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Open Economies Review

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 1995, Pages 399-410

Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?

(1) Masciandaro, Donato a

a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY (Italy)

Author keywords

bank regulation; central banking; inflation; monetary policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344457590 PISSN: 09237992 EISSN: 1573708X Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1007/BF01000390 Document Type: Review

Times cited : (24)

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