NATO's post-cold war collective action problem

International Security

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 78-106

  Lepgold, Joseph ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032380760     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.23.1.78     Document Type: Review

References (106)

1. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). For an interesting attempt to apply regime theory to NATO, see Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistance after the Cold War," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 445-475.
2. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). For an interesting attempt to apply regime theory to NATO, see Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistance after the Cold War," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 445-475.
3. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-WEU-251, September 8, 1997, p. 1.
4. Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 306.
5. Ronald D. Asmus, "Double Enlargement: Redefining the Atlantic Partnership after the Cold War," in David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 35.
6. See Keohane, After Hegemony, chap. 6.
7. Micheal E. Brown, European Security: Defining the Debates (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming). Quoted material appears on p. 29 of August 1997 draft.
8. These points are found in "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," agreed by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 7-8, 1991, reprinted in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO handbook (Brussels: NATO Office to as the Information and Press, 1995), p. 237, Article 10. Hereafter this document will be referred to as the "Strategic Concept."
9. These points are found in "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," agreed by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 7-8, 1991, reprinted in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO handbook (Brussels: NATO Office to as the Information and Press, 1995), p. 237, Article 10. Hereafter this document will be referred to as the "Strategic Concept."
10. Asmus, "Double Enlargement," p. 37.
11. Strategic Concept, Articles 32, 47(d), pp. 241-245.
12. Quoted in Bruce Jentleson, "Who, Why, What, and How: Debates over Post-Cold War Military Intervention," in Robert J. Leiber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman, 1997), p. 64.
13. James Goodby, "Can Collective Security Work? Reflections on the European Case," in Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, Managing Global Chaos, p. 248.
14. Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 10-11. In some conflicts, of course, the local parties do not see humanitarian relief as disinterested, even if that is its intention. In fact, the relief supplies can themselves become spoils of war. For a good treatment of these issues in the case of Sudan, see David Keen, The Benefits of Famine (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 144-147.
15. Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 10-11. In some conflicts, of course, the local parties do not see humanitarian relief as disinterested, even if that is its intention. In fact, the relief supplies can themselves become spoils of war. For a good treatment of these issues in the case of Sudan, see David Keen, The Benefits of Famine (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 144-147.
16. Stuart Kaufman, "Preventive Peacekeeping, Ethnic Violence, and Macedonia," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1996), p. 232.
17. David Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 67.
18. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict (Berkeley: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, 1996), pp. 12, 39-42; and Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear," pp. 67-68.
19. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict (Berkeley: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, 1996), pp. 12, 39-42; and Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear," pp. 67-68.
20. Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear," pp. 43-44.
21. Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss, "Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics: An Overview," in Lepgold and Weiss, eds., Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 27-30.
22. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1997), p. 6.
23. A succinct statement of current U.S. policy on this issue is found in Walter Slocombe, "Is There Still a Role for Nuclear Deterrence?" NATO Review, Vol. 45, No. 6 (November/December 1997), p. 25.
24. Ibid.
25. For a discussion of the concept of security communities, see Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957).
26. Charles Glaser, "Future Security Arrangements for Europe," in George W. Downs, ed., Collective Security beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) p. 230.
27. Ibid., p. 231.
28. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 36-39.
29. Glaser, "Future Security Arrangements for Europe," pp. 230-231.
30. Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler distinguish between "free" and "easy" riding in "Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods," Economic Journal, Vol. 94, No. 375 (September 1984), p. 580, fn. 2. They note that "free" riding implies no contribution at all to a collective good and is thus a polar type. "Easy" riding, which implies some contribution short of what would be the optimum from a group perspective, is presumably more typical. I use both terms to leave open the possibility that either can occur within NATO.
31. Strategic Concept, Article 39, p. 243.
32. Lawrence Freedman, "Bosnia: Does Peace Support Make Any Sense?" NATO Review, Vol. 43, No. 6 (November 1995), p. 19.
33. These two possibilities are taken from Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 50-51.
34. Goodby, "Can Collective Security Work?" p. 238.
35. Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How?" p. 52.
36. These are called "club goods." See Todd Sandler, Collective Action (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982), pp. 6-7.
37. These goods are known as "common pool resources." See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 30-33. For a typology of the four principal types of goods (nonrival and nonexcludable, rival and excludable, nonrival and excludable, rival and nonexcludable), see J. Samuel Barkin and George E. Shambaugh, "Hypotheses on the International Politics of Common Pool Resources," in Barkin and Shambaugh, Anarchy and the Environment: The International Relations of Common Pool Resources (Albany: State University of New York Press, forthcoming), chap. 1.
38. These goods are known as "common pool resources." See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 30-33. For a typology of the four principal types of goods (nonrival and nonexcludable, rival and excludable, nonrival and excludable, rival and nonexcludable), see J. Samuel Barkin and George E. Shambaugh, "Hypotheses on the International Politics of Common Pool Resources," in Barkin and Shambaugh, Anarchy and the Environment: The International Relations of Common Pool Resources (Albany: State University of New York Press, forthcoming), chap. 1.
39. James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of NATO," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), p. 240. This is the case because the capability of the deterring state or organization to carry out a threat of retaliation is a function of its capacity to cover a target set in some other state, not the size of the territory being protected.
40. Sandler, Collective Action, pp. 100-101; and Murdoch and Sandler, "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of NATO," p. 242.
41. Sandler, Collective Action, pp. 100-101; and Murdoch and Sandler, "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of NATO," p. 242.
42. Eric Schmitt, "The G.O.P. Is Urging Hussein's Ouster," New York Times, February 17, 1998, p. A6.
43. In 1977 and 1978 NATO members agreed to increase their defense budgets 3 percent annually in real terms. Beginning in the 1980s, the U.S. Congress required the executive branch to report annually whether other members were carrying out this commitment. In general, these reports found that, except in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, few non-U.S. members met their pledge. See Phil williams, U.S. Troops in Europe, Chatham Hous Papers No. 25, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Routledge and kegan Paul, 1984), p. 60.
44. On this point see Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), p. 266; James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "Complementarity, Free Riding, and the Military Expenditures of NATO Allies," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 25, No. 1/2 (November 1984), pp. 83-101; John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, "The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests," Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 373-396; and Glenn Palmer, "Corralling the Free Rider: Deterrence and the Western Alliance," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 1990), pp. 147-164.
45. On this point see Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), p. 266; James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "Complementarity, Free Riding, and the Military Expenditures of NATO Allies," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 25, No. 1/2 (November 1984), pp. 83-101; John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, "The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests," Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 373-396; and Glenn Palmer, "Corralling the Free Rider: Deterrence and the Western Alliance," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 1990), pp. 147-164.
46. On this point see Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), p. 266; James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "Complementarity, Free Riding, and the Military Expenditures of NATO Allies," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 25, No. 1/2 (November 1984), pp. 83-101; John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, "The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests," Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 373-396; and Glenn Palmer, "Corralling the Free Rider: Deterrence and the Western Alliance," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 1990), pp. 147-164.
47. On this point see Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), p. 266; James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "Complementarity, Free Riding, and the Military Expenditures of NATO Allies," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 25, No. 1/2 (November 1984), pp. 83-101; John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, "The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests," Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 373-396; and Glenn Palmer, "Corralling the Free Rider: Deterrence and the Western Alliance," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 1990), pp. 147-164.
48. Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 44-45, 62-70.
49. Donald M. Snow, National Security, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 213.
50. Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), pp. 67-68; and Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear," p. 68.
51. Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), pp. 67-68; and Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear," p. 68.
52. Freedman, "Bosnia: Does Peace Support Make Any Sense?" p. 238.
53. Ibid.
54. Goodby, "Can Collective Security Work?" p. 238.
55. Ivo Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 5, 6, 9.
56. Joseph C. Cyrulik, "So We Control the Air," Washington Post, February 3, 1998, p. A17.
57. David T. Burbach, "Ready for Action? European Capabilities for Peace Operations," Breakthroughs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 10-19.
58. Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping,"p. 316.
59. Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, Adelphi Paper No. 305 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1996, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies), p. 37.
60. Committee on Techniques for the Enhancement of Human Performance, Daniel Druckman, Jerome Singer, and Harold Van Cott, eds., Enhancing Organizational Performance (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences Press, 1997), chap. 7, pp. 168-169. The analysis concludes that "a gap exists between the skills being trained and the activities that occur in peacekeeping and related missions" (p. 169).
61. Kaufman, "Preventive Peacekeeping, Ethnic Violence, and Macedonia," p. 240.
62. Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 201
63. Freedman, "Bosnia: Does Peace Support Make Any Sense?" p. 21.
64. Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), chap. 1.
65. Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.105.
66. The one apparent exception would seem to be the use of nuclear to retaliate for the use of weapons of mass destruction by some state or other actor. For an argument that there is an implicit norm proscribing nuclear attack against a nonnuclear actor, see Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 134-143.
67. Bertel Heurlin, Military Command Structures in the Baltic Sea Area (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 3.
68. Chris Hedges, "Bosnia Jitters: West Fearful of Having to Use Force," New York Times, September 11, 1997, p. A6.
69. Rick Atkinson, "Warriors without a War," Washington Post, April 14, 1997; and Ralph Peters, "After the Revolution," Parameters, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 7-14.
70. Rick Atkinson, "Warriors without a War," Washington Post, April 14, 1997; and Ralph Peters, "After the Revolution," Parameters, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 7-14.
71. William Drodziak, "U.S. Urges Formation of Special Unit for War Crimes Duty," Washington Post, December 18, 1996, p. A25; Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Ponders Special Force to Arrest War Suspects," New York Times, December 9, 1996, p. A11; and Philip Shenon, "Nominee to Lead Joint Chiefs Faces Tough Bosnia Questions," New York Times, September 10, 1997, p. A18.
72. William Drodziak, "U.S. Urges Formation of Special Unit for War Crimes Duty," Washington Post, December 18, 1996, p. A25; Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Ponders Special Force to Arrest War Suspects," New York Times, December 9, 1996, p. A11; and Philip Shenon, "Nominee to Lead Joint Chiefs Faces Tough Bosnia Questions," New York Times, September 10, 1997, p. A18.
73. William Drodziak, "U.S. Urges Formation of Special Unit for War Crimes Duty," Washington Post, December 18, 1996, p. A25; Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Ponders Special Force to Arrest War Suspects," New York Times, December 9, 1996, p. A11; and Philip Shenon, "Nominee to Lead Joint Chiefs Faces Tough Bosnia Questions," New York Times, September 10, 1997, p. A18.
74. This paragraph draws on J. Samuel Barkin and George E. Shambaugh, "Common Pool Resources and International Environmental Politics," Environmental Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 1996,p. 433. For the original tragedy-of-the commons argument, see Garret Hardin, Science, Vol. 162 (December 1968), pp. 1243-1248.
75. This paragraph draws on J. Samuel Barkin and George E. Shambaugh, "Common Pool Resources and International Environmental Politics," Environmental Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 1996,p. 433. For the original tragedy-of-the commons argument, see Garret Hardin, Science, Vol. 162 (December 1968), pp. 1243-1248.
76. Barkin and Shambaugh, "Common Pool Resources and International Environmental Politics," p. 433.
77. Harvey Starr, Anarchy, Order, and Integration (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 38.
78. Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), p. 66.
79. Brian Urquhart, "Who Will Police the World?" New York Review of Books, May 12, 1994, p. 31. The result, in the words of one of analysis, is that "having gone from feast to famine in the mid-1990s, the United Nations had a bad case of institutional indigestion." See Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics, p. 91.
80. Brian Urquhart, "Who Will Police the World?" New York Review of Books, May 12, 1994, p. 31. The result, in the words of one of analysis, is that "having gone from feast to famine in the mid-1990s, the United Nations had a bad case of institutional indigestion." See Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics, p. 91.
81. William Drozdiak, "Instability to the South Worries U.S. Forces in Europe," Washington Post Foreign Service (www.washingtonpost.com), May 19, 1997, p. A02.
82. William Drozdiak, "European Allies at Expanded Role for NATO," Washington Post, February 22, 1998, p. A27.
83. Hedges, "Bosnia Jitters."
84. Strategic Concept, Article 10, p. 237.
85. Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," p. 272.
86. See "A New Kind of Alliances?" Economist, June 1, 1996, p. 19.
87. Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 89.
88. Anthony Cragg, "The Combined Joint Task Forces Concept: A Key Component of the Alliance's Adaptation," NATO Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1996), p. 9.
89. James A. Thomson, "A partnership, New NATO Military Structure," in Gompert and Larrabee, America and Europe, p. 86.
90. Ostrom, Governing the Commons, pp. 88-92. The sentence in quotes appears on pp. 90-91.
91. Drodziak, "Instability to the South Worries U.S. Forces in Europe," p. A02.
92. James R. Golden, NATO Burden-Sharing: Risk and Opportunities, CSIS, Washington Papers, No. 96 (Washington, D.C.: Praeger, 1983), p. 40.
93. Heurlin, Military Command Structures in the Baltic Sea Area, pp. 6, 10. For another argument that post-Cold War Europe is likely to several distinct geopolitical regions, see James Kurth, "The Shape of Things to Come," National Interest, Summer 1991.
94. Heurlin, Military Command Structures in the Baltic Sea Area, pp. 6, 10. For another argument that post-Cold War Europe is likely to several distinct geopolitical regions, see James Kurth, "The Shape of Things to Come," National Interest, Summer 1991.
95. Charles Barry, " Creating a European Security and Defense Identity," Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 15 (Spring 1997), p. 62.
96. Ibid., p. 66.
97. Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory Practice," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1997), p. 62.
98. Burbach, "Ready for Action?" p. 10.
99. Rick Atkinson, "NATO Gives Members Response Flexibility," Washington Post, June 4, 1996, p. A14.
100. Stanley R. Sloan, Combined Joint Task Forces and New Missions for NATO, Library of Congress report no. 95-1176 F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 7, 1995), p. CRS-4.
101. Charles William Maynes, "A Workable Clinton Doctrine," Foreign Policy, No. 93 (Winter 1993-94) p. 11; see, also Aaron Friedberg, "The future of American Power," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 109, No. 1 (Spring 1994), p. 11.
102. Charles William Maynes, "A Workable Clinton Doctrine," Foreign Policy, No. 93 (Winter 1993-94) p. 11; see, also Aaron Friedberg, "The future of American Power," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 109, No. 1 (Spring 1994), p. 11.
103. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, pp. 48-50.
104. George W. Downs and Keisuke Iida, "Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security," in Downs, Collective Security beyond the Cold War, p. 25.
105. Maynes, "A Workable Clinton Doctrine," p. 11.
106. NATO Handbook, p. 168.