For details on the bank's defiance of parliament in 1992, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 May 1992.
170. On the bank's first chairman, Georgii Matyukhin, see Izvestiya, 15 May 1992, 19 May 1992 and 2 June 1992; Fedorov, pp. 40-41; on Gerashchenko, see Moskovskie novosti, 20 September 1992 and notes 107 and 108 below. For details on the bank's defiance of parliament in 1992, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 May 1992.
171. On the bank's first chairman, Georgii Matyukhin, see Izvestiya, 15 May 1992, 19 May 1992 and 2 June 1992; Fedorov, pp. 40-41; on Gerashchenko, see Moskovskie novosti, 20 September 1992 and notes 107 and 108 below. For details on the bank's defiance of parliament in 1992, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 May 1992.
172. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992;
173. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992;
174. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992;
175. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992;
176. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992;
177. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 10 January 1993 and 13 January 1993; Segodnya, 16 March 1993; and Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 April 1993). This was particularly true of the controversial TsBR telegram of 28 July 1992 which authorised a massive credit emission to resolve the inter-enterprise arrears problem (on this controversy, see Izvestiya, 3 August 1992 and 4 August 1992; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 4 August 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 4 August 1992; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 August 1992). Sachs and Fischer are persuasive in assigning principal responsibility to the bank; see Sachs, p. 49; and Stanley Fischer, 'Prospects for Russian Stabilisation in the Summer of 1993', in Åslund (ed.), Transformation, p. 10.
178. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 10 January 1993 and 13 January 1993; Segodnya, 16 March 1993; and Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 April 1993). This was particularly true of the controversial TsBR telegram of 28 July 1992 which authorised a massive credit emission to resolve the inter-enterprise arrears problem (on this controversy, see Izvestiya, 3 August 1992 and 4 August 1992; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 4 August 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 4 August 1992; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 August 1992). Sachs and Fischer are persuasive in assigning principal responsibility to the bank; see Sachs, p. 49; and Stanley Fischer, 'Prospects for Russian Stabilisation in the Summer of 1993', in Åslund (ed.), Transformation, p. 10.
179. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 10 January 1993 and 13 January 1993; Segodnya, 16 March 1993; and Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 April 1993). This was particularly true of the controversial TsBR telegram of 28 July 1992 which authorised a massive credit emission to resolve the inter-enterprise arrears problem (on this controversy, see Izvestiya, 3 August 1992 and 4 August 1992; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 4 August 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 4 August 1992; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 August 1992). Sachs and Fischer are persuasive in assigning principal responsibility to the bank; see Sachs, p. 49; and Stanley Fischer, 'Prospects for Russian Stabilisation in the Summer of 1993', in Åslund (ed.), Transformation, p. 10.
180. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 10 January 1993 and 13 January 1993; Segodnya, 16 March 1993; and Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 April 1993). This was particularly true of the controversial TsBR telegram of 28 July 1992 which authorised a massive credit emission to resolve the inter-enterprise arrears problem (on this controversy, see Izvestiya, 3 August 1992 and 4 August 1992; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 4 August 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 4 August 1992; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 August 1992). Sachs and Fischer are persuasive in assigning principal responsibility to the bank; see Sachs, p. 49; and Stanley Fischer, 'Prospects for Russian Stabilisation in the Summer of 1993', in Åslund (ed.), Transformation, p. 10.
181. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 10 January 1993 and 13 January 1993; Segodnya, 16 March 1993; and Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 April 1993). This was particularly true of the controversial TsBR telegram of 28 July 1992 which authorised a massive credit emission to resolve the inter-enterprise arrears problem (on this controversy, see Izvestiya, 3 August 1992 and 4 August 1992; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 4 August 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 4 August 1992; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 August 1992). Sachs and Fischer are persuasive in assigning principal responsibility to the bank; see Sachs, p. 49; and Stanley Fischer, 'Prospects for Russian Stabilisation in the Summer of 1993', in Åslund (ed.), Transformation, p. 10.
182. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 10 January 1993 and 13 January 1993; Segodnya, 16 March 1993; and Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 April 1993). This was particularly true of the controversial TsBR telegram of 28 July 1992 which authorised a massive credit emission to resolve the inter-enterprise arrears problem (on this controversy, see Izvestiya, 3 August 1992 and 4 August 1992; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 4 August 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 4 August 1992; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 August 1992). Sachs and Fischer are persuasive in assigning principal responsibility to the bank; see Sachs, p. 49; and Stanley Fischer, 'Prospects for Russian Stabilisation in the Summer of 1993', in Åslund (ed.), Transformation, p. 10.
183. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 10 January 1993 and 13 January 1993; Segodnya, 16 March 1993; and Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 April 1993). This was particularly true of the controversial TsBR telegram of 28 July 1992 which authorised a massive credit emission to resolve the inter-enterprise arrears problem (on this controversy, see Izvestiya, 3 August 1992 and 4 August 1992; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 4 August 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 4 August 1992; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 August 1992). Sachs and Fischer are persuasive in assigning principal responsibility to the bank; see Sachs, p. 49; and Stanley Fischer, 'Prospects for Russian Stabilisation in the Summer of 1993', in Åslund (ed.), Transformation, p. 10.
184. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 10 January 1993 and 13 January 1993; Segodnya, 16 March 1993; and Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 April 1993). This was particularly true of the controversial TsBR telegram of 28 July 1992 which authorised a massive credit emission to resolve the inter-enterprise arrears problem (on this controversy, see Izvestiya, 3 August 1992 and 4 August 1992; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 4 August 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 4 August 1992; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 August 1992). Sachs and Fischer are persuasive in assigning principal responsibility to the bank; see Sachs, p. 49; and Stanley Fischer, 'Prospects for Russian Stabilisation in the Summer of 1993', in Åslund (ed.), Transformation, p. 10.
185. Granville, chapter 3; Fedorov, pp. 40-41. TsBR officials tended, with some justice, to emphasise the government's appetite for credit (see Izvestiya, 25 September 1992, 10 March 1993, 12 March 1993 and 17 March 1993; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 September 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 13 January 1993). President El'tsin's promises to various lobbies did not help matters either (Izvestiya, 2 June 1992). However, many of the credits were issued by the bank on its own initiative, with little or no consultation with the government (see Rossiisskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992; Rossiiskie vesti, 10 January 1993 and 13 January 1993; Segodnya, 16 March 1993; and Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 April 1993). This was particularly true of the controversial TsBR telegram of 28 July 1992 which authorised a massive credit emission to resolve the inter-enterprise arrears problem (on this controversy, see Izvestiya, 3 August 1992 and 4 August 1992; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 4 August 1992; Moskovskii komsomolets, 4 August 1992; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 August 1992). Sachs and Fischer are persuasive in assigning principal responsibility to the bank; see Sachs, p. 49; and Stanley Fischer, 'Prospects for Russian Stabilisation in the Summer of 1993', in Åslund (ed.), Transformation, p. 10.
186. Kommersant" -Daily, 11 June 1996.
187. Goodman, p. 340.
188. Timo Välilä, Essays on the Credibility of Central Bank Independence (Gothenburg, University of Gothenburg, 1996), pp. 4-9.
189. One side effect of this 'war of central banks' was that the two authorities both sought to persuade commercial banks to register with, and be regulated by, them. A sort of Gresham's law of regulation operated - bad regulation drives out good - as the very permissive regime of the Bank of Russia found favour with the banks. Russia is still struggling with the consequences of this period of ultra-liberalism in banking regulation.
190. Kryuchkova, p. 126; see also Semler, p. 50.
191. In particular, it had little or no allocative function except in retail and labour markets, nor was it a universal or anonymous medium of exchange; for a brief discussion of this issue, see Tompson, 'Old Habits', pp. 1160-1161.
192. Remarks at the World Economic Forum's 'Russia Forum' and 'Ukraine Forum', Moscow and Kiev, June 1992.
193. Granville, pp. 4-5; Sachs, pp. 39-40; Fedorov, p. 37; IMF Economic Review: Russian Federation (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1993), p. 29; Ekonomika i zhizn', 50, December 1993, p. 1; and Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992. Gerashchenko's deputy Arnol'd Voilukov stated flatly that currency stabilisation was 'only one narrow task' for the bank and stressed its role in supporting production in key sectors; Izvestiya, 25 September 1992.
194. Granville, pp. 4-5; Sachs, pp. 39-40; Fedorov, p. 37; IMF Economic Review: Russian Federation (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1993), p. 29; Ekonomika i zhizn', 50, December 1993, p. 1; and Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992. Gerashchenko's deputy Arnol'd Voilukov stated flatly that currency stabilisation was 'only one narrow task' for the bank and stressed its role in supporting production in key sectors; Izvestiya, 25 September 1992.
195. Granville, pp. 4-5; Sachs, pp. 39-40; Fedorov, p. 37; IMF Economic Review: Russian Federation (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1993), p. 29; Ekonomika i zhizn', 50, December 1993, p. 1; and Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992. Gerashchenko's deputy Arnol'd Voilukov stated flatly that currency stabilisation was 'only one narrow task' for the bank and stressed its role in supporting production in key sectors; Izvestiya, 25 September 1992.
196. Granville, pp. 4-5; Sachs, pp. 39-40; Fedorov, p. 37; IMF Economic Review: Russian Federation (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1993), p. 29; Ekonomika i zhizn', 50, December 1993, p. 1; and Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992. Gerashchenko's deputy Arnol'd Voilukov stated flatly that currency stabilisation was 'only one narrow task' for the bank and stressed its role in supporting production in key sectors; Izvestiya, 25 September 1992.
197. Granville, pp. 4-5; Sachs, pp. 39-40; Fedorov, p. 37; IMF Economic Review: Russian Federation (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1993), p. 29; Ekonomika i zhizn', 50, December 1993, p. 1; and Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992. Gerashchenko's deputy Arnol'd Voilukov stated flatly that currency stabilisation was 'only one narrow task' for the bank and stressed its role in supporting production in key sectors; Izvestiya, 25 September 1992.
198. Granville, pp. 4-5; Sachs, pp. 39-40; Fedorov, p. 37; IMF Economic Review: Russian Federation (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1993), p. 29; Ekonomika i zhizn', 50, December 1993, p. 1; and Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992. Gerashchenko's deputy Arnol'd Voilukov stated flatly that currency stabilisation was 'only one narrow task' for the bank and stressed its role in supporting production in key sectors; Izvestiya, 25 September 1992.
199. Granville, pp. 4-5; Sachs, pp. 39-40; Fedorov, p. 37; IMF Economic Review: Russian Federation (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1993), p. 29; Ekonomika i zhizn', 50, December 1993, p. 1; and Moskovskii komsomolets, 30 September 1992. Gerashchenko's deputy Arnol'd Voilukov stated flatly that currency stabilisation was 'only one narrow task' for the bank and stressed its role in supporting production in key sectors; Izvestiya, 25 September 1992.
200. Segodnya, 23 September 1993 and 30 October 1993; Izvestiya, 1 October 1993 and 12 October 1993. Bank officials did not deny financing parliament but rather claimed that the finance ministry had authorised the payment orders involved.
201. Segodnya, 23 September 1993 and 30 October 1993; Izvestiya, 1 October 1993 and 12 October 1993. Bank officials did not deny financing parliament but rather claimed that the finance ministry had authorised the payment orders involved.
202. Segodnya, 12 October 1993.
203. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 September 1992 and 18 September 1992.
204. Rossiiskie vesti, 22 September 1993.
205. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 November 1993.
206. Afanas'ev expresses doubts as to whether or not Chernomyrdin really had strong views of his own on the matter, and many of the premier's statements, at least until the October 1994 ruble crisis, suggest that he did not fully appreciate the significance of monetary policy.
207. Pravda-5, 24 June 1997; Galan, p. 42.
208. See Dubinin's remarks on this point in Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; and Galan, pp. 42-43.
209. See Dubinin's remarks on this point in Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 June 1997; and Galan, pp. 42-43.
210. Peter Moser, 'The Supply of Central Bank Independence', Discussion Paper No. 9501, University of St Gallen, 1994, cited in Eijffinger & De Haan, pp. 52-53.
211. Russkii telegraf, 30 December 1997.
212. The banks were consistent in lobbying for softer monetary policies throughout 1992-97. See, e.g. Izvestiya, 21 March 1992 and 8 April 1992; Segodnya, 6 September 1995; Finansovye izvestiya, 3 December 1996 and 24 April 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 26 November 1997.
213. The banks were consistent in lobbying for softer monetary policies throughout 1992-97. See, e.g. Izvestiya, 21 March 1992 and 8 April 1992; Segodnya, 6 September 1995; Finansovye izvestiya, 3 December 1996 and 24 April 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 26 November 1997.
214. The banks were consistent in lobbying for softer monetary policies throughout 1992-97. See, e.g. Izvestiya, 21 March 1992 and 8 April 1992; Segodnya, 6 September 1995; Finansovye izvestiya, 3 December 1996 and 24 April 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 26 November 1997.
215. The banks were consistent in lobbying for softer monetary policies throughout 1992-97. See, e.g. Izvestiya, 21 March 1992 and 8 April 1992; Segodnya, 6 September 1995; Finansovye izvestiya, 3 December 1996 and 24 April 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 26 November 1997.
216. For a discussion of the instruments available to the TsBR early in the reform period, see Stephen Lewarne, 'Legal Aspects of Monetary Policy in the Former Soviet Union', Europe-Asia Studies, 45, 2, 1993, pp. 193-209.
217. Goodman, p. 340.
218. Segodnya, 29 June 1993 and 9 July 1993; Moskovskie novosti, 24, 13 June 1993, p. A13, and 27, 4 July 1993, p. A12.
219. Segodnya, 29 June 1993 and 9 July 1993; Moskovskie novosti, 24, 13 June 1993, p. A13, and 27, 4 July 1993, p. A12.
220. The bankers' complaints about Paramonova were summed up in a joint letter issued by a number of leading bankers in 1995; Segodnya, 6 September 1995.
221. Fedorov, pp. 39-40.
222. Tompson, 'Ministry of Cash'.
223. The banks were, for example, sharply critical of the authorities' November 1997 anti-crisis measures; Izvestiya, 4 December 1997.
224. See especially Yaroslav Skvortsov, 'Bankovskii risk ob"yavlen blagorodnym delom' and 'Sergei Dubinin: Bankiry ne vsegda vinovaty', Kommersant", 21, 10 June 1997, p. 20 and pp. 21-22 respectively; Finansovye izvestiya, 21 April 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 18 November 1997.
225. See especially Yaroslav Skvortsov, 'Bankovskii risk ob"yavlen blagorodnym delom' and 'Sergei Dubinin: Bankiry ne vsegda vinovaty', Kommersant", 21, 10 June 1997, p. 20 and pp. 21-22 respectively; Finansovye izvestiya, 21 April 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 18 November 1997.
226. See especially Yaroslav Skvortsov, 'Bankovskii risk ob"yavlen blagorodnym delom' and 'Sergei Dubinin: Bankiry ne vsegda vinovaty', Kommersant", 21, 10 June 1997, p. 20 and pp. 21-22 respectively; Finansovye izvestiya, 21 April 1997; Kommersant" -Daily, 18 November 1997.
227. Russian Economic Trends, 7, 1, 1998, p. 95; Russian Economic Trends Monthly Update, 5 June 1998, p. 7.
228. Russian Economic Trends, 7, 1, 1998, p. 95; Russian Economic Trends Monthly Update, 5 June 1998, p. 7.
229. Izvestiya, 4 December 1997 and 6 December 1997; Reuters, 2 June 1998.
230. Izvestiya, 4 December 1997 and 6 December 1997; Reuters, 2 June 1998.