Computer Industry Executives: An Analysis of the New Barons' Compensation

Information Systems Research

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 398-414

  Talmor, Eli ^a,b   Wallace, James S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Cash Based Compensation; Executive Compensation; Pay for Performance; Stock Options; Stock Based Compensation

Indexed keywords

COMPENSATION (PERSONNEL); INVESTMENTS;

COMPUTER INDUSTRY; EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION; GROWTH PROSPECTS; MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE; PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE; RESTRICTED STOCK; SERVICE INDUSTRIES; STOCK OPTIONS;

COMPUTERS;

EID: 0032245476     PISSN: 10477047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/isre.9.4.398     Document Type: Article

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