Power diffusion or concentration? In search of the Spanish policy process

West European Politics

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 103-123

  Heywood, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; POLICY MAKING; POLITICAL SYSTEM; POWER RELATIONS;

SPAIN;

EID: 0032436777     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402389808425273     Document Type: Article

References (79)

1. Nancy Bermeo, 'Sacrifice, Sequence, and Strength in Successful Dual Transitions: Lessons from Spain', Journal of Politics 56/3 (Aug. 1994) p.608, comments that 'scores of scholars describe Spain's new democracy as neocorporatist'. This essay shares Bermeo's scepticism over the appropriateness of such a characterisation, but on the basis of a very different analysis of how Spain's democracy has developed. For interpretations of Spain as neo-/corporatist, see Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla, 'Spain: From Corporatism to Corporatism', in A. Williams (ed.) Southern Europe Transformed (London: Harper & Row, 1984); Juan Martínez Alier and Jordi Roca, 'Spain after Franco: From Corporatist Ideology to Corporatist Reality', International Journal of Political Economy 177/4 (1987); Jordi Roca, 'Neo-Corporatism in Post-Franco Spain' and Victor Pérez-Díaz, 'Economic Policies and Social Patterns in Spain During the Transition', both in I. Scholten (ed.), Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism (London: Sage 1987); Víctor Pérez-Díaz, The Return of Civil Society (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP 1993) pp.215-30; Guillermo de la Dehesa, 'Spain' in J. Williamson (ed.) The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington DC: Inst. for Int. Economics 1994).
2. Nancy Bermeo, 'Sacrifice, Sequence, and Strength in Successful Dual Transitions: Lessons from Spain', Journal of Politics 56/3 (Aug. 1994) p.608, comments that 'scores of scholars describe Spain's new democracy as neocorporatist'. This essay shares Bermeo's scepticism over the appropriateness of such a characterisation, but on the basis of a very different analysis of how Spain's democracy has developed. For interpretations of Spain as neo-/corporatist, see Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla, 'Spain: From Corporatism to Corporatism', in A. Williams (ed.) Southern Europe Transformed (London: Harper & Row, 1984); Juan Martínez Alier and Jordi Roca, 'Spain after Franco: From Corporatist Ideology to Corporatist Reality', International Journal of Political Economy 177/4 (1987); Jordi Roca, 'Neo-Corporatism in Post-Franco Spain' and Victor Pérez-Díaz, 'Economic Policies and Social Patterns in Spain During the Transition', both in I. Scholten (ed.), Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism (London: Sage 1987); Víctor Pérez-Díaz, The Return of Civil Society (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP 1993) pp.215-30; Guillermo de la Dehesa, 'Spain' in J. Williamson (ed.) The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington DC: Inst. for Int. Economics 1994).
3. Nancy Bermeo, 'Sacrifice, Sequence, and Strength in Successful Dual Transitions: Lessons from Spain', Journal of Politics 56/3 (Aug. 1994) p.608, comments that 'scores of scholars describe Spain's new democracy as neocorporatist'. This essay shares Bermeo's scepticism over the appropriateness of such a characterisation, but on the basis of a very different analysis of how Spain's democracy has developed. For interpretations of Spain as neo-/corporatist, see Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla, 'Spain: From Corporatism to Corporatism', in A. Williams (ed.) Southern Europe Transformed (London: Harper & Row, 1984); Juan Martínez Alier and Jordi Roca, 'Spain after Franco: From Corporatist Ideology to Corporatist Reality', International Journal of Political Economy 177/4 (1987); Jordi Roca, 'Neo-Corporatism in Post-Franco Spain' and Victor Pérez-Díaz, 'Economic Policies and Social Patterns in Spain During the Transition', both in I. Scholten (ed.), Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism (London: Sage 1987); Víctor Pérez-Díaz, The Return of Civil Society (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP 1993) pp.215-30; Guillermo de la Dehesa, 'Spain' in J. Williamson (ed.) The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington DC: Inst. for Int. Economics 1994).
4. Nancy Bermeo, 'Sacrifice, Sequence, and Strength in Successful Dual Transitions: Lessons from Spain', Journal of Politics 56/3 (Aug. 1994) p.608, comments that 'scores of scholars describe Spain's new democracy as neocorporatist'. This essay shares Bermeo's scepticism over the appropriateness of such a characterisation, but on the basis of a very different analysis of how Spain's democracy has developed. For interpretations of Spain as neo-/corporatist, see Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla, 'Spain: From Corporatism to Corporatism', in A. Williams (ed.) Southern Europe Transformed (London: Harper & Row, 1984); Juan Martínez Alier and Jordi Roca, 'Spain after Franco: From Corporatist Ideology to Corporatist Reality', International Journal of Political Economy 177/4 (1987); Jordi Roca, 'Neo-Corporatism in Post-Franco Spain' and Victor Pérez-Díaz, 'Economic Policies and Social Patterns in Spain During the Transition', both in I. Scholten (ed.), Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism (London: Sage 1987); Víctor Pérez-Díaz, The Return of Civil Society (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP 1993) pp.215-30; Guillermo de la Dehesa, 'Spain' in J. Williamson (ed.) The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington DC: Inst. for Int. Economics 1994).
5. Nancy Bermeo, 'Sacrifice, Sequence, and Strength in Successful Dual Transitions: Lessons from Spain', Journal of Politics 56/3 (Aug. 1994) p.608, comments that 'scores of scholars describe Spain's new democracy as neocorporatist'. This essay shares Bermeo's scepticism over the appropriateness of such a characterisation, but on the basis of a very different analysis of how Spain's democracy has developed. For interpretations of Spain as neo-/corporatist, see Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla, 'Spain: From Corporatism to Corporatism', in A. Williams (ed.) Southern Europe Transformed (London: Harper & Row, 1984); Juan Martínez Alier and Jordi Roca, 'Spain after Franco: From Corporatist Ideology to Corporatist Reality', International Journal of Political Economy 177/4 (1987); Jordi Roca, 'Neo-Corporatism in Post-Franco Spain' and Victor Pérez-Díaz, 'Economic Policies and Social Patterns in Spain During the Transition', both in I. Scholten (ed.), Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism (London: Sage 1987); Víctor Pérez-Díaz, The Return of Civil Society (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP 1993) pp.215-30; Guillermo de la Dehesa, 'Spain' in J. Williamson (ed.) The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington DC: Inst. for Int. Economics 1994).
6. Nancy Bermeo, 'Sacrifice, Sequence, and Strength in Successful Dual Transitions: Lessons from Spain', Journal of Politics 56/3 (Aug. 1994) p.608, comments that 'scores of scholars describe Spain's new democracy as neocorporatist'. This essay shares Bermeo's scepticism over the appropriateness of such a characterisation, but on the basis of a very different analysis of how Spain's democracy has developed. For interpretations of Spain as neo-/corporatist, see Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla, 'Spain: From Corporatism to Corporatism', in A. Williams (ed.) Southern Europe Transformed (London: Harper & Row, 1984); Juan Martínez Alier and Jordi Roca, 'Spain after Franco: From Corporatist Ideology to Corporatist Reality', International Journal of Political Economy 177/4 (1987); Jordi Roca, 'Neo-Corporatism in Post-Franco Spain' and Victor Pérez-Díaz, 'Economic Policies and Social Patterns in Spain During the Transition', both in I. Scholten (ed.), Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism (London: Sage 1987); Víctor Pérez-Díaz, The Return of Civil Society (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP 1993) pp.215-30; Guillermo de la Dehesa, 'Spain' in J. Williamson (ed.) The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington DC: Inst. for Int. Economics 1994).
7. Nancy Bermeo, 'Sacrifice, Sequence, and Strength in Successful Dual Transitions: Lessons from Spain', Journal of Politics 56/3 (Aug. 1994) p.608, comments that 'scores of scholars describe Spain's new democracy as neocorporatist'. This essay shares Bermeo's scepticism over the appropriateness of such a characterisation, but on the basis of a very different analysis of how Spain's democracy has developed. For interpretations of Spain as neo-/corporatist, see Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla, 'Spain: From Corporatism to Corporatism', in A. Williams (ed.) Southern Europe Transformed (London: Harper & Row, 1984); Juan Martínez Alier and Jordi Roca, 'Spain after Franco: From Corporatist Ideology to Corporatist Reality', International Journal of Political Economy 177/4 (1987); Jordi Roca, 'Neo-Corporatism in Post-Franco Spain' and Victor Pérez-Díaz, 'Economic Policies and Social Patterns in Spain During the Transition', both in I. Scholten (ed.), Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism (London: Sage 1987); Víctor Pérez-Díaz, The Return of Civil Society (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP 1993) pp.215-30; Guillermo de la Dehesa, 'Spain' in J. Williamson (ed.) The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington DC: Inst. for Int. Economics 1994).
8. The contents of the various pacts negotiated between 1977 and 1985 are reproduced in CC.OO., De los Pactos de la Moncloa al AES (Madrid: Avance 1989).
9. Omar G. Encarnación, 'Social Concertation in Democratic and Market Transitions. Comparative Lessons from Spain', Comparative Political Studies 30/4 (1997) pp.395-6, argues that 'Franquist notions of societal integration also embodied a project of political control [...]. It emphasized that all societal relations must conform to a divine doctrine of class harmony and the common good as stipulated by the state.' There is no apparent recognition in this account that the reality of labour relations under Franco, which were based on class domination and repression, followed an entirely different logic.
10. See Richard Gunther, 'Spanish Public Policy: From Dictatorship to Democracy', Estudios/Working Papers 1996/84 (Madrid: Inst. Juan March 1996) pp.43-5.
11. As discussed below, David Soskice draws a distinction between 'liberal market economies' (LMEs), in which employers and the labour force have relatively weak representative associations, and 'co-ordinated market economies' (CMEs), in which a dense network of associations allows for long-term policy co-ordination between government and peak associations. See David Soskice, 'The Institutional Infrastructure for International Competitiveness: A Comparative Analysis of the UK and Germany', in A.B. Atkínson and R. Brunetta (eds) The Economics of the New Europe (London: Macmillan 1991). The argument here therefore runs counter to the views expressed in my The Government and Politics of Spain (London: Macmillan 1995) pp.243-7, which followed the orthodoxy on neo-/corporatism.
12. As discussed below, David Soskice draws a distinction between 'liberal market economies' (LMEs), in which employers and the labour force have relatively weak representative associations, and 'co-ordinated market economies' (CMEs), in which a dense network of associations allows for long-term policy co-ordination between government and peak associations. See David Soskice, 'The Institutional Infrastructure for International Competitiveness: A Comparative Analysis of the UK and Germany', in A.B. Atkínson and R. Brunetta (eds) The Economics of the New Europe (London: Macmillan 1991). The argument here therefore runs counter to the views expressed in my The Government and Politics of Spain (London: Macmillan 1995) pp.243-7, which followed the orthodoxy on neo-/corporatism.
13. It is not necessary for these purposes to debate the precise meaning of the terms 'corporatism' and 'neo-corporatism'. What is clearly understood by the analyses of Spain which make reference to the terms is that government and peak associations of business and labour have tended to operate in concert, reflected in the establishment of social pacts. For a detailed discussion of the key points at issue in debates over the meaning of corporatism, see Martin J. Bull, 'The Corporatist Ideal-Type and Political Exchange', Political Studies 40/2 (1992) pp.255-72. A more recent account is Alberto Oliet Palá, 'Corporativismo y neocorporativismo', in Rafael del Aguila (ed.) Manual de Ciencia Político (Madrid: Trotta 1997) pp.319-47.
14. It is not necessary for these purposes to debate the precise meaning of the terms 'corporatism' and 'neo-corporatism'. What is clearly understood by the analyses of Spain which make reference to the terms is that government and peak associations of business and labour have tended to operate in concert, reflected in the establishment of social pacts. For a detailed discussion of the key points at issue in debates over the meaning of corporatism, see Martin J. Bull, 'The Corporatist Ideal-Type and Political Exchange', Political Studies 40/2 (1992) pp.255-72. A more recent account is Alberto Oliet Palá, 'Corporativismo y neocorporativismo', in Rafael del Aguila (ed.) Manual de Ciencia Político (Madrid: Trotta 1997) pp.319-47.
15. See further Paul Heywood and Ignacio Molina, 'La «présidentialisation» du système espagnol: la Moncloa', Revue Française d'Administration Publique 83 (1997) pp.447-58 and Paul Heywood, 'Governing a New Democracy: the Power of the Prime Minister in Spain', West European Politics 14/2 (April 1991) pp.97-115 [repr. in G.W. Jones (ed.) West European Prime Ministers (London: Frank Cass 1991)].
16. See further Paul Heywood and Ignacio Molina, 'La «présidentialisation» du système espagnol: la Moncloa', Revue Française d'Administration Publique 83 (1997) pp.447-58 and Paul Heywood, 'Governing a New Democracy: the Power of the Prime Minister in Spain', West European Politics 14/2 (April 1991) pp.97-115 [repr. in G.W. Jones (ed.) West European Prime Ministers (London: Frank Cass 1991)].
17. See further Paul Heywood and Ignacio Molina, 'La «présidentialisation» du système espagnol: la Moncloa', Revue Française d'Administration Publique 83 (1997) pp.447-58 and Paul Heywood, 'Governing a New Democracy: the Power of the Prime Minister in Spain', West European Politics 14/2 (April 1991) pp.97-115 [repr. in G.W. Jones (ed.) West European Prime Ministers (London: Frank Cass 1991)].
18. Technically, the PM in Spain is the President of the Council of Ministers, and is routinely referred to as the President of the Government.
19. Clear distinctions can be drawn between the executive capacity of the UCD governments under Adolfo Suárez and Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo (1977-82) and the PSOE administrations of Felipe Gonzalez between 1982 and 1993. In the former case, Suárez and Calvo Sotelo were significantly constrained by the lack of an absolute majority in parliament and by deep internal party divisions: González, by contrast, enjoyed unparalleled authority as a result of absolute majorities and, at least until the early 1990s, a disciplined and united party behind him. After the 1993 elections, Gonzalez was constrained by the loss of an absolute majority, party divisions and corruption scandals. Similarly, the PP government of José María Aznar since 1996 has had to rely on support from regional nationalists. Space does not permit a detailed account of core executive capacity, which would need to analyse not just the functions of the core executive in terms of policy co-ordination, political and administrative management, but also its support structure (size, composition, resources, distribution of power), and the political opportunity structure (constitutionally embedded versus contingent powers, polarised or consensual political system, unitary or decentralised state, majoritarian or coalition government).
20. On the importance of historical memory in conditioning the transition to democracy, see esp. Paloma Aguilar Fernández, Memoria y olvido de la Guerra Civil española (Madrid: Alianza 1996). See also her contribution in this volume, and her article, 'Collective Memory of the Spanish Civil War: The Case of the Political Amnesty in the Spanish Transition to Democracy', Democratization 4/4 (1997), as well as Pérez-Díaz, Return of Civil Society (note 1) pp.194, 215-6.
21. On the importance of historical memory in conditioning the transition to democracy, see esp. Paloma Aguilar Fernández, Memoria y olvido de la Guerra Civil española (Madrid: Alianza 1996). See also her contribution in this volume, and her article, 'Collective Memory of the Spanish Civil War: The Case of the Political Amnesty in the Spanish Transition to Democracy', Democratization 4/4 (1997), as well as Pérez-Díaz, Return of Civil Society (note 1) pp.194, 215-6.
22. On the importance of historical memory in conditioning the transition to democracy, see esp. Paloma Aguilar Fernández, Memoria y olvido de la Guerra Civil española (Madrid: Alianza 1996). See also her contribution in this volume, and her article, 'Collective Memory of the Spanish Civil War: The Case of the Political Amnesty in the Spanish Transition to Democracy', Democratization 4/4 (1997), as well as Pérez-Díaz, Return of Civil Society (note 1) pp.194, 215-6.
23. de la Dehesa, 'Spain' (note 1) p.128. Moreover, the employers' federation, the CEOE, was still in its formative stages at this point and the union movement was divided by intense rivalry between the Communist Comisiones Obereras (CC.OO.) and the Socialist Union General de Trahajadores (UGT).
24. Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (London: Methuen 1986) p.136, argues: 'In fact, as Suárez knew, the PCE and even the PSOE would be unable to oblige the government to fulfil its side of the bargain.' For a good discussion of pacts and labour during the transition, see Kerstin Hamann, 'The Pacted Transition to Democracy and Labour Politics in Spain', South European Society & Politics 2/2 (Autumn 1997) pp.110-38.
25. Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (London: Methuen 1986) p.136, argues: 'In fact, as Suárez knew, the PCE and even the PSOE would be unable to oblige the government to fulfil its side of the bargain.' For a good discussion of pacts and labour during the transition, see Kerstin Hamann, 'The Pacted Transition to Democracy and Labour Politics in Spain', South European Society & Politics 2/2 (Autumn 1997) pp.110-38.
26. Encarnación, 'Social Concertation' (note 3) p.388.
27. Contra Robert M. Fishman, Working-Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell UP 1990) pp.218, who argues that 'the pacts obviously do represent the corporatist style of the joint formulation of policy and distributional decisions by labor, business and the state.'
28. Article 131.2 of the Constitution envisaged the establishment of such a Council to ensure that the government should consult with 'trade unions and other professional, business and economic organisations' when developing plans for general economic activity. The CES comprises 61 members, including a president appointed by the government: 20 each from the trade unions, employers' groups, and consumer groups (including a number of government-proposed economic experts). The CES can make recommendations, but has no formal or binding powers.
29. There were also other smaller, but still significant, independent union federations, notably the USO (Unión Sindical Obrera) and the Basque-based ELA-STV (Eusko Langileak Alkarlasuna - Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos), as well as a some sectorally specific organisations, which further contributed to fragmentation.
30. See 'Resolución General del II Congreso de la C.S. de CC.OO. sobre el ANE', 21 June 1981, reproduced in CC.OO., De los Pactos de la Moncloa al AES (note 2) pp. 163-4.
31. This point is well made by Bermeo, 'Sacrifice, Sequence, and Strength' (note 1) p.613. As Bermeo notes, 'problems with unfulfilled promises are frequently cited as a major reason for the breakdown of the pact-making system today'.
32. See Kerstin Hamann, 'The Legislative Process and Interest Groups in Spain', paper prepared for the 55th annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago IL (10-12 April 1997) p.5. Hamann quotes the Minister of Labour's comment that the draft 'had not been submitted for prior negotiation with the social and economic partners since this might have cast doubt on the fact that it was the Government's sole responsibility to define the framework of labour relations' (originally cited in Juan A. Sagardoy Bengoechea, 'The Spanish Workers' Statute', Int. Labour Review 120/2 (1981) pp.217-8 [my emphasis added]). In contrast, Pérez-Díaz, Return of Civil Society (note 1) p.223, sees the Workers' Statute as part of a series of 'social or corporatist pacts' which took place within 'the framework of permanent negotiations between political and economic forces'.
33. See Kerstin Hamann, 'The Legislative Process and Interest Groups in Spain', paper prepared for the 55th annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago IL (10-12 April 1997) p.5. Hamann quotes the Minister of Labour's comment that the draft 'had not been submitted for prior negotiation with the social and economic partners since this might have cast doubt on the fact that it was the Government's sole responsibility to define the framework of labour relations' (originally cited in Juan A. Sagardoy Bengoechea, 'The Spanish Workers' Statute', Int. Labour Review 120/2 (1981) pp.217-8 [my emphasis added]). In contrast, Pérez-Díaz, Return of Civil Society (note 1) p.223, sees the Workers' Statute as part of a series of 'social or corporatist pacts' which took place within 'the framework of permanent negotiations between political and economic forces'.
34. See Kerstin Hamann, 'The Legislative Process and Interest Groups in Spain', paper prepared for the 55th annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago IL (10-12 April 1997) p.5. Hamann quotes the Minister of Labour's comment that the draft 'had not been submitted for prior negotiation with the social and economic partners since this might have cast doubt on the fact that it was the Government's sole responsibility to define the framework of labour relations' (originally cited in Juan A. Sagardoy Bengoechea, 'The Spanish Workers' Statute', Int. Labour Review 120/2 (1981) pp.217-8 [my emphasis added]). In contrast, Pérez-Díaz, Return of Civil Society (note 1) p.223, sees the Workers' Statute as part of a series of 'social or corporatist pacts' which took place within 'the framework of permanent negotiations between political and economic forces'.
35. Union membership fell from a peak of 4.4 million workers in 1978 (UGT: 2,020,000; CC.OO.: 1,840,441; USO: 556,000) to a low of under 1 million in 1986 (UGT: 369,690; CC.OO.: 332,019). Since 1986, total membership has continued to hover around the 1 million mark. See Rafael Pardo, 'Organizaciones empresariales, sindicatos y relaciones industriales en el cambio de siglo', in Javier Tusell, Emílio Lamo de Espinosa and Rafael Pardo (eds) Entre dos siglos. Reflexiones sobre la democracia española (Madrid: Alianza 1996) pp.485-500.
36. It is interesting to note that the Communist Party, led by Santiago Carrillo, was desperate to be involved in the Moncloa Pacts as a signal of its political significance following the PCE's poor performance in the June 1977 general elections. See Santiago Carrillo, El año de la Constitución (Barcelona: Critica 1978) pp. 115-24; Gregorio Morán, Miseria y grandeza del Partido Comunísta de España, 1939-1985 (Barcelona: Planeta 1986) pp.554-5. The CC.OO., on the other hand, which enjoyed a larger following than the UGT in the initial stages of the transition to democracy, was always much more hesitant about pacts, suggesting that pact-making often reflects political weakness rather than strength.
37. It is interesting to note that the Communist Party, led by Santiago Carrillo, was desperate to be involved in the Moncloa Pacts as a signal of its political significance following the PCE's poor performance in the June 1977 general elections. See Santiago Carrillo, El año de la Constitución (Barcelona: Critica 1978) pp. 115-24; Gregorio Morán, Miseria y grandeza del Partido Comunísta de España, 1939-1985 (Barcelona: Planeta 1986) pp.554-5. The CC.OO., on the other hand, which enjoyed a larger following than the UGT in the initial stages of the transition to democracy, was always much more hesitant about pacts, suggesting that pact-making often reflects political weakness rather than strength.
38. The characterisation here draws on Soskice, 'Institutional Infrastructure'; Peter A. Hall, 'The Comparative Political Economy of Europe in an Era of Interdependence' (paper presented at conference on 'The Politics and Political Economy of Contemporary Capitalism', U. of North Carolina, Sept. 1994); and Peter A. Hall, 'Organized Market Economies and Unemployment in Europe: Is it Finally Time to Accept Liberal Orthodoxy?' (paper presented at 11th International Conference of Europeanists, Baltimore, Feb. 1998). I am grateful to Erik Jones for bringing this last paper to my attention.
39. The characterisation here draws on Soskice, 'Institutional Infrastructure'; Peter A. Hall, 'The Comparative Political Economy of Europe in an Era of Interdependence' (paper presented at conference on 'The Politics and Political Economy of Contemporary Capitalism', U. of North Carolina, Sept. 1994); and Peter A. Hall, 'Organized Market Economies and Unemployment in Europe: Is it Finally Time to Accept Liberal Orthodoxy?' (paper presented at 11th International Conference of Europeanists, Baltimore, Feb. 1998). I am grateful to Erik Jones for bringing this last paper to my attention.
40. The characterisation here draws on Soskice, 'Institutional Infrastructure'; Peter A. Hall, 'The Comparative Political Economy of Europe in an Era of Interdependence' (paper presented at conference on 'The Politics and Political Economy of Contemporary Capitalism', U. of North Carolina, Sept. 1994); and Peter A. Hall, 'Organized Market Economies and Unemployment in Europe: Is it Finally Time to Accept Liberal Orthodoxy?' (paper presented at 11th International Conference of Europeanists, Baltimore, Feb. 1998). I am grateful to Erik Jones for bringing this last paper to my attention.
41. Contrary to the central argument in Bermeo, 'Sacrifice, Sequence and Strength' (note 1), structural adjustment measures carried out in the latter part of the 1980s and in the early 1990s did not represent an economic 'transition', parallel to the political transition from dictatorship to democracy. Spain already had an established market-based capitalist economy, and it is misleading to see the adjustments carried out under the Socialists, which matched adjustments carried out in several industrial democracies in the 1980s, as being comparable with the 'dual transitions' which marked former communist regimes of eastern Europe.
42. Elements of the 1980 Workers' Statute had in fact been reformed by Decreto Real (decree law) in Dec. 1993. Consultation through the CES in Oct. and Nov. 1993 had resulted in the unions walking out of discussions, although the general strike called for 27 Jan. 1994 had nothing like the impact of the 1988 stoppage.
43. For details of the 1994 reform, see G. Vidal Caruana and J Vidal-Beneyto, Análisis práctico de la Reforma Laboral (Madrid; Editorial CIS 1994); UGT-FIA, Reforma laboral y negociation colectiva (Madrid: UGT 1994); CC.OO., La acción sindical en el nuevo marco de relaciones laborales (Madrid: Unión Sindical de Madrid Región 1994); M.R. Alarcon (ed.) La Reforma Laboral de 1994 (Madrid: Marcial Pons 1994).
44. For details of the 1994 reform, see G. Vidal Caruana and J Vidal-Beneyto, Análisis práctico de la Reforma Laboral (Madrid; Editorial CIS 1994); UGT-FIA, Reforma laboral y negociation colectiva (Madrid: UGT 1994); CC.OO., La acción sindical en el nuevo marco de relaciones laborales (Madrid: Unión Sindical de Madrid Región 1994); M.R. Alarcon (ed.) La Reforma Laboral de 1994 (Madrid: Marcial Pons 1994).
45. For details of the 1994 reform, see G. Vidal Caruana and J Vidal-Beneyto, Análisis práctico de la Reforma Laboral (Madrid; Editorial CIS 1994); UGT-FIA, Reforma laboral y negociation colectiva (Madrid: UGT 1994); CC.OO., La acción sindical en el nuevo marco de relaciones laborales (Madrid: Unión Sindical de Madrid Región 1994); M.R. Alarcon (ed.) La Reforma Laboral de 1994 (Madrid: Marcial Pons 1994).
46. For details of the 1994 reform, see G. Vidal Caruana and J Vidal-Beneyto, Análisis práctico de la Reforma Laboral (Madrid; Editorial CIS 1994); UGT-FIA, Reforma laboral y negociation colectiva (Madrid: UGT 1994); CC.OO., La acción sindical en el nuevo marco de relaciones laborales (Madrid: Unión Sindical de Madrid Región 1994); M.R. Alarcon (ed.) La Reforma Laboral de 1994 (Madrid: Marcial Pons 1994).
47. See Hall, 'Comparative Political Economy' (note 22) pp.24-6; Paul Heywood and Vincent Wright, 'Executives, Bureaucracies and Decision-Making', in Martin Rhodes, Paul Heywood and Vincent Wright (eds) Developments in West European Politics (London: Macmillan 1997) p.79.
48. See Hall, 'Comparative Political Economy' (note 22) pp.24-6; Paul Heywood and Vincent Wright, 'Executives, Bureaucracies and Decision-Making', in Martin Rhodes, Paul Heywood and Vincent Wright (eds) Developments in West European Politics (London: Macmillan 1997) p.79.
49. On the failure of social interests to become institutionally entrenched in democratic Spain, see Joaquim Molins and Alex Casademunt in this volume.
50. See Paul Heywood, Spain's Next Five Years: A Political Risk Analysis (London: Economist Intelligence Unit 1991) p.23. The guerristas were supporters of Alfonso Guerra, deputy prime minister until his resignation at the start of 1991, whose rhetoric became increasingly leftist in opposition to the renovadores, supporters of the market-oriented policies favoured by Felipe Gonález and the Minister of the Economy, Carlos Solchaga.
51. See below, and also Raj Chari in this volume.
52. A. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little Brown 1984).
53. See Heywood and Wright, 'Executives, Bureaucracies and Decision-making' (note 26).
54. See José López Calvo, Organización yfuncionamiento del Gobierno (Madrid: Tecnos 1996) pp.240ff; Alejandro Nieto, La "nueva" organización del desgobierno (Barcelona: Ariel 1996) pp.114ff.
55. See José López Calvo, Organización yfuncionamiento del Gobierno (Madrid: Tecnos 1996) pp.240ff; Alejandro Nieto, La "nueva" organización del desgobierno (Barcelona: Ariel 1996) pp.114ff.
56. The rank of secretary of state, equivalent to a British minister of state or junior minister, was created in 1977. Secretaries of state are in charge of specific and wide-ranging areas within departments (two departments have no secretary of state). The MEH has seen a further extension of its ambit since the Partido Popular assumed power in 1996, with the Secretary of State for Commerce transferring to its authority from the Ministry of Industry; tourism and small and medium size businesses have also moved under its auspices.
57. A Budget Office, run by a secretary of state, was established within the Moncloa in 1996 to help the PM play a more direct role in the formulation of budgetary policy priorities.
58. Against all this should be set the fact that autonomy granted to the Bank of Spain in 1994 (in order to allow Spain to qualify for economic and monetary union under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty) has removed one of the MEH's direct instruments of control, although the central bank's monetary policy must support the government's overall economic policy.
59. This arrangement was introduced by the PP administration of Aznar. Previously, there were six committees, dealing respectively with fiscal policy, public spending and employment; the effective use of public resources; developing human capital; social protection policy; the single European market; and regions and infrastructure. These had in turn replaced in 1989 six other committees, with more broad ranging remits. See J. Sánchez Revenga, Presupuestos Generales del Estado y aspectos básicos del Presupueslo general de las CEE (Barcelona: Ariel 1994) p.114.
60. M. Baena del Alcázar, Instituciones Administrativas (Madrid: Marcial Pons 1992) p.110. See also, E. Zapico, La modernización simbólica del presupuesto público (Inst. Vasco de Administración Pública 1989).
61. M. Baena del Alcázar, Instituciones Administrativas (Madrid: Marcial Pons 1992) p.110. See also, E. Zapico, La modernización simbólica del presupuesto público (Inst. Vasco de Administración Pública 1989).
62. Previously, the normative budget was drawn up by DGP's Subdirectorate General for Planning (Subdirección General de Estudios) and the realistic budget by the Subdirectorate General for Economic Analysis and Drafting (Subdirección General de Análisis y Programación Económical. The first of these bodies no longer exists, whilst the latter no longer draws up the realistic budget although it remains responsible for broad budgetary planning.
63. Interview by Belén Barreiro with José Antonio Godé, Subdirector General de Política Presupuestaria, 18 May 1998.
64. Nieto, La "nueva" organization (note 32) p. 126.
65. Gunther, 'Spanish Public Policy' (note 4) pp.51-9 passim., points out that under the UCD governments of Suárez and Calvo Sotelo, discussions of economic or budgetary matters in the Council of Ministers were rare, and disputes on such matters were never resolved by a vote; instead, the PM would arbitrate - a practice which continued under the PSOE governments of Gonzalez. In fact, under the PSOE, the authority of the Minister of the Economy was further enhanced by downplaying the role of the deputy PM, who no longer took part in bilateral negotiations between the MEH and other spending ministries.
66. de la Dehesa, 'Spain' (note 1) pp. 139-40; Enrique Fuentes Quintana, 'Economía y economistas españoles', Revista de Economia (1991).
67. de la Dehesa, 'Spain' (note 1) pp. 139-40; Enrique Fuentes Quintana, 'Economía y economistas españoles', Revista de Economia (1991).
68. See Pablo Castellano, 'El Parlamento y el Gobierno', in Javier Tusell and Justino Sinova (eds) La década socialista. El ocaso de Felipe González (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe 1992) pp. 139-50; Manuel Ramírez, 'Problemática actual del Parlamento', Revista de Estudios Políticos 87 (Jan.-March 1995) pp.53-80. For an alternative view, see Javier Pérez Royo, 'El mito de la crisis del Parlamento', in Tusell et al., Entre dos siglos (note 20) pp.53-78. A detailed description of how the Spanish parliament operates is in Michael T. Newton, Institutions of Modern Spain (Cambridge: CUP 1997) pp.45-7 2 .
69. See Pablo Castellano, 'El Parlamento y el Gobierno', in Javier Tusell and Justino Sinova (eds) La década socialista. El ocaso de Felipe González (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe 1992) pp. 139-50; Manuel Ramírez, 'Problemática actual del Parlamento', Revista de Estudios Políticos 87 (Jan.-March 1995) pp.53-80. For an alternative view, see Javier Pérez Royo, 'El mito de la crisis del Parlamento', in Tusell et al., Entre dos siglos (note 20) pp.53-78. A detailed description of how the Spanish parliament operates is in Michael T. Newton, Institutions of Modern Spain (Cambridge: CUP 1997) pp.45-7 2 .
70. See Pablo Castellano, 'El Parlamento y el Gobierno', in Javier Tusell and Justino Sinova (eds) La década socialista. El ocaso de Felipe González (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe 1992) pp. 139-50; Manuel Ramírez, 'Problemática actual del Parlamento', Revista de Estudios Políticos 87 (Jan.-March 1995) pp.53-80. For an alternative view, see Javier Pérez Royo, 'El mito de la crisis del Parlamento', in Tusell et al., Entre dos siglos (note 20) pp.53-78. A detailed description of how the Spanish parliament operates is in Michael T. Newton, Institutions of Modern Spain (Cambridge: CUP 1997) pp.45-7 2 .
71. See Pablo Castellano, 'El Parlamento y el Gobierno', in Javier Tusell and Justino Sinova (eds) La década socialista. El ocaso de Felipe González (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe 1992) pp. 139-50; Manuel Ramírez, 'Problemática actual del Parlamento', Revista de Estudios Políticos 87 (Jan.-March 1995) pp.53-80. For an alternative view, see Javier Pérez Royo, 'El mito de la crisis del Parlamento', in Tusell et al., Entre dos siglos (note 20) pp.53-78. A detailed description of how the Spanish parliament operates is in Michael T. Newton, Institutions of Modern Spain (Cambridge: CUP 1997) pp.45-7 2 .
72. The reasons for the rejection were entirely political, rather than because of any fundamental conflict over macroeconomic objectives or priorities. The PP government of José María Aznar has also been forced to rely on a pact with the CiU, together with the Basque nationalist PNV. The broad parameters of macroeconomic policy since the 1993 elections have remained conditioned by a cross-party determination to meet the convergence criteria for economic and monetary union laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. Indeed, the budgets for 1996 and 1997 were marked by a high degree of continuity, in spite of having been elaborated by governments of very distinct ideological persuasion. Since 1993, major effort has been devoted to ensuring greater budgetary discipline, which had previously been among the most lax in Europe.
73. See Gunther, 'Spanish Public Policy' (note 4) pp.44-6. Of course, some interests have close ties with particular parties, for instance the Catholic Church and the Partido Popular. In general, though, mainstream parties have sought to colonise the centre ground of politics.
74. On Spain's complex system of regional autonomy, see Josep Colomer in this volume; Heywood, Government and Politics of Spain (note 5) Ch.7;
75. Newton, Institutions of Modern Spain (note 43) Ch.7.
76. See Ana Rico, Pablo González and Marta Fraile in this volume for a penetrating analysis of regional decentralisation of health policy.
77. See Martin Rhodes, Paul Heywood and Vincent Wright, 'Towards a New Europe?' idem, Developments in West European Politics (note 26) pp.8-11.
78. See Colin Crouch and Anand Menon, 'Organised Interests and the State', in ibid. pp. 151-68.
79. For a discussion of the diversity of capitalist organisation within Europe, see Martin Rhodes and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, 'Capitalism versus Capitalism in Western Europe', in ibid. pp.171-89.