Managerial bargaining power in the determination of compensation contracts and corporate investment

International Economic Review

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 69-93

  Stoughton, Neal M ^a   Talmor, Eli ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345975870     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00006     Document Type: Article

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