Turkey and the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A delicate balance

Middle Eastern Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 51-72

  Cornell, Svante E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FOREIGN POLICY; GEOPOLITICAL RELATIONS; INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT;

AZERBAIJAN; TURKEY;

EID: 0031832659     PISSN: 00263206     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00263209808701209     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. See, among others, Human Rights Watch / Helsinki, Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (NY: HumanRights Watch, 1994).
2. Erich Feigl, On Mythe de la Terreur - Le Terrorisme Arménien, ses Origines et ses Causes (Salzburg: Druckhaus Nonntal, 1991).
3. Christopher Walker, Armenia and Karabagh - The Struggle for Unity (London: Minority Rights Group, 1991).
4. Feigl, Un Mythe de la Terreur, p.215.
5. For a detailed overview of the period, see Haidar Bammate, 'The Caucasus and the Russian Revolution (from a political viewpoint)' in Central Asian Survey, 1/2, 1991 (article first published in Paris in 1929).
6. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p.73.
7. Audrey L Altstadt, 'Nagorno Karabakh - "Apple of Discord" in the Azerbaijani SSR', Central Asian Survey, 4, 1988.
8. This policy of Stalin's is clear if one observes the national delimitations in the Caucasus. An example is the regions of Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. It seems, indeed, as if the delimitation is designed purely to cause dissent in the regions that would enable Russia to control the regions. The Karachay and Balkar are in fact in most respects one people speaking the same Turkic language; similarly Kabardins and Cherkess are both Circassian peoples. Thus the result of the national delimitation is that both regions include two titular nationalities without ethno-linguistic affinities, which have mutual prejudices and historical antagonisms against each other. For an overview of the subject, see Pustilnik, Marina, 'Caucasian Stresses', Transition, 15 March 1995, pp.16-18; or Rieks Smeets, 'Circassia', Central Asian Survey, 1, 1995.
9. This policy of Stalin's is clear if one observes the national delimitations in the Caucasus. An example is the regions of Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. It seems, indeed, as if the delimitation is designed purely to cause dissent in the regions that would enable Russia to control the regions. The Karachay and Balkar are in fact in most respects one people speaking the same Turkic language; similarly Kabardins and Cherkess are both Circassian peoples. Thus the result of the national delimitation is that both regions include two titular nationalities without ethno-linguistic affinities, which have mutual prejudices and historical antagonisms against each other. For an overview of the subject, see Pustilnik, Marina, 'Caucasian Stresses', Transition, 15 March 1995, pp.16-18; or Rieks Smeets, 'Circassia', Central Asian Survey, 1, 1995.
10. In the regional hierarchy of the Soviet Union, the highest units were the 15 Republics of the Union, which had the theoretical right to withdraw from the union. Immediately under these were the Autonomous Republics, with a higher degree of autonomy than the autonomous Oblasts, or regions.
11. For an overview of the population distribution of Nagorno Karabakh and Nakhichevan between 1959 and 1979, see Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire - A Guide (London: Hurst & Co., 1985).
12. Tamara Dragadze sees this report as being announced to show the gravity of the conflict and to calm down sentiments. See Tamara Dragadze, The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: Structure and Sentiment', Third World Quarterly, No. 1 (Jan. 1989), p.56. Igor Nolyain, on the other hand, sees the radio statement as a deliberately provocative statement, which was unnecessary and would obviously flare up the conflict. Indeed, studies of crowd psychology tend to show that such statements do not have any calming effect on individuals; on the contrary they can be used very easily by provocative elements. See Igor Nolyain, 'Moscow's Initiation of the Azeri-Armenian Conflict', Central Asian Survey, Vol.4 No.13, 1994.
13. Tamara Dragadze sees this report as being announced to show the gravity of the conflict and to calm down sentiments. See Tamara Dragadze, The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: Structure and Sentiment', Third World Quarterly, No. 1 (Jan. 1989), p.56. Igor Nolyain, on the other hand, sees the radio statement as a deliberately provocative statement, which was unnecessary and would obviously flare up the conflict. Indeed, studies of crowd psychology tend to show that such statements do not have any calming effect on individuals; on the contrary they can be used very easily by provocative elements. See Igor Nolyain, 'Moscow's Initiation of the Azeri-Armenian Conflict', Central Asian Survey, Vol.4 No.13, 1994.
14. See Stéphane Yérasimos' excellent article 'Caucase: Le Retour de la Russie', Politique Internationale, 1, 1994.
15. Certain analysts have tried to prove that the Azeri-Armenian conflict was initiated by the authorities in Moscow in as a part of a policy of 'divide and rule' in the Transcaucasus, as they felt that the region was getting out of their control. Moscow's support for the Abkhazian separatists in Georgia is well documented. For an overview of the subject, see Igor Nolyain, op.cit. [11].
16. The claim of the Karabakh Soviet was based upon Art. 70 of the Soviet constitution, which affirms the right of peoples to self-determination. However, the claim was rejected on the basis of Art. 78, which states that 'territory may be altered only by mutual agreement of the concerned republics, and subject to the ratification by the USSR'. Thus the rejection of the demand by the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet made the proposal impossible according to Soviet law.
17. Peter Rutland, 'Democracy and Nationalism in Armenia', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.46, No.5 (1994), p.844.
18. Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder (London: Zed, 1994), p.142.
19. For a detailed discussion of the legal aspect of the conflict, see Svante E. Cornell, 'Undeclared War - the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered' in Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.20, No.4 (Summer 1997).
20. Robert Cullen, 'A Reporter at Large', The New Yorker, 15 April 1991.
21. Human Rights Watch, Seven Years of Conflict, pp.4, 63.
22. See United Nations General Assembly Resolution on 'Emergency International Assistance to Refugees and Displaced Persons in Azerbaijan', 19 Nov. 1993, as well as Security Council Resolutions 822 (30 April 1993), 853 (29 July 1993), 874 (14 Oct. 1993), and 884 (11 Nov. 1993).
23. See Turkish Daily News, 3 Dec. 1996, pp.A1 and A6 for an overview of the summit.
24. For Abkhazia, see John Colarusso, 'Abkhazia', Central Asian Survey, 1, 1995; for South Ossetia, see Birch, Julian, Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm', Central Asian Survey, 1, 1995. For a general overview of Russia's policies in the former Soviet republics and its divide and rule policy in the Caucasus, see Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, Back in the USSR - Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia, Harvard University: John F. Kennedy School of Government, January 1994, especially the Chapters on Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia. See also Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers - A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, forthcoming in 1998.
25. For Abkhazia, see John Colarusso, 'Abkhazia', Central Asian Survey, 1, 1995; for South Ossetia, see Birch, Julian, Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm', Central Asian Survey, 1, 1995. For a general overview of Russia's policies in the former Soviet republics and its divide and rule policy in the Caucasus, see Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, Back in the USSR - Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia, Harvard University: John F. Kennedy School of Government, January 1994, especially the Chapters on Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia. See also Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers - A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, forthcoming in 1998.
26. For Abkhazia, see John Colarusso, 'Abkhazia', Central Asian Survey, 1, 1995; for South Ossetia, see Birch, Julian, Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm', Central Asian Survey, 1, 1995. For a general overview of Russia's policies in the former Soviet republics and its divide and rule policy in the Caucasus, see Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, Back in the USSR - Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia, Harvard University: John F. Kennedy School of Government, January 1994, especially the Chapters on Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia. See also Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers - A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, forthcoming in 1998.
27. For Abkhazia, see John Colarusso, 'Abkhazia', Central Asian Survey, 1, 1995; for South Ossetia, see Birch, Julian, Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm', Central Asian Survey, 1, 1995. For a general overview of Russia's policies in the former Soviet republics and its divide and rule policy in the Caucasus, see Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, Back in the USSR - Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia, Harvard University: John F. Kennedy School of Government, January 1994, especially the Chapters on Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia. See also Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers - A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, forthcoming in 1998.
28. On this issue, see also Thomas Goltz, 'Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand', Foreign Policy, No.92 (Fall 1993).
29. On the oil issue, see Elaine Holoboff, 'Russia and Oil Politics in the Caspian', Jane's Intelligence Review, Feb. 1996, and Clive Schofield and Martin Pratt, 'Claims to the Caspian Sea', Jane's Intelligence Review, Feb. 1996.
30. On the oil issue, see Elaine Holoboff, 'Russia and Oil Politics in the Caspian', Jane's Intelligence Review, Feb. 1996, and Clive Schofield and Martin Pratt, 'Claims to the Caspian Sea', Jane's Intelligence Review, Feb. 1996.
31. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe Series (hereafter FBIS-WEU), 11 March 1992, quoting Agence France Press (AFP) Broadcast, 10 March 1992.
32. Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad - The Changing Face of Central Asia (London: Harper-Collins, 1994), p.293.
33. Dilip Hiro, 'The Azerbaijan Question', The Nation, 14 Sept. 1992.
34. Hence at the first summit of Turkic republics in Ankara in November 1992, the Central Asian leaders refused to enter into any tight Turkic political or economic body. Nazarbayev further refused to endorse any statement supporting Turkish Cypriots or Bosnian Muslims, claiming that the primary allegiance of the Central Asian states remained with Russia and that they would not accept anything that could jeopardize their relations with Moscow. Moreover, he maintained a strict neutrality on Nagorno Karabakh. For a discussion of these developments, see Goldenberg, op. cit. [16], pp.50-2.
35. FBIS-WEU, 12 Nov. 1991, quoting TRT Television, 9 Nov. 1992.
36. In February 1992, ex-communist President Ayaz Mutalibov was ousted by a popular revolt led by the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF). In his place, the parliamentary chairman Yakub Mamedov was installed as acting president. In May Mutalibov attempted to regain his position, but again the APF opposed him and forced him to flee the country. Until 7 June 1992 Isa Gamberov served as acting president until Abülfez Elçibey was elected President by popular vote in a multi-candidate election.
37. Interview with Dr Mehmet Novruzoǧlu Aliyev, Ambassador of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Turkey, Ankara, Dec. 1996.
38. FBIS-WEU, 3 March 1992, quoting Milliyet, same date.
39. FBIS-WEU, 9 March 1992, quoting Türkiye Radiyolarï, 6 March 1992.
40. See Le Monde, 27 February 1992, p. 7; also FBIS-WEU, 9 March 1992, quoting TRT Television, 7 March 1992. On the CSCE's view of Turkey's role, see FBIS-WEU, 11 March 1992, quoting TRT Television, 10 March 1992.
41. FBIS-WEU, 9 March 1992, quoting Türkiye Radiyolarï, 8 March 1992.
42. FBIS-WEU, 10 March 1992, quoting TRT Television, 9 March 1992.
43. FBIS-WEU, 5 March 1992, quoting news agency Anatolia, same date.
44. See, for example, the religious-conservative dailies Türkiye and Zaman. For an English sample article, see FBIS-WEU, 5 March 1992, quoting Türkiye, 1 March 1992.
45. See FBIS-WEU, 27 Feb. 1992, quoting Anatolia News Agency, 25 Feb. 1992.
46. Elizabeth Fuller, 'Nagorno Karabakh: Can Turkey Remain Neutral?', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol.1 No.14, 3 April 1992, p.37, quoting Handelsblatt, 11 March 1992.
47. Elizabeth Fuller, 'Nagorno Karabakh: Can Turkey Remain Neutral?', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol.1 No.14, 3 April 1992, p.37, quoting Handelsblatt, 11 March 1992.
48. FBIS-WEU, 5 March 1992, quoting Anatolia News Agency, 4 March 1992.
49. FBIS-WEU, 13 March 1992, quoting Türkiye Radyolarï, 12 March 1992.
50. FBIS-WEU, 3 March 1992, quoting TRT Television, 2 March 1992.
51. Fuller, op. cit. [40], p. 38, and Washington Post, 19 March 1992.
52. Fuller, op. cit. [40], p. 38, and Washington Post, 19 March 1992.
53. Gun Kut, 'Elçibey'in sonu, Türkiye modelinin sonudur', Cumhuriyet, 24 June 1993.
54. Goltz, op. cit. [23].
55. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia Series (hereafter FBIS-CEA) 8 Sept. 1993, quoting Aydinlik, 5 Sept. 1993.
56. For a discussion of the issue, see Joseph A. Kechichian and Theodore W. Karasik, 'The Crisis in Azerbaijan: How Clans Influence the Politics of an Emerging Republic', Middle East Policy, Summer 1996, pp.64-5.
57. FBIS-WEU, 5 March 1992, quoting Anatolia News Agency, 4 March 1992.
58. For a recent discussion on Turkish-US relations, involving the Kurdish and the aid issues, see Mahmut Bali Aykan, 'Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning Persian Gulf Security in the Post-Cold War Era', Middle East Journal, Summer 1996.
59. On 9 March 1993 Turkey and Azerbaijan signed an agreement for the construction of a 1,060-km pipeline which was planned to go from Baku into Iran, then back into Nakhichevan and from there cross over into Turkey. (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts [Middle East], 16 March 1993.) However Azerbaijan's political instability and its difficult relations with Russia make the pipeline project unclear. Furthermore the deal was signed without consultations with Iran, although the drawing of the pipeline would include Iranian territory. Iran, for itself prefers the laying of a pipeline from Baku through Iran to the Persian Gulf, thus staying within Iran. Hence other drawings of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline have been discussed, and to day's date a route crossing Georgian territory seems to be the most realistic alternative, although it would mean 1650 km instead of 1060. Hence the Turkish Ministry of Energy declared that for the feasibility of such a project, a guaranteed throughput of at least 25 million tons of crude annually is necessary. For a recent assessment of the pipeline issue, see Nazlan Ertan, 'Baku-Ceyhan: Pipeline or Pipe Dream', Turkish Probe, 17 May 1996, pp. 19-20.
60. For a discussion of the Moscow-Ankara rivalry, see Süha Bölükbaşi, 'Ankara's Baku-Centered Transcaucasia Policy: Has It Failed?', Middle East Journal, Jan. 1997.
61. See Elizabeth Fuller, 'Turkish-Russian Relations, 1992-1994', RFE/RL Research Report, 6 May 1994, quoting the Independent, 1 June 1993.
62. See Elizabeth Fuller, 'Turkish-Russian Relations, 1992-1994', RFE/RL Research Report, 6 May 1994, quoting the Independent, 1 June 1993.
63. Ibid., quoting Die Zeit, 8 April 1994.
64. See Aykan, op. cit. [50], p.351.
65. See Fuller, op. cit. [53] quoting The New York Times and ITAR-TASS, 15 April 1993.
66. See Fuller, op. cit. [53] quoting The New York Times and ITAR-TASS, 15 April 1993.
67. Ibid., quoting the Independent, 1 July 1993.
68. See FBIS-WEU, 6 June 1994.
69. For an Armenian account of the 'Genocide', see Richard Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian Genocide in Perspective (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1988). For a Turkish account, see Kamuran Gürün, The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed (New York, N.: St. Martin's Press, 1985). See also Feigl, op. cit. [2].
70. For an Armenian account of the 'Genocide', see Richard Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian Genocide in Perspective (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1988). For a Turkish account, see Kamuran Gürün, The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed (New York, N.: St. Martin's Press, 1985). See also Feigl, op. cit. [2].
71. For an Armenian account of the 'Genocide', see Richard Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian Genocide in Perspective (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1988). For a Turkish account, see Kamuran Gürün, The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed (New York, N.: St. Martin's Press, 1985). See also Feigl, op. cit. [2].
72. See discussion in Goldenberg, op. cit. [16].
73. For an account of Armenian terrorism, see Michael M. Gunter, 'The Armenian Terrorist Campaign against Turkey', Orbis, Summer 1983.
74. See issues of the newspapers Zaman and Türkiye, as well as a statement by the head of the Turkish state's Directorate for Religious Affairs, Mehmet Nun Yilmaz, in FBIS-WEU, 5 March 1992, quoting Türkiye Radyolan, same date.
75. For an example of Demirel's statements to explain the government's Karabakh policy, see FBIS-WEU, 10 March 1993, quoing TRT Television, 9 March 1993.
76. This statement seems to come back over and over again in conversations with Azeris.
77. Interview with Dr Novruzoglu, op. cit. [31].
78. For a discussion on Turkey's achievements, see Bölükbaşi, op. cit. [52].