Turkish perspectives on Turkish-US relations concerning Persian Gulf security in the post-Cold war era: 1989-1995

Middle East Journal

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 344-358

  Aykan, Mahmut Bali ^a  

^a MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0001679706     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (93)

1. US Government, "Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy," Treaties and other International Acts, Series 9901, Annex to Supplementary Agreement No. 2. (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1980).
2. For the US interpretation of the agreement see ibid., p. 26; for the Turkish position on the same issue see interview with Turkey's Foreign Minister liter Turkmen in Cumhuriyet, 1 December 1980, pp. 1, 7.
3. For the US interpretation of the agreement see ibid., p. 26; for the Turkish position on the same issue see interview with Turkey's Foreign Minister liter Turkmen in Cumhuriyet, 1 December 1980, pp. 1, 7.
4. See Mahmut Bali Aykan. "Türkiye'nin Basra Körfezi Güvenligi Politikasi: 1979-1988" (Turkey's Persian Gulf Security Policy: 1979-1988), ODTÜ Gelisme Dergisi 21, no. 1 (1994), pp. 50-53.
5. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe Series (hereafter referred to as FBIS - WES), 28 January 1993 p. 39.
6. The Turkish authorities expressed their irritation at the way the US took the decision in question without consulting with them beforehand. See FBIS-WES. 7 February 1990, pp. 27-28. The Turks had a similar experience with the Americans during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. See "Introduction" in Kemal H. Karpat, ed., Turkey's Foreign Policy In Transition: 1950-1974 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), p.8.
7. In an interview with Ug̈ur Ergün, Deputy Head of the Department of North America in the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, on 17 November 1995, the author was told that, as of November 1995, only Incirlik, Pirinçlik and Karatas (in reduced capacity) remained as operational NATO bases in Turkey.
8. See FBIS-WES, 12 January 1991, p. 37.
9. See Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Concerning the Developments in Northern Iraq in The Post-Gulf War Era: 1991-1995" to be published in the October 1996 issue of Middle Eastern Studies. For the Turkish reasons for cooperating with the collective economic and military sanctions against Iraq during the Kuwait crisis of 1990-1991 see FBIS-WES, 4 March 1991. p. 5; FBIS-WES, 13 August 1990, p. 16; FBIS-WES, 8 January 1991, p. 31.
10. See Cumhuriyet, 9 August 1994, p. 8; 9 April 1994, p. 9.
11. See Cumhuriyet, 9 August 1994, p. 8; 9 April 1994, p. 9.
12. On the new defense strategy to be pursued by Turkey in the post-Cold War era see FBIS-WES, 22 December 1989, p. 25. See the views of the Turkish Armed forces concerning the regional situation in the Persian Gulf, in FBIS-WES, 4 March 1991, pp. 53-54. See also Vitaly Naumkin, "The Political and Security Linkages Between the Gulf and the Muslim States of CATR." in Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ed., From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1994).
13. Turkish Chief of Staff General Dogan Cures said "Russia is now posing a greater threat than it used to during the Cold War " FBIS-WES, 6 June 1994, p. 67.
14. For the view of the Turkish foreign affairs ministry on this subject see FBIS-WES, 22 December 1989, p. 25. See also FBIS-WES, 28 November 1989, pp. 13-14.
15. For these Turkish requests see Cumhuriyet, 1 March 1994, p. 3; ibid., 9 August 1994, p. 8; Hürriyet, 21 February 1994, p. 16; Milliyet, 11 January 1995, p. 15. See also FBIS-WES, 18 March 1993, p. 58. Further on these Turkish requests see Carol Migdalovitz, Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 23 March, 1995), p. 7.
16. For these Turkish requests see Cumhuriyet, 1 March 1994, p. 3; ibid., 9 August 1994, p. 8; Hürriyet, 21 February 1994, p. 16; Milliyet, 11 January 1995, p. 15. See also FBIS-WES, 18 March 1993, p. 58. Further on these Turkish requests see Carol Migdalovitz, Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 23 March, 1995), p. 7.
17. For these Turkish requests see Cumhuriyet, 1 March 1994, p. 3; ibid., 9 August 1994, p. 8; Hürriyet, 21 February 1994, p. 16; Milliyet, 11 January 1995, p. 15. See also FBIS-WES, 18 March 1993, p. 58. Further on these Turkish requests see Carol Migdalovitz, Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 23 March, 1995), p. 7.
18. For these Turkish requests see Cumhuriyet, 1 March 1994, p. 3; ibid., 9 August 1994, p. 8; Hürriyet, 21 February 1994, p. 16; Milliyet, 11 January 1995, p. 15. See also FBIS-WES, 18 March 1993, p. 58. Further on these Turkish requests see Carol Migdalovitz, Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 23 March, 1995), p. 7.
19. For these Turkish requests see Cumhuriyet, 1 March 1994, p. 3; ibid., 9 August 1994, p. 8; Hürriyet, 21 February 1994, p. 16; Milliyet, 11 January 1995, p. 15. See also FBIS-WES, 18 March 1993, p. 58. Further on these Turkish requests see Carol Migdalovitz, Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 23 March, 1995), p. 7.
20. For these Turkish requests see Cumhuriyet, 1 March 1994, p. 3; ibid., 9 August 1994, p. 8; Hürriyet, 21 February 1994, p. 16; Milliyet, 11 January 1995, p. 15. See also FBIS-WES, 18 March 1993, p. 58. Further on these Turkish requests see Carol Migdalovitz, Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 23 March, 1995), p. 7.
21. For the defense strategy of the Bush Administration, see Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendricson, The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order And America's Purpose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), pp. 35-36. See interview with President Özal on the concept of "strategic cooperation" in FBIS-WES, 2 April 1991, p. 32. See also FBIS-WES, 3 April 1991, p. 27. According to a statement made by the undersecretary of the Turkish foreign affairs ministry, Tugay Özçeri, "strategic cooperation" with the United States would cover joint defense, security, political, economic, commercial, scientific and technological cooperation. FBIS-WES, 23 May 1991, p. 26.
22. For an example of such views see Nur Batur in Milliyet, 31 March 1991, p. 19.
23. See FBIS-WES, 2 April 1991, p. 42.
24. For the basic principles of this Turkish policy see Hamit Batu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy", Belleten, no. 6, March 1965, pp. 21-25. See also Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, Washington D.C., Home Page. http://www.turkey.org/turkey.
25. Concerning traditional Turkish policy on this question see the Turkish-Iranian Joint Communiqué issued on 15 June 1969 in Belleten, Haziran 1969, no. 57, p. 66. See Turkish President Turgut Özal's views on the Persian Gulf security question after the Kuwaiti crisis of 1990 in FBIS-WES, 4 March 1991, p. 54; FBIS-WES, 8 March 1991, p. 23.; and FBIS-WES, 12 March 1991, p. 43.
26. There was a consensus on these points among key Turkish military and civilian circles influential in the Turkish foreign policy-making process. See FBIS-WES, 4 March 1991, pp. 23, 54; FBIS-WES, 6 March 1991, p. 8 (annex); and FBIS-WES, 7 March 1991, p. 33.
27. For Turkish President Turgut Özal's view on Turkey's role in the post-Gulf War Persian Gulf security framework see FBIS-WES, 8 March 1991, p. 24; FBIS-WES, 12 March 1991, p. 43. For a comparison of this Turkish view with that of the 1950s see George McGhee, ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Orladogu (USA-Turkey-NATO-Middle East), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1992), pp. 240-67, 265.
28. See Mahmut B. Aykan, Turkey's Role in The Organisation of The Islamic Conference, 1960-1992: The Nature of Deviation From The Kemalist Heritage (New York: Vantage Press. 1994).
29. Ibid., chaps. 1 and 2.
30. See the statement by the US assistant secretary for European affairs, Richard Holbrooke, to that effect in Carol Migdalovitz, "Turkey's Military Offensive In Northern Iraq," CRS, 13 April 1995, pp. 5-6.
31. According to the Clinton administration, "moderate" Kurdish political leaders ". . . must be granted the right to express themselves in the Turkish political system to solve the Kurdish issue [in Turkey]." See Milliyet, 18 April 1995, p. 16.
32. For Turkish premier Tansu Çiller's views on the Kurdish issue in Turkey see, Milliyet, 18 April 1995, p. 15; ibid., 20 April 1995, p. 17; ibid., 7 May 1995, p. 13. For other Turkish official views on the subject see FBIS-WES, 2 August 1994, p. 51, and Cumhuriyet, 3 May 1995, p. 3. The Turkish official position on the Kurdish issue in Turkey has been questioned by the deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP), later closed down. See the views and proposals of former DEP deputy Mahmut Alinak in his book, Parlamentodan Dokuzuncu Kogusa (From Parliament to Jail), vol. 1 (Ankara: Tila Yayinevi, 1994). See particularly, pp. 13-26, 33-38, 63-69, 83, 96, 117-21, 176-77, 186-89, 194-203, 207-09, 222-25.
33. For Turkish premier Tansu Çiller's views on the Kurdish issue in Turkey see, Milliyet, 18 April 1995, p. 15; ibid., 20 April 1995, p. 17; ibid., 7 May 1995, p. 13. For other Turkish official views on the subject see FBIS-WES, 2 August 1994, p. 51, and Cumhuriyet, 3 May 1995, p. 3. The Turkish official position on the Kurdish issue in Turkey has been questioned by the deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP), later closed down. See the views and proposals of former DEP deputy Mahmut Alinak in his book, Parlamentodan Dokuzuncu Kogusa (From Parliament to Jail), vol. 1 (Ankara: Tila Yayinevi, 1994). See particularly, pp. 13-26, 33-38, 63-69, 83, 96, 117-21, 176-77, 186-89, 194-203, 207-09, 222-25.
34. For Turkish premier Tansu Çiller's views on the Kurdish issue in Turkey see, Milliyet, 18 April 1995, p. 15; ibid., 20 April 1995, p. 17; ibid., 7 May 1995, p. 13. For other Turkish official views on the subject see FBIS-WES, 2 August 1994, p. 51, and Cumhuriyet, 3 May 1995, p. 3. The Turkish official position on the Kurdish issue in Turkey has been questioned by the deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP), later closed down. See the views and proposals of former DEP deputy Mahmut Alinak in his book, Parlamentodan Dokuzuncu Kogusa (From Parliament to Jail), vol. 1 (Ankara: Tila Yayinevi, 1994). See particularly, pp. 13-26, 33-38, 63-69, 83, 96, 117-21, 176-77, 186-89, 194-203, 207-09, 222-25.
35. For Turkish premier Tansu Çiller's views on the Kurdish issue in Turkey see, Milliyet, 18 April 1995, p. 15; ibid., 20 April 1995, p. 17; ibid., 7 May 1995, p. 13. For other Turkish official views on the subject see FBIS-WES, 2 August 1994, p. 51, and Cumhuriyet, 3 May 1995, p. 3. The Turkish official position on the Kurdish issue in Turkey has been questioned by the deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP), later closed down. See the views and proposals of former DEP deputy Mahmut Alinak in his book, Parlamentodan Dokuzuncu Kogusa (From Parliament to Jail), vol. 1 (Ankara: Tila Yayinevi, 1994). See particularly, pp. 13-26, 33-38, 63-69, 83, 96, 117-21, 176-77, 186-89, 194-203, 207-09, 222-25.
36. For Turkish premier Tansu Çiller's views on the Kurdish issue in Turkey see, Milliyet, 18 April 1995, p. 15; ibid., 20 April 1995, p. 17; ibid., 7 May 1995, p. 13. For other Turkish official views on the subject see FBIS-WES, 2 August 1994, p. 51, and Cumhuriyet, 3 May 1995, p. 3. The Turkish official position on the Kurdish issue in Turkey has been questioned by the deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP), later closed down. See the views and proposals of former DEP deputy Mahmut Alinak in his book, Parlamentodan Dokuzuncu Kogusa (From Parliament to Jail), vol. 1 (Ankara: Tila Yayinevi, 1994). See particularly, pp. 13-26, 33-38, 63-69, 83, 96, 117-21, 176-77, 186-89, 194-203, 207-09, 222-25.
37. For Turkish premier Tansu Çiller's views on the Kurdish issue in Turkey see, Milliyet, 18 April 1995, p. 15; ibid., 20 April 1995, p. 17; ibid., 7 May 1995, p. 13. For other Turkish official views on the subject see FBIS-WES, 2 August 1994, p. 51, and Cumhuriyet, 3 May 1995, p. 3. The Turkish official position on the Kurdish issue in Turkey has been questioned by the deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP), later closed down. See the views and proposals of former DEP deputy Mahmut Alinak in his book, Parlamentodan Dokuzuncu Kogusa (From Parliament to Jail), vol. 1 (Ankara: Tila Yayinevi, 1994). See particularly, pp. 13-26, 33-38, 63-69, 83, 96, 117-21, 176-77, 186-89, 194-203, 207-09, 222-25.
38. A written statement released by the US Embassy in Ankara maintained that the United States did not really favor a "political solution," which was understood by the Turks to mean a federal solution or autonomy for the Kurds, but a "civilian non-military solution" on cultural, economic, educational and political matters discussed by the Turks themselves. Cumhuriyet, 29 October 1994, p. 10.
39. See statement by Turkey's Foreign Minister, Mumtaz Soysal, to that effect in FBIS-WES, 2 November 1994, p. 51.
40. This was the view of the Turkish military. See Cumhuriyet, 20 April 1995, p. 6. Hikmat Cetin, the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP) (who is himself of Kurdish origin) not only agreed with this military view but came to oppose even education in Kurdish. See Cumhuriyet, 8 April 1995, p. 17; and Milliyet, 30 April 1995, p. 15.
41. This was the view of the Turkish military. See Cumhuriyet, 20 April 1995, p. 6. Hikmat Cetin, the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP) (who is himself of Kurdish origin) not only agreed with this military view but came to oppose even education in Kurdish. See Cumhuriyet, 8 April 1995, p. 17; and Milliyet, 30 April 1995, p. 15.
42. This was the view of the Turkish military. See Cumhuriyet, 20 April 1995, p. 6. Hikmat Cetin, the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP) (who is himself of Kurdish origin) not only agreed with this military view but came to oppose even education in Kurdish. See Cumhuriyet, 8 April 1995, p. 17; and Milliyet, 30 April 1995, p. 15.
43. FBIS-WES, 2 April 1991, p. 36. See also the document put forward by the Turkish government on the "Kurdish minority issue," in FBIS-WES, 1 April 1991, p. 36.
44. See Cumhuriyet, 2 May 1995, p. 4. See interviews with Turkish president Süleyman Demirel in Milliyet, 2 May 1995, pp.14-15; and Cumhuriyet, 10 May 1995, pp. 1, 17. From the US perspective, the PKK threat to Turkey falls into "the first category of vital interests" of the United States because it threatens both the survival of Turkey, as a key ally, and US economic interests in a strategically important region. See US Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "Remarks Prepared For Delivery by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry," Fortune 500 Forum, Philadelphia, PA, 1994, pp. 1, 3. Apparently, however, the Turks feel that Americans cannot appreciate the gravity of the PKK threat simply because it is not a direct and immediate threat to the United States as it is to Turkey.
45. See Cumhuriyet, 2 May 1995, p. 4. See interviews with Turkish president Süleyman Demirel in Milliyet, 2 May 1995, pp.14-15; and Cumhuriyet, 10 May 1995, pp. 1, 17. From the US perspective, the PKK threat to Turkey falls into "the first category of vital interests" of the United States because it threatens both the survival of Turkey, as a key ally, and US economic interests in a strategically important region. See US Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "Remarks Prepared For Delivery by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry," Fortune 500 Forum, Philadelphia, PA, 1994, pp. 1, 3. Apparently, however, the Turks feel that Americans cannot appreciate the gravity of the PKK threat simply because it is not a direct and immediate threat to the United States as it is to Turkey.
46. See Cumhuriyet, 2 May 1995, p. 4. See interviews with Turkish president Süleyman Demirel in Milliyet, 2 May 1995, pp.14-15; and Cumhuriyet, 10 May 1995, pp. 1, 17. From the US perspective, the PKK threat to Turkey falls into "the first category of vital interests" of the United States because it threatens both the survival of Turkey, as a key ally, and US economic interests in a strategically important region. See US Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "Remarks Prepared For Delivery by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry," Fortune 500 Forum, Philadelphia, PA, 1994, pp. 1, 3. Apparently, however, the Turks feel that Americans cannot appreciate the gravity of the PKK threat simply because it is not a direct and immediate threat to the United States as it is to Turkey.
47. See Cumhuriyet, 2 May 1995, p. 4. See interviews with Turkish president Süleyman Demirel in Milliyet, 2 May 1995, pp.14-15; and Cumhuriyet, 10 May 1995, pp. 1, 17. From the US perspective, the PKK threat to Turkey falls into "the first category of vital interests" of the United States because it threatens both the survival of Turkey, as a key ally, and US economic interests in a strategically important region. See US Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "Remarks Prepared For Delivery by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry," Fortune 500 Forum, Philadelphia, PA, 1994, pp. 1, 3. Apparently, however, the Turks feel that Americans cannot appreciate the gravity of the PKK threat simply because it is not a direct and immediate threat to the United States as it is to Turkey.
48. Milliyet, 18 April 1995, p. 14.
49. Milliyet, 14 May 1995, p. 13.
50. FBIS-WES, 29 August 1994, p. 49.
51. The Pentagon blocked the shipment of some crucial pieces of military equipment, and objected to the delivery of the missile launcher systems for Sikorsky and Black Hawk helicopters to Turkey. Qualitatively, the US military aid to Turkey was converted by the US Congress from grants into loans-first at concessional rates and later at market rates-beginning in 1993. See "Linkage between US Aid [to Turkey] and Human Rights and other Concerns," in Migdalovitz, "Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues," pp. 8-13. See also FBIS-WES, 9 September 1994, p. 54
52. For a detailed analysis of Turkey's traditional Persian Gulf policy see Aykan, "Türkiye'nin Basra Körfezi."
53. On the position of the Clinton administration on the overthrow of Saddam Husayn see Thomas Mattair and Stephen Brannon, "The UN Sanctions Against Iraq: Issues Influencing Continuation or Removal," Middle East Policy 3, no. 1 (1994), pp. 32-3.
54. Milliyet, 12 July 1994, p. 5, and ibid., 1 September 1994, p. 20.
55. Milliyet, 12 July 1994, p. 5, and ibid., 1 September 1994, p. 20.
56. FBIS-WES. 9 December 1992, p. 39; FBIS-WES, 8 December 1992, pp. 59-60; FBIS-WES, 5 February 1993, pp. 59-60; FBIS-WES, 25 February 1993, p. 60.
57. See Premier Süleyman Demirel's statement to that effect in FBIS-WES, 25 November 1992, p. 43.
58. Cumhuriyet, 6 August 1993, p. 7.
59. Cumhuriyet, 26 July 1993, p. 9.
60. See Turkish official statements on these points in Milliyet, 3 May 1995, p. 9.
61. FBIS-WES, 25 November 1992, pp. 43, 45. For the official Turkish view on the meaning and nature of the tripartite meetings from the perspective of Turkish foreign policy see FBIS-WES, 28 December 1992, p. 24. For a detailed discussion of Turkey's "Active Bridge Policy" see Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 1960-1992: pp. 120-42.
62. FBIS-WES, 16 November 1992, pp. 25-26
63. Ibid.
64. FBIS-WES. 1 September 1996, pp. 41-42
65. Millivet, 3 August 1994, p. 15; Milliyet, 27 August 1994, p. 19.
66. Millivet, 3 August 1994, p. 15; Milliyet, 27 August 1994, p. 19.
67. See FBIS-WES, 7 September 1994, p. 69.
68. On the Turkish-European conflict over the human rights question and the difficulties the Turks have in developing a strategy on this issue see Milliyet, 3 May 1995, p. 13; and Milliyet, 8 May 1995, p. 4. See also, Keesing's Record of World Events (KRWE) June 1994, p. 40069; and KRWE, December 1994, p. 40333; and KRWE, April 1995, p. 40522; and Cumhuriyet, 19 April 1995, p. 9.
69. On the Turkish-European conflict over the human rights question and the difficulties the Turks have in developing a strategy on this issue see Milliyet, 3 May 1995, p. 13; and Milliyet, 8 May 1995, p. 4. See also, Keesing's Record of World Events (KRWE) June 1994, p. 40069; and KRWE, December 1994, p. 40333; and KRWE, April 1995, p. 40522; and Cumhuriyet, 19 April 1995, p. 9.
70. On the Turkish-European conflict over the human rights question and the difficulties the Turks have in developing a strategy on this issue see Milliyet, 3 May 1995, p. 13; and Milliyet, 8 May 1995, p. 4. See also, Keesing's Record of World Events (KRWE) June 1994, p. 40069; and KRWE, December 1994, p. 40333; and KRWE, April 1995, p. 40522; and Cumhuriyet, 19 April 1995, p. 9.
71. On the Turkish-European conflict over the human rights question and the difficulties the Turks have in developing a strategy on this issue see Milliyet, 3 May 1995, p. 13; and Milliyet, 8 May 1995, p. 4. See also, Keesing's Record of World Events (KRWE) June 1994, p. 40069; and KRWE, December 1994, p. 40333; and KRWE, April 1995, p. 40522; and Cumhuriyet, 19 April 1995, p. 9.
72. On the Turkish-European conflict over the human rights question and the difficulties the Turks have in developing a strategy on this issue see Milliyet, 3 May 1995, p. 13; and Milliyet, 8 May 1995, p. 4. See also, Keesing's Record of World Events (KRWE) June 1994, p. 40069; and KRWE, December 1994, p. 40333; and KRWE, April 1995, p. 40522; and Cumhuriyet, 19 April 1995, p. 9.
73. On the Turkish-European conflict over the human rights question and the difficulties the Turks have in developing a strategy on this issue see Milliyet, 3 May 1995, p. 13; and Milliyet, 8 May 1995, p. 4. See also, Keesing's Record of World Events (KRWE) June 1994, p. 40069; and KRWE, December 1994, p. 40333; and KRWE, April 1995, p. 40522; and Cumhuriyet, 19 April 1995, p. 9.
74. Milliyet, 12 May 1995, p. 7. Cumhuriyet, 27 March 1995.
75. Milliyet, 12 May 1995, p. 7. Cumhuriyet, 27 March 1995.
76. See Milliyet, 6 May 1995, p. 15. On Turkish perspectives concerning differences between the approaches of Turkey and the United States to Russia see FBIS-WES, 9 January 1995, p. 56. See also Jim Nichol, "Transcaucasus Newly Independent States: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests," CRS Issue Brief, (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 3 March 1995), pp. 1-6.
77. See Milliyet, 6 May 1995, p. 15. On Turkish perspectives concerning differences between the approaches of Turkey and the United States to Russia see FBIS-WES, 9 January 1995, p. 56. See also Jim Nichol, "Transcaucasus Newly Independent States: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests," CRS Issue Brief, (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 3 March 1995), pp. 1-6.
78. Michael M. Gunter, "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq," Middle East Journal 50, no. 2, p. 238.
79. See Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Concerning the Developments in Northern Iraq in the Post-Gulf War Era: 1991-1995."
80. See Cumhuriyet, 27 March 1993, p. 9.
81. See the statement made by Marc Grossman, US ambassador to Ankara, to that effect, in Millivet, 19 April 1995, p. 15.
82. See FBIS-WES, 3 January 1993, pp. 43-44; Milliyet, 19 November 1994, p. 17.
83. See FBIS-WES, 3 January 1993, pp. 43-44; Milliyet, 19 November 1994, p. 17.
84. Süleyman Demirel served as the leader of the liberal Justice Party, which was a successor of Adnan Menderes' Democratic Party, and predecessor of the True Path Party, formed in the 1980s. It was during the Democratic Party's rule that Turkey was admitted to NATO (1952). With such a background, Demirel's pro-Western views were in contrast to those of Erbakan, who, as leader of the Islamic Conservative Party since the early 1970s, has consistently opposed Turkey's membership in NATO and the EU on the grounds that the overall interests of the Christian West and Muslim Turkey did not coincide. Upon becoming president, however, Demirel began to claim - with reference to the Kurdish question in Turkey - that the West wanted to revive the Treaty of Sèvres, an international agreement, signed in August 1920, partitioning Anatolia along ethnic lines. He argued that Turkey would not be able to please the West, no matter what it did in the field of democratization. On this issue he came to sound like Erbakan.
85. US assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke reportedly warned that "persistent problems" concerning the human rights situation in Turkey might "deter trade" with that country following "legislative pressures" in the United States. FBIS-WES, 10 February 1995, p. 41. Democratization will reportedly be an important criterion in assessing where to concentrate US foreign assistance resources. See Curt Tarnoff and Larry Q. Nowels, US Foreign Assistance: The Rationale, the Record, and the Challenges in the Post-Cold war Era (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1994), pp. 20-24.
86. The 1974 US arms embargo against Turkey resulted from the latter's dispatching of troops to Cyprus to support Turkish Cypriots against perceived violations of the federal foundations of the Republic of Cyprus by Greek Cypriots. The US Congress suspended all military assistance to Turkey, which, in turn, closed US-Turkish bases. The embargo was finally lifted in 1978. See Dankwart A. Rustow, Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), pp. 93-105.
87. FBIS-WES, 9 January 1995, p. 56.
88. FBIS-WES, 29 August 1994, p. 50. For the Özal government policy action in November 1989, see FBIS-WES, 29 November 1989, pp. 25-26.
89. A poll taken in Turkey in May 1995 indicated that 11% of the polled wanted shari'at. Hurriyet, 13 May 1995, p. 13. The corresponding figure in a similar poll conducted in 1987 was 7%. Milliyet, 23 January 1987, p. 1.
90. A poll taken in Turkey in May 1995 indicated that 11% of the polled wanted shari'at. Hurriyet, 13 May 1995, p. 13. The corresponding figure in a similar poll conducted in 1987 was 7%. Milliyet, 23 January 1987, p. 1.
91. Official US statements stressed that Turkey was "the only country in the region that has a water surplus," Cumhuriyet, 25 April 1995, p. 19. The Turks disagree. See the official Turkish perspective on the water issue Water Problem In the Middle East (Ankara: Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, Department of Regional and Crossborder Waters, 1994), pp. 3-4. See also Cumhuriyet, 28 October 1993, p. 15.
92. Official US statements stressed that Turkey was "the only country in the region that has a water surplus," Cumhuriyet, 25 April 1995, p. 19. The Turks disagree. See the official Turkish perspective on the water issue Water Problem In the Middle East (Ankara: Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, Department of Regional and Crossborder Waters, 1994), pp. 3-4. See also Cumhuriyet, 28 October 1993, p. 15.
93. Official US statements stressed that Turkey was "the only country in the region that has a water surplus," Cumhuriyet, 25 April 1995, p. 19. The Turks disagree. See the official Turkish perspective on the water issue Water Problem In the Middle East (Ankara: Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, Department of Regional and Crossborder Waters, 1994), pp. 3-4. See also Cumhuriyet, 28 October 1993, p. 15.