Collective memory of the Spanish civil war: The case of the political amnesty in the Spanish transition to democracy

Democratization

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 88-109

  Aguilar, Paloma ^a,b  

^a Instituto Juan March   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE EDUCACIÓN A DISTANCIA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; POLITICAL HISTORY; POLITICAL MOBILISATION;

SPAIN;

EID: 0031463074     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510349708403537     Document Type: Article

References (74)

1. Sidney Tarrow identifies two fundamental gaps in the new literature on transitions to democracy. On the one hand, the study of 'the strategic choices that mass publics make in inducing elites to move either towards democracy or in some other direction'; on the other, the analysis of 'how the solution to this problem conditions the nature of the emerging democratic system and its consolidation'. Sidney Tarrow, 'Mass Mobilization and Regime Change: Pacts, Reform and Popular Power in Italy (1918-1922) and Spain (1875-1978)', in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p.207. One of the few studies of the transition to, and consolidation of, democracy in Spain focusing on the mobilizations of this period is that of Ramón Adell, La transición politico en la calle. Manifestations políticas de grupos y masas. Madrid, 1976/1987 (Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1989).
2. Sidney Tarrow identifies two fundamental gaps in the new literature on transitions to democracy. On the one hand, the study of 'the strategic choices that mass publics make in inducing elites to move either towards democracy or in some other direction'; on the other, the analysis of 'how the solution to this problem conditions the nature of the emerging democratic system and its consolidation'. Sidney Tarrow, 'Mass Mobilization and Regime Change: Pacts, Reform and Popular Power in Italy (1918-1922) and Spain (1875-1978)', in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p.207. One of the few studies of the transition to, and consolidation of, democracy in Spain focusing on the mobilizations of this period is that of Ramón Adell, La transición politico en la calle. Manifestations políticas de grupos y masas. Madrid, 1976/1987 (Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1989).
3. Collective memory of the Spanish Civil War acted, mainly, in two different though complementary ways. On the one hand, it dissuaded the main political and social actors from engaging in confrontational politics. On the other hand, it persuaded actors to reach agreements and to embrace consensus.
4. Preference for these values was revealed in several polls conducted by the Instituto de Opinión Pública, above all between 1966 and 1976. For these data see, among other studies, Rafael López Pintor, La opinión pública espan̄ola del franquismo a la democracia (Madrid: CIS, 1982); Fundación FOESSA, Informe sociológico sobre el cambio político en España: 1975-1981 (Madrid: Euramérica, 1981).
5. Preference for these values was revealed in several polls conducted by the Instituto de Opinión Pública, above all between 1966 and 1976. For these data see, among other studies, Rafael López Pintor, La opinión pública espan̄ola del franquismo a la democracia (Madrid: CIS, 1982); Fundación FOESSA, Informe sociológico sobre el cambio político en España: 1975-1981 (Madrid: Euramérica, 1981).
6. According to Nancy Bermeo, 'political learning is the process through which people modify their political beliefs and tactics as a result of severe crisis, frustrations, and dramatic changes in environment'. Nancy Bermeo, 'Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorshi', Comparative Politics, Vol.24, No.3 (1992), pp.273-91, p.274.
7. Tarrow, 'Mass Mobilization', p.216.
8. The analytical distinction between 'hegemonic memory' and 'dominant memory' is useful. The latter is the narrative about the past more preeminent in public discourse, that is, in politics and the main mass media. The former is the most widespread in society. That is, among the many social memories we may find with respect to different variables (age, class, education and so on), it is the hegemonic one. In the following note we discuss the possibility, and consequences, of not having a hegemonic memory in society.
9. As, for example, in the former Yugoslavia, where the past clearly played the opposite role to that which it exercised in Spain. In Spain, memory of the fratricidal war clearly deterred confrontation; in the former Yugoslavia, memory of the civil war which broke out during the Second World War fuelled the subsequent violence. Various factors account for the difference. One of the most important is the predominant political culture in both countries. Dyker argues that in Yugoslavia no political cultures eclipsed the remaining existing cultures. Dyker found pronounced cultural fragmentation which made this country vulnerable to instability and political polarization. This also means there was no dominant collective memory of the past and that peaceful coexistence among the various cultures would be difficult. In Spain, despite the existence of a problem of national integration, a dominant political culture did exist along with an historical memory shared by the overwhelming majority of society as well as a project for coexistence accepted by nearly all Spaniards. David A. Dyker, 'Yugoslavia: Unity out of Diversity?' in Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds.), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (London: Macmillan, 1977).
10. While some minor groups disagreed with this version, most behaved as if there was a total consensus in this respect. The disagreement came, mainly, from both the radical right and the radical left. Consequently, both these groups excluded themselves from the negotiated process of the transition to democracy, rejecting the idea of a 'common guilt'.
11. For a more detailed study of the concept of historical memory in general and its influence in shaping the particular form of the transition in Spain, see Paloma Aguilar, Memoria y Olvido de la Guerra Civil Espan̄ola (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1996).
12. On the widespread mobilization within which demands for an amnesty took place, see: Robert Fishman, Working-Class Organisation and the Return to Democracy in Spain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); José M. Maravall, La político de la transición (Madrid: Taurus, 1981); Víctor Pérez Díaz, La primacía de la sociedad civil (Madrid: Alianza, 1993); Luis E. Alonso, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales y el hecho diferencial espan̄ol: una interpretación', in José Vidai Beneyto (ed.), Espan̄a a Debate (Madrid: Tecnos, 1991); José Álvarez Junco, 'Movimientos sociales: del modelo tradicional a la modernidad postfranquista', in Enrique Laraña y Joseph Gusfield (eds.), Los movimientos sociales. De la ideología a la identidad (Madrid: CIS, 1994); Juan J. García de la Cruz, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales', in Salvador Giner (ed.), Espan̄a: Sociedad y Político (Madrid: Espasa, 1990).
13. On the widespread mobilization within which demands for an amnesty took place, see: Robert Fishman, Working-Class Organisation and the Return to Democracy in Spain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); José M. Maravall, La político de la transición (Madrid: Taurus, 1981); Víctor Pérez Díaz, La primacía de la sociedad civil (Madrid: Alianza, 1993); Luis E. Alonso, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales y el hecho diferencial espan̄ol: una interpretación', in José Vidai Beneyto (ed.), Espan̄a a Debate (Madrid: Tecnos, 1991); José Álvarez Junco, 'Movimientos sociales: del modelo tradicional a la modernidad postfranquista', in Enrique Laraña y Joseph Gusfield (eds.), Los movimientos sociales. De la ideología a la identidad (Madrid: CIS, 1994); Juan J. García de la Cruz, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales', in Salvador Giner (ed.), Espan̄a: Sociedad y Político (Madrid: Espasa, 1990).
14. On the widespread mobilization within which demands for an amnesty took place, see: Robert Fishman, Working-Class Organisation and the Return to Democracy in Spain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); José M. Maravall, La político de la transición (Madrid: Taurus, 1981); Víctor Pérez Díaz, La primacía de la sociedad civil (Madrid: Alianza, 1993); Luis E. Alonso, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales y el hecho diferencial espan̄ol: una interpretación', in José Vidai Beneyto (ed.), Espan̄a a Debate (Madrid: Tecnos, 1991); José Álvarez Junco, 'Movimientos sociales: del modelo tradicional a la modernidad postfranquista', in Enrique Laraña y Joseph Gusfield (eds.), Los movimientos sociales. De la ideología a la identidad (Madrid: CIS, 1994); Juan J. García de la Cruz, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales', in Salvador Giner (ed.), Espan̄a: Sociedad y Político (Madrid: Espasa, 1990).
15. On the widespread mobilization within which demands for an amnesty took place, see: Robert Fishman, Working-Class Organisation and the Return to Democracy in Spain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); José M. Maravall, La político de la transición (Madrid: Taurus, 1981); Víctor Pérez Díaz, La primacía de la sociedad civil (Madrid: Alianza, 1993); Luis E. Alonso, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales y el hecho diferencial espan̄ol: una interpretación', in José Vidai Beneyto (ed.), Espan̄a a Debate (Madrid: Tecnos, 1991); José Álvarez Junco, 'Movimientos sociales: del modelo tradicional a la modernidad postfranquista', in Enrique Laraña y Joseph Gusfield (eds.), Los movimientos sociales. De la ideología a la identidad (Madrid: CIS, 1994); Juan J. García de la Cruz, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales', in Salvador Giner (ed.), Espan̄a: Sociedad y Político (Madrid: Espasa, 1990).
16. On the widespread mobilization within which demands for an amnesty took place, see: Robert Fishman, Working-Class Organisation and the Return to Democracy in Spain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); José M. Maravall, La político de la transición (Madrid: Taurus, 1981); Víctor Pérez Díaz, La primacía de la sociedad civil (Madrid: Alianza, 1993); Luis E. Alonso, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales y el hecho diferencial espan̄ol: una interpretación', in José Vidai Beneyto (ed.), Espan̄a a Debate (Madrid: Tecnos, 1991); José Álvarez Junco, 'Movimientos sociales: del modelo tradicional a la modernidad postfranquista', in Enrique Laraña y Joseph Gusfield (eds.), Los movimientos sociales. De la ideología a la identidad (Madrid: CIS, 1994); Juan J. García de la Cruz, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales', in Salvador Giner (ed.), Espan̄a: Sociedad y Político (Madrid: Espasa, 1990).
17. On the widespread mobilization within which demands for an amnesty took place, see: Robert Fishman, Working-Class Organisation and the Return to Democracy in Spain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); José M. Maravall, La político de la transición (Madrid: Taurus, 1981); Víctor Pérez Díaz, La primacía de la sociedad civil (Madrid: Alianza, 1993); Luis E. Alonso, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales y el hecho diferencial espan̄ol: una interpretación', in José Vidai Beneyto (ed.), Espan̄a a Debate (Madrid: Tecnos, 1991); José Álvarez Junco, 'Movimientos sociales: del modelo tradicional a la modernidad postfranquista', in Enrique Laraña y Joseph Gusfield (eds.), Los movimientos sociales. De la ideología a la identidad (Madrid: CIS, 1994); Juan J. García de la Cruz, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales', in Salvador Giner (ed.), Espan̄a: Sociedad y Político (Madrid: Espasa, 1990).
18. Among studies including data on the number of working days and hours lost through strike action, see José M. Maravall, Dictadura y disentimiento politico (Madrid: Alfaguara, 1978), and José F. Tezanos, 'Los conflictos laborales en Espan̄a', Revista de Estudios Políticos, Vol.38 (1974), pp.93-110. On the labour movement during the dictatorship, see Joe Foweraker, Making Democracy in Spain: Grassroots Struggle in the South, 1955-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
19. Among studies including data on the number of working days and hours lost through strike action, see José M. Maravall, Dictadura y disentimiento politico (Madrid: Alfaguara, 1978), and José F. Tezanos, 'Los conflictos laborales en Espan̄a', Revista de Estudios Políticos, Vol.38 (1974), pp.93-110. On the labour movement during the dictatorship, see Joe Foweraker, Making Democracy in Spain: Grassroots Struggle in the South, 1955-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
20. Among studies including data on the number of working days and hours lost through strike action, see José M. Maravall, Dictadura y disentimiento politico (Madrid: Alfaguara, 1978), and José F. Tezanos, 'Los conflictos laborales en Espan̄a', Revista de Estudios Políticos, Vol.38 (1974), pp.93-110. On the labour movement during the dictatorship, see Joe Foweraker, Making Democracy in Spain: Grassroots Struggle in the South, 1955-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
21. Enrique de la Villa y Aurelio Desdentado, La amnistia laboral. Una crítica político y jurídica (Madrid: Ediciones de la Torre, 1978), p.22.
22. Ibid., p.204.
23. Miguel Castells, Los procesos políticos. (De la cártel a la amnistía) (Madrid: Fundamentos, 1977), p.158.
24. Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, El camino hacia la democracia. Escritos en 'Cuadernos para el Diálogo' (1963-1976) (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1985), p.414.
25. Marcelino Camacho, Confleso que he luchado (Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 1990), p.295.
26. Ruiz Giménez, p.210.
27. Jesús Iribarren, Documentas de la Conferencia Episcopal Espan̄ola (Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1984), p.342.
28. Ibid., p.406. Emphasis added.
29. Carrero Blanco was prime minister and Franco's chosen successor as Head of State. A leader of the most immobilist elements within the regime, his assassination by the Basque terrorist organization ETA opened a succession crisis. ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna) is a radical Basque terrorist organisation founded in 1959.
30. For a list of all pardons conceded between 1936 and 1975, see Enrique Linde Paniagua, Amnistía e indulto en Espan̄a (Madrid: Túcar, 1976), p.208.
31. José M. Rodríguez Devesa, Derecho Penal Espan̄ol (Madrid: Gráficas Carasa, 1981), pp.638-69.
32. Ibid., p.641.
33. Clearly, the Civil War was not forgotten. Indeed, because the memory was so much alive, many thought that to avoid a repetition a public debate on it should be avoided. At the same time, it was an important topic for Spanish society, very much present in films, novels, history books, memoirs and exhibitions.
34. Fraga was then Minister of Information and Tourism and a prominent reformist within the regime. These declarations are in Laureano López Rodó, Memorias. An̄os decisivos (Barcelona: Plaza Janés/Cambio 16, 1991), p.474.
35. Only in the 1980s would political prisoners of the dictatorship be specifically compensated for the years they had spent incarcerated.
36. Castells, p. 157.
37. Decree of 25 Nov. 1975, No. 2940/75, Boletin Oficial del Estado, 25 and 26 Nov. 1975.
38. Arias Navarro was Prime Minister when Franco died.
39. Antonio Garrigues, Diáloges conmigo mismo (Barcelona: Planeta, 1978), p.170.
40. Suárez's democratic and pacifying credentials were to a large extent rooted in how, as acting Minister of the Interior during the first government of the monarchy, he handled two crucial events. His moderate response to the violence in Vitoria and Montejurra, described below, not only contrasted with that of the minister, Fraga, but also made Suárez one of the natural candidates for prime minister in the new government.
41. Royal Decree-Act 30 July 1976, No.10/76. Boletin Oficial del Estado, 4 Aug.1976.
42. Miguel Herrero de Miñón, Memorias de estío (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1993), pp.73-4.
43. The Minister of Justice, Landelino Lavilla, declared that 'the amnesty is intended to be an effective and sincere measure of reconciliation to promote complete national coexistence', El Pais, 12 Aug. 1976.
44. The UMD was a clandestine organisation formed in August 1974 by 12 junior army officers who favored democracy and whose members were arrested and imprisoned a year later.
45. These were the soldiers who had supported the Republican cause during the Civil War and who had lost all their rights after expulsion from the army. They now demanded their reincorporation into the armed forces or, given that the majority had reached retirement age, the recognition of their right to a pension corresponding to the rank which they would have held had they not been purged.
46. In its final form, this controversial law had amnestied not only those members of the military who had conspired against the Republic, but also anarchists who had taken part in the revolutionary unpheavals of the period. See Stanley G. Payne, Spain's First Democracy: The Second Republic. 1936-1939 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), p.187.
47. Herrero de Miñón, p.79.
48. Alfonso Osorio, Trayectoria poli̇tico de un ministre de ta Corona (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980), p.161.
49. GRAPO (Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre) is an extreme left wing terrorist organisation created in 1976.
50. Instituto de Opinion Pública (IOP), now the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Study No.I,093, 'Indulto y Amnistía (1)', Jan. 1976; number of interviews: 1,250.
51. The results are even more conclusive if abstentions are omitted. More than 84 per cent of those who responded favored a general amnesty which excluded crimes involving bloodshed, whilst 77 per cent thought that this could help to pacify the political climate and further national reconciliation.
52. IOP-CIS, Study No.1, 105, Indulto y Amnistía (2)', July 1976; number of interviews: 1,438.
53. As with the previous poll, if we omit those who abstained and again calculate the percentages on the basis of the answers obtained, 66.5 per cent agreed with the Act and almost 60 per cent declared that it would help to bring about true national reconciliation.
54. Rodolfo Martín Villa, Al servicio del Estado (Barcelona: Planeta, 1984), p.164.
55. José E. Sobremonte, Indultos y amnistía (Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 1980), p.102.
56. The government also recognized the need to introduce wide acts of clemency in order to pacify the increasingly tense situation in the Basque Country.
57. IOP-CIS, Study No.1, 13, 'Indulto y Amnistía (3)', Sept. 1977; number of interviews: 476 in the Basque Country and 1,087 in Spain as a whole. This poll is discussed in Revista Española de Opinión Pública, No. 50, Oct.-Dec. 1977: pp.265-85.
58. Act of 23 Sept. 1939.
59. Martín Villa, p.164.
60. As employers refused to allow workers to call assemblies in the workplace, these were often held in churches.
61. According to Martín Villa, these actions had not been promoted by the 'the large illegal organizations at the national level', but by much more radical and maximalist 'marginal organizations'. Martín Villa, p.27.
62. For the evolution of labour conflict during the transition, see Maravall, La político, p.29 This shows that strikes fell notably between March and August 1976. Whilst they rose again in September, the general downward trend continued until November 1977. A dramatic upturn began the following month, reaching a climax in May 1978.
63. See Joan Trullén i Thomàs, Fundamentos econémicos de la transición político española. La político económica de los Acuerdos de la Moncloa (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1993).
64. Maravall, La político, p.27.
65. 'The pressure from labour was always very intense, but there came a moment when it became largely disconnected from the strategies of the organizations and, moreover, hard for these to direct', ibid., p.28.
66. See Víctor Sampedro, Nuevos movimientos sociales, agendas políticas e informativas: el caso de la objeción de conciencia (Madrid: Instituto Juan March, 1996).
67. See the second volume of the thesis by Adell, op. cit., pp.14-18.
68. This is hardly surprising, given that the first six months of 1977 were plagued by violence. In January and February three pro-amnesty demonstrators died, the first in Sestao (Bilbao) and the others in Madrid. There was a further death in March, the prelude to the four victims of protests of this kind which took place in May. January 1977 also saw the assassination of five labour lawyers in their office in the Calle Atocha in Madrid. On various occasions it has been noted that the moderate and peaceful attitude of the PCE at the funerals for its murdered members was what convinced the government, and an important part of public opinion, of the democratizing and cooperative disposition of the Communists, who were legalized only three months later. Finally, it should be noted that the police also suffered losses, as five policemen were killed in the same period.
69. At least 65 Basque mayors threatened to resign if all prisoners were not finally released, and the Pro-Amnesty Committees announced a new week of protest if the same objective was not obtained.
70. Public order and social peace, both narrowly conceived, were the priorities of the Spanish right. Although AP leaders declared that 'peaceful coexistence in a democratic system could only come through national reconciliation', they were very worried by the possibility that an excessively wide amnesty might give rise to 'belligerent' attitudes by those seeking 'revenge'. As such, they always opposed any amnesty including crimes involving bloodshed. On the other hand, they rarely disguised their hostility towards the pro-amnesty mobilizations, declaring that on some occasions these only sought to disturb public order. Moreover, they insisted that the amnesty could not be 'the consequence of weakness, blackmail, or the loss of control of the street'. Manuel Fraga, Alianza Popular (Bilbao: Albia, 1977), p.75.
71. The coalition of left wing and republican parties which won the last elections of the Second Republic held in February 1936, four months before the outbreak of the Civil War.
72. De La Villa and Desdentado, p.29.
73. El País, 10 Dec. 1977, p.9. These declarations were basically directed towards the extra-parliamentary groups which had not accepted the Moncloa Pacts.
74. According to a poll carried out by the IOP-CIS in 1977, only four per cent of the population had recently participated in 'any congress, meeting, demonstration or lecture connected with a political party or politics in general'. See Revisia Española de Estudios Políticos, Vol.48 (1977). p.426.