The new institutionalism and EC governance: The promise and limits of institutional analysis

Governance

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 429-458

  Pollack, Mark A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030473551     PISSN: 09521895     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0491.1996.tb00251.x     Document Type: Article

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