The change of tide in political cooperation: A limited information model of European integration

International Organization

Volumn 48, Issue 4, 1994, Pages 633-662

  Schneider, Gerald ^a   Cederman, Lars Erik ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84971945562     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300028332     Document Type: Article

References (81)

1. Helmut Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn (The Germans and their neighbors) (Berlin: Siedler, 1990), p. 96.
2. Horst Siebert, The New Economic Landscape in Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 1.
3. Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community,” in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community, Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 41-84.
4. Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, “1992: Recasting the European Bargain,” World Politics 42 (October 1989), pp. 95-128.
5. Geoffrey Garrett, “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community’s Internal Market,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 533-560.
6. Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook make this point in “‘Less Filling, Tastes Great’: The Realist-Neoliberal Debate,” World Politics 46 (January 1994), pp. 209-234.
7. Joseph Nye, “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” World Politics 40 (January 1988), pp. 235-251.
8. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
9. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978), pp. 167-214.
10. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
11. Jeffrey Banks, Signaling Games in Political Science (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1991).
12. Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
13. Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
14. James D. Fearon, “Deterrence and the Spiral Model: The Role of Costly Signals in Crisis Bargaining,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 30 August-2 September 1990.
15. Robert D. Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
16. Keisuke Iida, “Analytic Uncertainty and International Cooperation: Theory and Application to International Economic Policy Coordination,” International Studies Quarterly 37 (December 1993), pp. 431-457.
17. Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Study,” World Politics 41 (January 1989), pp. 43-69.
18. Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 13.
19. Simon Bulmer and Wolfgang Wessels, The European Council: Decision-making in European Politics (London: Macmillan, 1987), p. 2.
20. Michael Butler, Europe: More than a Continent (London: Heinemann, 1986).
21. Marceil Von Donat, Das ist der Gipfel! Die EG-Regierungschefs unter sich (This is the summit! The EC heads of government among themselves) (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 1987).
22. Leon Lindberg, “Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon,” International Organization 24 (Autumn 1970), pp. 694-731.
23. Helen Wallace, “Widening and Deepening: The European Community and the New European Agenda,” Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA) discussion paper no. 23, RIAA, London, 1989.
24. Anna Michalski and Helen Wallace, The European Community: The Challenge of Enlargement (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992).
25. Albert O. Hirschmann, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 27-29.
26. Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe’s Would-be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971), p. 104.
27. Joseph Nye, Peace in Parts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
28. Richard Corbett, “The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 30 (September 1993), pp. 271-298.
29. David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1933).
30. David Little, Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991).
31. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937).
32. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1963).
33. Paul Colomy, ed., Functionalist Sociology: Classic Statements (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1990).
34. Paul Colomy, ed., Neofunctionalist Sociology: Contemporary Statement (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1990).
35. John Harsanyi, “Rational Choice Models of Political Behavior Versus Functionalist and Conformist Theories,” World Politics 21 (July 1969), pp. 513-538.
36. Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
37. Harold K. Jacobson, William M. Reisinger, and Todd Mathers, “National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations,” American Political Science Review 80 (March 1986), p. 142.
38. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 12-38.
39. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economical Forces 1950-1957 (London: Stevens and Sons, 1958).
40. Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964).
41. Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 40.
42. Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community, Decisionmaking, and Institutional Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991).
43. Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus 95 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915.
44. Fritz W. Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration,” Public Administration 66 (Fall 1988), pp. 239-278.
45. Ernst B. Haas’s “Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration,” International Organization 30 (Spring 1976), pp. 173-212.
46. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753-775.
47. David R. Cameron, “The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences,” in Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., Euro-politics, Institutions, and Policymaking in the “New” European Community (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 65.
48. David M. Andrews, “Germany, Maastricht, and EMU: The Limits of Integration Theory,” paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Ga., 31 March-4 April 1992.
49. Wayne Sandholtz, “Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht,” International Organization 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 1-39.
50. Finn Laursen, “Toward European Political Union: An Analysis of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union,” paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Ga., 31 March-4 April 1992.
51. Gerald Schneider, “Getting Closer at Different Speeds: Strategic Interaction in Widening European Integration,” in Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, eds., Game Theory and International Relations (Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar, 1994), pp. 125-155.
52. William Wallace, “Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a Political System,” in Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Carol Webb, eds., Policy Making in the European Community (Chichester, England: John Wiley and Sons, 1977), pp. 403-436.
53. Robert Aumann, “Survey of Repeated Games,” in Robert Aumann, ed., Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oscar Morgenstern (Mannheim, Germany: Bibliographisches Institut, 1981), pp. 11-42.
54. Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin, “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting and with Incomplete Information,” Econometrica 54 (May 1986), pp. 533-564.
55. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
56. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 226-254.
57. Wayne Sandholtz, High-tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 30.
58. Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 85 (September 1991), pp. 701-726.
59. Duncan Snidal, “International Cooperation Among Relative Gain Maximizers,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (December 1991), pp. 387-402.
60. George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker, “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum,” American Economic Review 67 (March 1977), pp. 76-90.
61. Carl Christian von Weizäcker, “Notes on Endogenous Change of Tastes,” Journal of Economic Theory 3 (December 1971), pp. 345-372.
62. Gerald Schneider, Time, Planning, and Policymaking: An Evaluation of a Complex Relationship (Bern: Peter Lang, 1991).
63. Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers of Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).
64. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460.
65. Fredrick W. Mayer, “Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-payments,” International Organization 46 (Autumn 1992), pp. 793-818.
66. Keisuke Iida, “When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-level Games with Uncertainty,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (September 1993), pp. 403-426.
67. Peter B. Evans, “Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Reflections and Projections,” in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 397-430.
68. Eric Rasmussen, Games and Information (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 54-60.
69. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 21-52.
70. Morris Fiorina, “Formal Models in Political Science,” American Journal of Political Science 19 (February 1975), pp. 133-159.
71. Lord Carrington, Reflect on Things Past (London: Collins, 1988), p. 319.
72. James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), pp. 492-493.
73. Christopher Tugendhat, Making Sense of Europe (London: Viking, 1986), p. 121.
74. Harold Wilson, Final Term (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p. 543.
75. Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, Organizational Ecology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).
76. Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
77. Michael Don Ward, ed., The New Geopolitics (Philadelphia: Gordon and Breach, 1992).
78. Jeffrey Banks and Joel Sobel, “Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games,” Econometrica 55 (May 1987), pp. 890-904.
79. Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991).
80. Ken Binmore, Essays on the Foundation of Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
81. David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 437.