An overview of incentive contracting

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 297-346

  Kraus, Sarit ^a,b  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER NETWORKS; INFORMATION MANAGEMENT; INFORMATION USE; MULTIPROCESSING SYSTEMS;

INCENTIVE CONTRACTING; MULTI-AGENT ENVIRONMENT;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 0030169699     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0004-3702(95)00059-3     Document Type: Article

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