Domestic support, weak governments, and regional cooperation: A case study of South Asia

Contemporary South Asia

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 57-77

  Dash, Kishore C ^a  

^a Thunderbird: The American Graduate School of International Management   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPING REGION; DOMESTIC SUPPORT; ECONOMIC POLICY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL FACTORS; REGIONAL COOPERATION; SAARC;

ASIA, (SOUTH);

EID: 0031465577     PISSN: 09584935     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09584939708719805     Document Type: Article

References (91)

1. The central assumptions of structural realism include the prevalence of anarchy in the international system, the centrality of unitary states as actors in that system, and relative gains motivations of states, resulting in limited cooperation. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979); Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
2. The central assumptions of structural realism include the prevalence of anarchy in the international system, the centrality of unitary states as actors in that system, and relative gains motivations of states, resulting in limited cooperation. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979); Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
3. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1977).
4. The seven propositions are: (1) States' motivation for absolute gains drive them to cooperate with each other, while states' concern for relative gains is likely to impede cooperation. (2) Cooperative behavior may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Reciprocity strategy involves the exchange of roughly equivalent values of goods. Lack of equivalence is likely to result in misunderstanding between nations and may lead to conflicts rather than cooperation. (3) The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of actors increases. (4) Repeated or structured iteration leads states to learn to cooperate. (5) International regimes promote maximization of absolute gains and thus facilitate cooper-ation. (6) Epistemic communities (i.e. community of transnational actors who share beliefs and epistemologies) facilitate absolute gains behavior and cooperation among the states. (7) Asymmetries in power may be more conducive to cooperation among states. For an overview of the representative literature on these propositions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 3, 1991, pp 701-726; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, Vol 38, No 1, 1985, pp 226-254; Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Charles Lipson, 'International cooperation in economic and security affairs', World Politics, Vol 37, No 1, 1984, pp 1-23; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Conybeare, 'Trade wars: a comparative study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot conflicts', in Oye, op cit, Ref 3, pp 147-172; and Barry Eichengreen, Exclusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent review of literature on these propositions, see Helen Milner, 'International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses'. World Politics, Vol 44, No 3, 1992, pp 466-496.
5. The seven propositions are: (1) States' motivation for absolute gains drive them to cooperate with each other, while states' concern for relative gains is likely to impede cooperation. (2) Cooperative behavior may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Reciprocity strategy involves the exchange of roughly equivalent values of goods. Lack of equivalence is likely to result in misunderstanding between nations and may lead to conflicts rather than cooperation. (3) The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of actors increases. (4) Repeated or structured iteration leads states to learn to cooperate. (5) International regimes promote maximization of absolute gains and thus facilitate cooper-ation. (6) Epistemic communities (i.e. community of transnational actors who share beliefs and epistemologies) facilitate absolute gains behavior and cooperation among the states. (7) Asymmetries in power may be more conducive to cooperation among states. For an overview of the representative literature on these propositions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 3, 1991, pp 701-726; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, Vol 38, No 1, 1985, pp 226-254; Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Charles Lipson, 'International cooperation in economic and security affairs', World Politics, Vol 37, No 1, 1984, pp 1-23; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Conybeare, 'Trade wars: a comparative study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot conflicts', in Oye, op cit, Ref 3, pp 147-172; and Barry Eichengreen, Exclusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent review of literature on these propositions, see Helen Milner, 'International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses'. World Politics, Vol 44, No 3, 1992, pp 466-496.
6. The seven propositions are: (1) States' motivation for absolute gains drive them to cooperate with each other, while states' concern for relative gains is likely to impede cooperation. (2) Cooperative behavior may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Reciprocity strategy involves the exchange of roughly equivalent values of goods. Lack of equivalence is likely to result in misunderstanding between nations and may lead to conflicts rather than cooperation. (3) The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of actors increases. (4) Repeated or structured iteration leads states to learn to cooperate. (5) International regimes promote maximization of absolute gains and thus facilitate cooper-ation. (6) Epistemic communities (i.e. community of transnational actors who share beliefs and epistemologies) facilitate absolute gains behavior and cooperation among the states. (7) Asymmetries in power may be more conducive to cooperation among states. For an overview of the representative literature on these propositions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 3, 1991, pp 701-726; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, Vol 38, No 1, 1985, pp 226-254; Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Charles Lipson, 'International cooperation in economic and security affairs', World Politics, Vol 37, No 1, 1984, pp 1-23; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Conybeare, 'Trade wars: a comparative study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot conflicts', in Oye, op cit, Ref 3, pp 147-172; and Barry Eichengreen, Exclusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent review of literature on these propositions, see Helen Milner, 'International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses'. World Politics, Vol 44, No 3, 1992, pp 466-496.
7. The seven propositions are: (1) States' motivation for absolute gains drive them to cooperate with each other, while states' concern for relative gains is likely to impede cooperation. (2) Cooperative behavior may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Reciprocity strategy involves the exchange of roughly equivalent values of goods. Lack of equivalence is likely to result in misunderstanding between nations and may lead to conflicts rather than cooperation. (3) The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of actors increases. (4) Repeated or structured iteration leads states to learn to cooperate. (5) International regimes promote maximization of absolute gains and thus facilitate cooper-ation. (6) Epistemic communities (i.e. community of transnational actors who share beliefs and epistemologies) facilitate absolute gains behavior and cooperation among the states. (7) Asymmetries in power may be more conducive to cooperation among states. For an overview of the representative literature on these propositions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 3, 1991, pp 701-726; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, Vol 38, No 1, 1985, pp 226-254; Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Charles Lipson, 'International cooperation in economic and security affairs', World Politics, Vol 37, No 1, 1984, pp 1-23; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Conybeare, 'Trade wars: a comparative study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot conflicts', in Oye, op cit, Ref 3, pp 147-172; and Barry Eichengreen, Exclusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent review of literature on these propositions, see Helen Milner, 'International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses'. World Politics, Vol 44, No 3, 1992, pp 466-496.
8. The seven propositions are: (1) States' motivation for absolute gains drive them to cooperate with each other, while states' concern for relative gains is likely to impede cooperation. (2) Cooperative behavior may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Reciprocity strategy involves the exchange of roughly equivalent values of goods. Lack of equivalence is likely to result in misunderstanding between nations and may lead to conflicts rather than cooperation. (3) The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of actors increases. (4) Repeated or structured iteration leads states to learn to cooperate. (5) International regimes promote maximization of absolute gains and thus facilitate cooper-ation. (6) Epistemic communities (i.e. community of transnational actors who share beliefs and epistemologies) facilitate absolute gains behavior and cooperation among the states. (7) Asymmetries in power may be more conducive to cooperation among states. For an overview of the representative literature on these propositions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 3, 1991, pp 701-726; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, Vol 38, No 1, 1985, pp 226-254; Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Charles Lipson, 'International cooperation in economic and security affairs', World Politics, Vol 37, No 1, 1984, pp 1-23; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Conybeare, 'Trade wars: a comparative study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot conflicts', in Oye, op cit, Ref 3, pp 147-172; and Barry Eichengreen, Exclusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent review of literature on these propositions, see Helen Milner, 'International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses'. World Politics, Vol 44, No 3, 1992, pp 466-496.
9. The seven propositions are: (1) States' motivation for absolute gains drive them to cooperate with each other, while states' concern for relative gains is likely to impede cooperation. (2) Cooperative behavior may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Reciprocity strategy involves the exchange of roughly equivalent values of goods. Lack of equivalence is likely to result in misunderstanding between nations and may lead to conflicts rather than cooperation. (3) The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of actors increases. (4) Repeated or structured iteration leads states to learn to cooperate. (5) International regimes promote maximization of absolute gains and thus facilitate cooper-ation. (6) Epistemic communities (i.e. community of transnational actors who share beliefs and epistemologies) facilitate absolute gains behavior and cooperation among the states. (7) Asymmetries in power may be more conducive to cooperation among states. For an overview of the representative literature on these propositions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 3, 1991, pp 701-726; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, Vol 38, No 1, 1985, pp 226-254; Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Charles Lipson, 'International cooperation in economic and security affairs', World Politics, Vol 37, No 1, 1984, pp 1-23; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Conybeare, 'Trade wars: a comparative study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot conflicts', in Oye, op cit, Ref 3, pp 147-172; and Barry Eichengreen, Exclusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent review of literature on these propositions, see Helen Milner, 'International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses'. World Politics, Vol 44, No 3, 1992, pp 466-496.
10. The seven propositions are: (1) States' motivation for absolute gains drive them to cooperate with each other, while states' concern for relative gains is likely to impede cooperation. (2) Cooperative behavior may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Reciprocity strategy involves the exchange of roughly equivalent values of goods. Lack of equivalence is likely to result in misunderstanding between nations and may lead to conflicts rather than cooperation. (3) The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of actors increases. (4) Repeated or structured iteration leads states to learn to cooperate. (5) International regimes promote maximization of absolute gains and thus facilitate cooper-ation. (6) Epistemic communities (i.e. community of transnational actors who share beliefs and epistemologies) facilitate absolute gains behavior and cooperation among the states. (7) Asymmetries in power may be more conducive to cooperation among states. For an overview of the representative literature on these propositions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 3, 1991, pp 701-726; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, Vol 38, No 1, 1985, pp 226-254; Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Charles Lipson, 'International cooperation in economic and security affairs', World Politics, Vol 37, No 1, 1984, pp 1-23; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Conybeare, 'Trade wars: a comparative study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot conflicts', in Oye, op cit, Ref 3, pp 147-172; and Barry Eichengreen, Exclusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent review of literature on these propositions, see Helen Milner, 'International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses'. World Politics, Vol 44, No 3, 1992, pp 466-496.
11. The seven propositions are: (1) States' motivation for absolute gains drive them to cooperate with each other, while states' concern for relative gains is likely to impede cooperation. (2) Cooperative behavior may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Reciprocity strategy involves the exchange of roughly equivalent values of goods. Lack of equivalence is likely to result in misunderstanding between nations and may lead to conflicts rather than cooperation. (3) The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of actors increases. (4) Repeated or structured iteration leads states to learn to cooperate. (5) International regimes promote maximization of absolute gains and thus facilitate cooper-ation. (6) Epistemic communities (i.e. community of transnational actors who share beliefs and epistemologies) facilitate absolute gains behavior and cooperation among the states. (7) Asymmetries in power may be more conducive to cooperation among states. For an overview of the representative literature on these propositions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 3, 1991, pp 701-726; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, Vol 38, No 1, 1985, pp 226-254; Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Charles Lipson, 'International cooperation in economic and security affairs', World Politics, Vol 37, No 1, 1984, pp 1-23; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Conybeare, 'Trade wars: a comparative study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot conflicts', in Oye, op cit, Ref 3, pp 147-172; and Barry Eichengreen, Exclusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent review of literature on these propositions, see Helen Milner, 'International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses'. World Politics, Vol 44, No 3, 1992, pp 466-496.
12. The seven propositions are: (1) States' motivation for absolute gains drive them to cooperate with each other, while states' concern for relative gains is likely to impede cooperation. (2) Cooperative behavior may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Reciprocity strategy involves the exchange of roughly equivalent values of goods. Lack of equivalence is likely to result in misunderstanding between nations and may lead to conflicts rather than cooperation. (3) The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of actors increases. (4) Repeated or structured iteration leads states to learn to cooperate. (5) International regimes promote maximization of absolute gains and thus facilitate cooper-ation. (6) Epistemic communities (i.e. community of transnational actors who share beliefs and epistemologies) facilitate absolute gains behavior and cooperation among the states. (7) Asymmetries in power may be more conducive to cooperation among states. For an overview of the representative literature on these propositions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 3, 1991, pp 701-726; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, Vol 38, No 1, 1985, pp 226-254; Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Charles Lipson, 'International cooperation in economic and security affairs', World Politics, Vol 37, No 1, 1984, pp 1-23; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Conybeare, 'Trade wars: a comparative study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot conflicts', in Oye, op cit, Ref 3, pp 147-172; and Barry Eichengreen, Exclusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent review of literature on these propositions, see Helen Milner, 'International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses'. World Politics, Vol 44, No 3, 1992, pp 466-496.
13. The seven propositions are: (1) States' motivation for absolute gains drive them to cooperate with each other, while states' concern for relative gains is likely to impede cooperation. (2) Cooperative behavior may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Reciprocity strategy involves the exchange of roughly equivalent values of goods. Lack of equivalence is likely to result in misunderstanding between nations and may lead to conflicts rather than cooperation. (3) The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of actors increases. (4) Repeated or structured iteration leads states to learn to cooperate. (5) International regimes promote maximization of absolute gains and thus facilitate cooper-ation. (6) Epistemic communities (i.e. community of transnational actors who share beliefs and epistemologies) facilitate absolute gains behavior and cooperation among the states. (7) Asymmetries in power may be more conducive to cooperation among states. For an overview of the representative literature on these propositions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 3, 1991, pp 701-726; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, Vol 38, No 1, 1985, pp 226-254; Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Charles Lipson, 'International cooperation in economic and security affairs', World Politics, Vol 37, No 1, 1984, pp 1-23; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Conybeare, 'Trade wars: a comparative study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot conflicts', in Oye, op cit, Ref 3, pp 147-172; and Barry Eichengreen, Exclusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent review of literature on these propositions, see Helen Milner, 'International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses'. World Politics, Vol 44, No 3, 1992, pp 466-496.
14. The seven propositions are: (1) States' motivation for absolute gains drive them to cooperate with each other, while states' concern for relative gains is likely to impede cooperation. (2) Cooperative behavior may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Reciprocity strategy involves the exchange of roughly equivalent values of goods. Lack of equivalence is likely to result in misunderstanding between nations and may lead to conflicts rather than cooperation. (3) The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of actors increases. (4) Repeated or structured iteration leads states to learn to cooperate. (5) International regimes promote maximization of absolute gains and thus facilitate cooper-ation. (6) Epistemic communities (i.e. community of transnational actors who share beliefs and epistemologies) facilitate absolute gains behavior and cooperation among the states. (7) Asymmetries in power may be more conducive to cooperation among states. For an overview of the representative literature on these propositions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Duncan Snidal, 'Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 3, 1991, pp 701-726; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, Vol 38, No 1, 1985, pp 226-254; Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Charles Lipson, 'International cooperation in economic and security affairs', World Politics, Vol 37, No 1, 1984, pp 1-23; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Conybeare, 'Trade wars: a comparative study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot conflicts', in Oye, op cit, Ref 3, pp 147-172; and Barry Eichengreen, Exclusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent review of literature on these propositions, see Helen Milner, 'International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses'. World Politics, Vol 44, No 3, 1992, pp 466-496.
15. Milner, op cit, Ref 3, p 489.
16. Charles Pentland, International Relations Theory and European Integration (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p 220.
17. James N. Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp 15-43. Rosenau's discussion of differences between domestic policy and foreign policy issue-areas offers useful insights to my analysis of regional cooperation as a community policy issue area. For some excellent reviews of literature and critical examination of Rosenau's conceptualization of issue-areas, see William C. Potter, 'Issue-area and foreign policy analysis', International Organization, Vol 34, No 3, 1980, pp 405-127; Mathew Evangelista, 'Issue-area and foreign policy revisited', International Organization, Vol 43, No 1, 1989, pp 147-171.
18. James N. Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp 15-43. Rosenau's discussion of differences between domestic policy and foreign policy issue-areas offers useful insights to my analysis of regional cooperation as a community policy issue area. For some excellent reviews of literature and critical examination of Rosenau's conceptualization of issue-areas, see William C. Potter, 'Issue-area and foreign policy analysis', International Organization, Vol 34, No 3, 1980, pp 405-127; Mathew Evangelista, 'Issue-area and foreign policy revisited', International Organization, Vol 43, No 1, 1989, pp 147-171.
19. James N. Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp 15-43. Rosenau's discussion of differences between domestic policy and foreign policy issue-areas offers useful insights to my analysis of regional cooperation as a community policy issue area. For some excellent reviews of literature and critical examination of Rosenau's conceptualization of issue-areas, see William C. Potter, 'Issue-area and foreign policy analysis', International Organization, Vol 34, No 3, 1980, pp 405-127; Mathew Evangelista, 'Issue-area and foreign policy revisited', International Organization, Vol 43, No 1, 1989, pp 147-171.
20. Rosenau, op cit, Ref 6, p 24.
21. Pentland, op cit, Ref 5, p 221.
22. Rosenau, op cit, Ref 6, pp 39-41.
23. Rosenau, however, has acknowledged that in an authoritarian system, the patterns of interaction in the domestic policies can be hierarchical or 'executive'. Rosenau's discussion of executive and legislative process of policy-making is based on Huntington's earlier formulation. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), Chapter 3, and p 146.
24. Pentland, op cit, Ref 5, p 224.
25. An earlier support for this view came from Shepherd. See Robert J. Shepherd, Public Opinion and European Integration (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1975), p 179.
26. Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games', International Organization, Vol 42, No 3, 1988, pp 427-460. For critical extension of Putnam's argument, see Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds), Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Fredrick W. Mayer, 'Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments', International Organization, Vol 46, No 4, 1992, pp 793-818; Keisuke Iida, 'When and how do domestic constraints matter? Two-level games with uncertainty', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 37, No 3, 1993, pp 403-126.
27. Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games', International Organization, Vol 42, No 3, 1988, pp 427-460. For critical extension of Putnam's argument, see Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds), Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Fredrick W. Mayer, 'Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments', International Organization, Vol 46, No 4, 1992, pp 793-818; Keisuke Iida, 'When and how do domestic constraints matter? Two-level games with uncertainty', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 37, No 3, 1993, pp 403-126.
28. Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games', International Organization, Vol 42, No 3, 1988, pp 427-460. For critical extension of Putnam's argument, see Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds), Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Fredrick W. Mayer, 'Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments', International Organization, Vol 46, No 4, 1992, pp 793-818; Keisuke Iida, 'When and how do domestic constraints matter? Two-level games with uncertainty', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 37, No 3, 1993, pp 403-126.
29. Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games', International Organization, Vol 42, No 3, 1988, pp 427-460. For critical extension of Putnam's argument, see Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds), Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Fredrick W. Mayer, 'Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments', International Organization, Vol 46, No 4, 1992, pp 793-818; Keisuke Iida, 'When and how do domestic constraints matter? Two-level games with uncertainty', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 37, No 3, 1993, pp 403-126.
30. Putnam, op cit, Ref 13, p 434. By emphasizing the role of decision-makers as the central strategic actors in the negotiation process, the two-level approach strikes a middle-ground between the state-centric theories and 'second-image-reversed' perspectives. According to the latter perspective, a state's preferences in the formulation of foreign economic policies are influenced by the interaction between international structure and domestic groups. Unlike the state-centric theories, the second-image-reversed approach does not consider the state as a unitary rational actor. Rather, a state is a fragmented unit consisting of different groups or units. A state's policy preferences often are expressions of coalitions of interests of these groups. For a representative literature on the second-image-reversed perspective, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Jeffry Frieden, 'Invested interest: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance', International Organization, Vol 45, No 4, 1991, pp 425-151; and David Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp 18-19; Ernst B. Hass, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p 18.
31. Putnam, op cit, Ref 13, p 434. By emphasizing the role of decision-makers as the central strategic actors in the negotiation process, the two-level approach strikes a middle-ground between the state-centric theories and 'second-image-reversed' perspectives. According to the latter perspective, a state's preferences in the formulation of foreign economic policies are influenced by the interaction between international structure and domestic groups. Unlike the state-centric theories, the second-image-reversed approach does not consider the state as a unitary rational actor. Rather, a state is a fragmented unit consisting of different groups or units. A state's policy preferences often are expressions of coalitions of interests of these groups. For a representative literature on the second-image-reversed perspective, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Jeffry Frieden, 'Invested interest: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance', International Organization, Vol 45, No 4, 1991, pp 425-151; and David Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp 18-19; Ernst B. Hass, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p 18.
32. Putnam, op cit, Ref 13, p 434. By emphasizing the role of decision-makers as the central strategic actors in the negotiation process, the two-level approach strikes a middle-ground between the state-centric theories and 'second-image-reversed' perspectives. According to the latter perspective, a state's preferences in the formulation of foreign economic policies are influenced by the interaction between international structure and domestic groups. Unlike the state-centric theories, the second-image-reversed approach does not consider the state as a unitary rational actor. Rather, a state is a fragmented unit consisting of different groups or units. A state's policy preferences often are expressions of coalitions of interests of these groups. For a representative literature on the second-image-reversed perspective, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Jeffry Frieden, 'Invested interest: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance', International Organization, Vol 45, No 4, 1991, pp 425-151; and David Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp 18-19; Ernst B. Hass, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p 18.
33. Putnam, op cit, Ref 13, p 434. By emphasizing the role of decision-makers as the central strategic actors in the negotiation process, the two-level approach strikes a middle-ground between the state-centric theories and 'second-image-reversed' perspectives. According to the latter perspective, a state's preferences in the formulation of foreign economic policies are influenced by the interaction between international structure and domestic groups. Unlike the state-centric theories, the second-image-reversed approach does not consider the state as a unitary rational actor. Rather, a state is a fragmented unit consisting of different groups or units. A state's policy preferences often are expressions of coalitions of interests of these groups. For a representative literature on the second-image-reversed perspective, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Jeffry Frieden, 'Invested interest: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance', International Organization, Vol 45, No 4, 1991, pp 425-151; and David Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp 18-19; Ernst B. Hass, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p 18.
34. Putnam, op cit, Ref 13, p 434. By emphasizing the role of decision-makers as the central strategic actors in the negotiation process, the two-level approach strikes a middle-ground between the state-centric theories and 'second-image-reversed' perspectives. According to the latter perspective, a state's preferences in the formulation of foreign economic policies are influenced by the interaction between international structure and domestic groups. Unlike the state-centric theories, the second-image-reversed approach does not consider the state as a unitary rational actor. Rather, a state is a fragmented unit consisting of different groups or units. A state's policy preferences often are expressions of coalitions of interests of these groups. For a representative literature on the second-image-reversed perspective, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Jeffry Frieden, 'Invested interest: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance', International Organization, Vol 45, No 4, 1991, pp 425-151; and David Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp 18-19; Ernst B. Hass, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p 18.
35. Putnam, op cit, Ref 13, p 434. By emphasizing the role of decision-makers as the central strategic actors in the negotiation process, the two-level approach strikes a middle-ground between the state-centric theories and 'second-image-reversed' perspectives. According to the latter perspective, a state's preferences in the formulation of foreign economic policies are influenced by the interaction between international structure and domestic groups. Unlike the state-centric theories, the second-image-reversed approach does not consider the state as a unitary rational actor. Rather, a state is a fragmented unit consisting of different groups or units. A state's policy preferences often are expressions of coalitions of interests of these groups. For a representative literature on the second-image-reversed perspective, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Jeffry Frieden, 'Invested interest: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance', International Organization, Vol 45, No 4, 1991, pp 425-151; and David Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp 18-19; Ernst B. Hass, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p 18.
36. Putnam, op cit, Ref 13, p 434. By emphasizing the role of decision-makers as the central strategic actors in the negotiation process, the two-level approach strikes a middle-ground between the state-centric theories and 'second-image-reversed' perspectives. According to the latter perspective, a state's preferences in the formulation of foreign economic policies are influenced by the interaction between international structure and domestic groups. Unlike the state-centric theories, the second-image-reversed approach does not consider the state as a unitary rational actor. Rather, a state is a fragmented unit consisting of different groups or units. A state's policy preferences often are expressions of coalitions of interests of these groups. For a representative literature on the second-image-reversed perspective, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Jeffry Frieden, 'Invested interest: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance', International Organization, Vol 45, No 4, 1991, pp 425-151; and David Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp 18-19; Ernst B. Hass, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p 18.
37. Putnam, op cit, Ref 13, p 434. By emphasizing the role of decision-makers as the central strategic actors in the negotiation process, the two-level approach strikes a middle-ground between the state-centric theories and 'second-image-reversed' perspectives. According to the latter perspective, a state's preferences in the formulation of foreign economic policies are influenced by the interaction between international structure and domestic groups. Unlike the state-centric theories, the second-image-reversed approach does not consider the state as a unitary rational actor. Rather, a state is a fragmented unit consisting of different groups or units. A state's policy preferences often are expressions of coalitions of interests of these groups. For a representative literature on the second-image-reversed perspective, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Jeffry Frieden, 'Invested interest: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance', International Organization, Vol 45, No 4, 1991, pp 425-151; and David Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp 18-19; Ernst B. Hass, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p 18.
38. Putnam, op cit, Ref 13, p 434. By emphasizing the role of decision-makers as the central strategic actors in the negotiation process, the two-level approach strikes a middle-ground between the state-centric theories and 'second-image-reversed' perspectives. According to the latter perspective, a state's preferences in the formulation of foreign economic policies are influenced by the interaction between international structure and domestic groups. Unlike the state-centric theories, the second-image-reversed approach does not consider the state as a unitary rational actor. Rather, a state is a fragmented unit consisting of different groups or units. A state's policy preferences often are expressions of coalitions of interests of these groups. For a representative literature on the second-image-reversed perspective, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Jeffry Frieden, 'Invested interest: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance', International Organization, Vol 45, No 4, 1991, pp 425-151; and David Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp 18-19; Ernst B. Hass, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p 18.
39. See Michael G. Huelshoff, 'Domestic politics and dynamic issue-linkage: a reformulation of integration theory', International Studies Quarterly, Vol 38, No 2, 1994, pp 255-279; Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: recasting European bargain', World Politics, Vol 42, No 1, 1989, pp 95-128; Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1991); Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in Keohane and Hoffmann, ibid; Simon Bulmer, 'Domestic politics and European Community policy-making', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 21, No 4, 1983, pp 349-363; Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, 'Europeans and the European Community: the dynamics of public support for European integration', International Organization, Vol 47, No 4, 1993, pp 507-534.
40. See Michael G. Huelshoff, 'Domestic politics and dynamic issue-linkage: a reformulation of integration theory', International Studies Quarterly, Vol 38, No 2, 1994, pp 255-279; Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: recasting European bargain', World Politics, Vol 42, No 1, 1989, pp 95-128; Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1991); Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in Keohane and Hoffmann, ibid; Simon Bulmer, 'Domestic politics and European Community policy-making', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 21, No 4, 1983, pp 349-363; Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, 'Europeans and the European Community: the dynamics of public support for European integration', International Organization, Vol 47, No 4, 1993, pp 507-534.
41. See Michael G. Huelshoff, 'Domestic politics and dynamic issue-linkage: a reformulation of integration theory', International Studies Quarterly, Vol 38, No 2, 1994, pp 255-279; Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: recasting European bargain', World Politics, Vol 42, No 1, 1989, pp 95-128; Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1991); Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in Keohane and Hoffmann, ibid; Simon Bulmer, 'Domestic politics and European Community policy-making', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 21, No 4, 1983, pp 349-363; Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, 'Europeans and the European Community: the dynamics of public support for European integration', International Organization, Vol 47, No 4, 1993, pp 507-534.
42. See Michael G. Huelshoff, 'Domestic politics and dynamic issue-linkage: a reformulation of integration theory', International Studies Quarterly, Vol 38, No 2, 1994, pp 255-279; Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: recasting European bargain', World Politics, Vol 42, No 1, 1989, pp 95-128; Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1991); Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in Keohane and Hoffmann, ibid; Simon Bulmer, 'Domestic politics and European Community policy-making', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 21, No 4, 1983, pp 349-363; Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, 'Europeans and the European Community: the dynamics of public support for European integration', International Organization, Vol 47, No 4, 1993, pp 507-534.
43. See Michael G. Huelshoff, 'Domestic politics and dynamic issue-linkage: a reformulation of integration theory', International Studies Quarterly, Vol 38, No 2, 1994, pp 255-279; Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: recasting European bargain', World Politics, Vol 42, No 1, 1989, pp 95-128; Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1991); Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in Keohane and Hoffmann, ibid; Simon Bulmer, 'Domestic politics and European Community policy-making', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 21, No 4, 1983, pp 349-363; Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, 'Europeans and the European Community: the dynamics of public support for European integration', International Organization, Vol 47, No 4, 1993, pp 507-534.
44. See Michael G. Huelshoff, 'Domestic politics and dynamic issue-linkage: a reformulation of integration theory', International Studies Quarterly, Vol 38, No 2, 1994, pp 255-279; Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: recasting European bargain', World Politics, Vol 42, No 1, 1989, pp 95-128; Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1991); Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in Keohane and Hoffmann, ibid; Simon Bulmer, 'Domestic politics and European Community policy-making', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 21, No 4, 1983, pp 349-363; Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, 'Europeans and the European Community: the dynamics of public support for European integration', International Organization, Vol 47, No 4, 1993, pp 507-534.
45. This argument is further supported by Karl Deutsch's analyses of the impact of 'positive feedback' and 'negative feedback' on decision-makers and the 'salience of integration issues to substantial interest-groups and people'.-See Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press, 1963); and The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), p 247. Keohane and Nye have also developed the same line of argument in their 'complex interdependence' conceptualization. See Keohane and Nye, op cit, Ref 2, p 226.
46. This argument is further supported by Karl Deutsch's analyses of the impact of 'positive feedback' and 'negative feedback' on decision-makers and the 'salience of integration issues to substantial interest-groups and people'.-See Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press, 1963); and The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), p 247. Keohane and Nye have also developed the same line of argument in their 'complex interdependence' conceptualization. See Keohane and Nye, op cit, Ref 2, p 226.
47. This argument is further supported by Karl Deutsch's analyses of the impact of 'positive feedback' and 'negative feedback' on decision-makers and the 'salience of integration issues to substantial interest-groups and people'.-See Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press, 1963); and The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), p 247. Keohane and Nye have also developed the same line of argument in their 'complex interdependence' conceptualization. See Keohane and Nye, op cit, Ref 2, p 226.
48. See Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Peter Katzenstein (ed), Between Power and Plenty (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Stephen Krasner, 'Approaches to the state: alternative conceptions and historical dynamics', Comparative Politics, Vol 16, No 2, 1984, pp 223-246; and B.A. Rockman, 'Minding the state - or a state of mind? Issues in the comparative conceptualization of the state', in J.A. Caporaso (ed), The Elusive State: International State and Comparative Perspectives (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), pp 173-203.
49. See Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Peter Katzenstein (ed), Between Power and Plenty (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Stephen Krasner, 'Approaches to the state: alternative conceptions and historical dynamics', Comparative Politics, Vol 16, No 2, 1984, pp 223-246; and B.A. Rockman, 'Minding the state - or a state of mind? Issues in the comparative conceptualization of the state', in J.A. Caporaso (ed), The Elusive State: International State and Comparative Perspectives (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), pp 173-203.
50. See Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Peter Katzenstein (ed), Between Power and Plenty (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Stephen Krasner, 'Approaches to the state: alternative conceptions and historical dynamics', Comparative Politics, Vol 16, No 2, 1984, pp 223-246; and B.A. Rockman, 'Minding the state - or a state of mind? Issues in the comparative conceptualization of the state', in J.A. Caporaso (ed), The Elusive State: International State and Comparative Perspectives (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), pp 173-203.
51. See Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Peter Katzenstein (ed), Between Power and Plenty (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Stephen Krasner, 'Approaches to the state: alternative conceptions and historical dynamics', Comparative Politics, Vol 16, No 2, 1984, pp 223-246; and B.A. Rockman, 'Minding the state - or a state of mind? Issues in the comparative conceptualization of the state', in J.A. Caporaso (ed), The Elusive State: International State and Comparative Perspectives (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), pp 173-203.
52. For an excellent review of this literature, see Timothy Mitchell, 'The limits of the state: beyond statist approaches and their critics', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 1, 1991, pp 77-96. For a different interpretation of 'strong-weak' state, see Suzanne and Lloyd Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1987), Chapter 1. For various usages of the term 'state' in the non-Western context - such as 'hard state', 'administrative state', 'soft state', 'bureaucratic polity', 'repressive-developmentalist state', etc, see the review of statist literature by Donald Crone, 'State, social elites, and government capacity in Southeast Asia', World Politics, Vol 22, No 2, 1988, pp 252-268. For an excellent discussion of states as 'quasi states' see Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
53. For an excellent review of this literature, see Timothy Mitchell, 'The limits of the state: beyond statist approaches and their critics', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 1, 1991, pp 77-96. For a different interpretation of 'strong-weak' state, see Suzanne and Lloyd Rudolph, In Pursuit
54. For an excellent review of this literature, see Timothy Mitchell, 'The limits of the state: beyond statist approaches and their critics', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 1, 1991, pp 77-96. For a different interpretation of 'strong-weak' state, see Suzanne and Lloyd Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1987), Chapter 1. For various usages of the term 'state' in the non-Western context - such as 'hard state', 'administrative state', 'soft state', 'bureaucratic polity', 'repressive-developmentalist state', etc, see the review of statist literature by Donald Crone, 'State, social elites, and government capacity in Southeast Asia', World Politics, Vol 22, No 2, 1988, pp 252-268. For an excellent discussion of states as 'quasi states' see Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
55. For an excellent review of this literature, see Timothy Mitchell, 'The limits of the state: beyond statist approaches and their critics', American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 1, 1991, pp 77-96. For a different interpretation of 'strong-weak' state, see Suzanne and Lloyd Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1987), Chapter 1. For various usages of the term 'state' in the non-Western context - such as 'hard state', 'administrative state', 'soft state', 'bureaucratic polity', 'repressive-developmentalist state', etc, see the review of statist literature by Donald Crone, 'State, social elites, and government capacity in Southeast Asia', World Politics, Vol 22, No 2, 1988, pp 252-268. For an excellent discussion of states as 'quasi states' see Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
56. For an extension of this argument, see Huelshoff, op cit, Ref 15, pp 264-265; Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp 16-17.
57. For an extension of this argument, see Huelshoff, op cit, Ref 15, pp 264-265; Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp 16-17.
58. Huelshoff, op cit, Ref 15, p 265.
59. This argument relies on the burgeoning literature concerned with such issues as the development and form of state structures, their capacity and autonomy in particular contexts, and the interaction of the state with various societal groups and organizations. Among the many studies in this area, see the following major works: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Nordlinger, op cit, Ref 17; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Krasner, op cit, Ref 17, pp 223-246; Harold Crouch, Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies); and Joel S. Midgal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. Chapters 1 and 11.
60. This argument relies on the burgeoning literature concerned with such issues as the development and form of state structures, their capacity and autonomy in particular contexts, and the interaction of the state with various societal groups and organizations. Among the many studies in this area, see the following major works: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Nordlinger, op cit, Ref 17; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Krasner, op cit, Ref 17, pp 223-246; Harold Crouch, Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies); and Joel S. Midgal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. Chapters 1 and 11.
61. This argument relies on the burgeoning literature concerned with such issues as the development and form of state structures, their capacity and autonomy in particular contexts, and the interaction of the state with various societal groups and organizations. Among the many studies in this area, see the following major works: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Nordlinger, op cit, Ref 17; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Krasner, op cit, Ref 17, pp 223-246; Harold Crouch, Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies); and Joel S. Midgal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. Chapters 1 and 11.
62. This argument relies on the burgeoning literature concerned with such issues as the development and form of state structures, their capacity and autonomy in particular contexts, and the interaction of the state with various societal groups and organizations. Among the many studies in this area, see the following major works: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Nordlinger, op cit, Ref 17; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Krasner, op cit, Ref 17, pp 223-246; Harold Crouch, Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies); and Joel S. Midgal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. Chapters 1 and 11.
63. This argument relies on the burgeoning literature concerned with such issues as the development and form of state structures, their capacity and autonomy in particular contexts, and the interaction of the state with various societal groups and organizations. Among the many studies in this area, see the following major works: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Nordlinger, op cit, Ref 17; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Krasner, op cit, Ref 17, pp 223-246; Harold Crouch, Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies); and Joel S. Midgal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. Chapters 1 and 11.
64. This argument relies on the burgeoning literature concerned with such issues as the development and form of state structures, their capacity and autonomy in particular contexts, and the interaction of the state with various societal groups and organizations. Among the many studies in this area, see the following major works: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Nordlinger, op cit, Ref 17; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Krasner, op cit, Ref 17, pp 223-246; Harold Crouch, Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies); and Joel S. Midgal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. Chapters 1 and 11.
65. This argument relies on the burgeoning literature concerned with such issues as the development and form of state structures, their capacity and autonomy in particular contexts, and the interaction of the state with various societal groups and organizations. Among the many studies in this area, see the following major works: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Nordlinger, op cit, Ref 17; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Krasner, op cit, Ref 17, pp 223-246; Harold Crouch, Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies); and Joel S. Midgal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. Chapters 1 and 11.
66. It should be noted that at the first foreign ministers' meeting at New Delhi from 1 to 3 August 1983, a Declaration on Regional Cooperation was adopted, formally beginning an organization called South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC). However, at the fourth foreign ministers' meeting at Dhaka on 5 December 1985, a decision was taken to change the name of the organization from SARC to SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). The change in the acronym was based on the thinking that while SARC refers to the process of South Asian Regional Cooperation, SAARC marks the establishment of an association to promote and develop such cooperation. For a detailed discussion of the origins and evolution of SAARC, see Kishore C. Dash, Public Opinion and Regional Cooperation in South Asia, unpublished dissertation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1994), Chapter 3.
67. Centralization, as used here, refers to concentration of power to make key national decisions in the hands of one or very few leaders. Quasi democracy refers to a fragile political system where the leaders, despite their election through popular vote, are severely constrained to formulate or implement only those kind of policies supported by the military, bureaucracy, other dominant societal actors, and international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, etc.
68. For a good account of the impact of these movements on the performances of South Asian governments, see Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Chapters 3 and 6.
69. In the Maldivian political system, the constitution does not provide for political parties. The President is first elected by a majority members of the Majlis (the Maldivian Parliament), which consists of 48 members. After the approval of the Majlis, the President's election has to be endorsed by a country-wide referendum. In the Maldives, despite the clear cut division of powers between the executive and the legislative organs, the President has overarching powers in the governance of the country. The President, however, can be removed from the office by the Majlis. Ibrahim Nasir, the predecessor of the present President Mr Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, was stripped of his presidency by the Majlis in 1978 when he misused the office for his personal gain. Bhutan has a monarchical system.
70. See Myron Weiner, 'Institution building in South Asia', in Robert A. Scalapino, S. Sato and J. Wanadi (eds), Asian Political Institutionalization (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986).
71. This is typical of all 'praetorian societies', as Huntington would argue. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), Chapter 4.
72. For an insightful discussion on aspects of government weakness in India, see Atul Kohli, 'Centralization and powerlessness: India's democracy in a comparative perspective', in Midgal et al. (eds), op cit, Ref 21, pp 89-107; also see, Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
73. For an insightful discussion on aspects of government weakness in India, see Atul Kohli, 'Centralization and powerlessness: India's democracy in a comparative perspective', in Midgal et al. (eds), op cit, Ref 21, pp 89-107; also see, Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
74. See Gowher Rizvi, South Asia in a Changing International Order (New Delhi: Sage, 1993), Chapter 4 and p 162.
75. The present study is based on an extensive open-ended interviews with 610 elites in South Asia. The in-person interviews were conducted during my field research in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka from February 1992 to December 1993. Two types of response percentages are given in this study: (1) percentages are given on the basis of total number of responses in a category; and (2) percentages are also calculated on the basis of total number of responses from a particular occupational group in a given category. Only those statistically significant findings are reported in the discussion. Data in this study are from Kishore C. Dash, op cit, Ref 22, chapter 2.
76. Equity theory, as developed in social psychology and economics, is broadly concerned with how people judge what is just, fair, deserved or equitable, and how these perceptions influence behavior. Without explicating the main propositions of equity theory in detail, the present work is primarily concerned with the extent to which individuals' 'distress' at perceived inequity may be related to their attitudinal support, or lack of it, for SAARC. Although equity theory has been applied to various issues, the first application of the theory to analyze perceptions of the European Community was made by Hewstone. By employing the formula suggested by Walster et al., Hewstone has determined the level of perceived inequity and the consequent support, or lack of it, of West Germans, French, Italians and British for European Community. Hewstone's methodology, as a whole, is not employed in the present work. Rather, by just asking separate questions about which member states are likely to contribute and benefit most or least, the present work attempts to unravel the degree of perceived inequity among the member states of SAARC. For further discussion, see Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European Community: A Social-Psychological Study in Four Member States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp 129-135; E. Walster et al., 'New Directions in Equity Research', in L. Berkowitz and E. Walster (eds), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol 9) (New York: Academic Press, 1976).
77. Equity theory, as developed in social psychology and economics, is broadly concerned with how people judge what is just, fair, deserved or equitable, and how these perceptions influence behavior. Without explicating the main propositions of equity theory in detail, the present work is primarily concerned with the extent to which individuals' 'distress' at perceived inequity may be related to their attitudinal support, or lack of it, for SAARC. Although equity theory has been applied to various issues, the first application of the theory to analyze perceptions of the European Community was made by Hewstone. By employing the formula suggested by Walster et al., Hewstone has determined the level of perceived inequity and the consequent support, or lack of it, of West Germans, French, Italians and British for European Community. Hewstone's methodology, as a whole, is not employed in the present work. Rather, by just asking separate questions about which member states are likely to contribute and benefit most or least, the present work attempts to unravel the degree of perceived inequity among the member states of SAARC. For further discussion, see Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European Community: A Social-Psychological Study in Four Member States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp 129-135; E. Walster et al., 'New Directions in Equity Research', in L. Berkowitz and E. Walster (eds), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol 9) (New York: Academic Press, 1976).
78. See Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, Europe's Would Be Polity (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), Chapter 1.
79. For a critical discussion, see Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, Ref 32; Shepherd, op cit, Ref 12; and Ronald Inglehart and Jacques-Rene Rabier, 'Economic uncertainty and European solidarity: public opinion trends', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 440, November, 1978, pp 66-67.
80. For a critical discussion, see Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, Ref 32; Shepherd, op cit, Ref 12; and Ronald Inglehart and Jacques-Rene Rabier, 'Economic uncertainty and European solidarity: public opinion trends', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 440, November, 1978, pp 66-67.
81. For a critical discussion, see Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, Ref 32; Shepherd, op cit, Ref 12; and Ronald Inglehart and Jacques-Rene Rabier, 'Economic uncertainty and European solidarity: public opinion trends', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 440, November, 1978, pp 66-67.
82. See Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, Ref 32.
83. See Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, Ref 32; Shepherd, op cit, Ref 12.
84. See Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, Ref 32; Shepherd, op cit, Ref 12.
85. See Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, Ref 32; Shepherd, op cit, Ref 12.
86. For a discussion on these characteristics, see Hewstone, op cit, Ref 31, p 81.
87. For a discussion of these two kinds of coalitions and their effect on regional cooperation, see Etel Solingen, 'Democracy, economic reform, and regional cooperation', Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 31 August-3 September 1995, pp 9-18.
88. For an explanation of 'stop-and-go' pattern of regional cooperation, see Gerald Schneider and Lars-Erik Cederman, 'The change of tide in political cooperation: a limited information model of European integration'. International Organization, Vol 48, No 4, 1994, pp 636-638. It is useful to compare and contrast a regional organization's 'stop-and-go' pattern of growth with 'turbulent nongrowth' as conceptualized by Ernst Haas. See Haas, op cit, Ref 14, Chapter 6.
89. For an explanation of 'stop-and-go' pattern of regional cooperation, see Gerald Schneider and Lars-Erik Cederman, 'The change of tide in political cooperation: a limited information model of European integration'. International Organization, Vol 48, No 4, 1994, pp 636-638. It is useful to compare and contrast a regional organization's 'stop-and-go' pattern of growth with 'turbulent nongrowth' as conceptualized by Ernst Haas. See Haas, op cit, Ref 14, Chapter 6.
90. For research in this area, see Dorette Corbey, 'Dialectical functionalism: stagnation as a booster of European integration', International Organization, Vol 49, No 2, 1995, pp 253-284; also see the works, op cit, Ref 14 and 15.
91. For research in this area, see Dorette Corbey, 'Dialectical functionalism: stagnation as a booster of European integration', International Organization, Vol 49, No 2, 1995, pp 253-284; also see the works, op cit, Ref 14 and 15.