The policy bargaining model

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-27

  Houba, Harold ^a  

^a VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Joint policy; Repeated games; Subgame perfectness

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031206484     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00795-1     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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