Dialectical functionalism: Stagnation as a booster of european integration

International Organization

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 253-284

  Corbey, Dorette ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84972438259     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300028393     Document Type: Article

References (128)

1. See for instance Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp 1-39;.
2. Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, “1992: Recasting the European Bargain,” World Politics 42 (October 1989), pp. 95-128;.
3. Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act,” in Keohane and Hoffmann, The New European Community; and.
4. David R. Cameron, “The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences,” in Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., Euro-Politics, Institutions, and Policymaking in the “New” European Community (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 23–74.
5. Compare also Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992); and.
6. Paul Taylor, “The European Community and the State: Assumptions, Theories, and Propositions,” Review of International Studies 17 (April 1991), pp. 109–125.
7. See Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (London: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 309.
8. See also Loukas Tsoukalis, “Looking into the Crystal Ball,” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (September/December 1982), pp. 229-44.
9. For an extensive discussion on the definition of integration, see C. Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber, 1973).
10. Compare also Huelshoff definition in Michael G. Huelshoff, “Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of Integration Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 38 (June 1994), pp. 255–79.
11. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (London: Stevens, 1958). For an overview of neofunctionalism, see Pentland, International Theory and European Integration.
12. Alan S. Milward and Vibeke Sørensen, “Interdependence or integration? A national choice,” in Alan S. Milward et al., eds., The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945–1992 (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 4.
13. To the extent that research has given attention to governments, their changing attitudes have been seen as an indication that integration is proceeding. See Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 8.
14. Summarizing this political process, the concept of “political spillover” has been introduced into the neofunctionalist vocabulary. See Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 23.
15. Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 282; emphasis original.
16. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 16.
17. See Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, pp. 101–6, for a description of the changing neofunctionalist expectations.
18. See Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1975).
19. For another recent reappraisal of neofunction-alism, see Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, “Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration,” International Organization, 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 41–76.
20. Keohane and Hoffmann, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s’ p. 19.
21. See also Linda Cornett and James A. Caporaso, “‘And Still It Moves!’ State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community,” in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 219–49 and p. 232 in particular.
22. This fact was also recognized in the 1970s. See, for instance, Roger D. Hansen, “European Integration: Forward March, Parade Rest, or Dismissed?” International Organization, 27 (Spring 1973), pp. 225–54.
23. Fritz W. Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration,” Public Administration 66 (Autumn 1988), pp. 239–78 and p. 266 in particular.
24. There seems little ground for the assumption that interest groups would have a pro-European attitude. See Alan Butt Philip, “Pressure Group Power in the European Community,” Intereconomics 22 (November/December 1987), pp. 282–89 and p. 287 in particular.
25. On politics and policy, see, for instance, Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, pp. 228–29.
26. On the social dimension, see Martin Rhodes, “The Social Dimension of the Single European Market: National Versus Transnational Regulation,” European Journal of Political Research 19 (March/April 1991), pp. 245-80; and.
27. Martin Rhodes, “The Future of the Social Dimension: Labour Market Regulation in Post Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies 30 (March 1992), pp. 23–51.
28. For a similar criticism, see Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” International Spectator 21 (1967), pp. 253 - 316 ;.
29. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory; and.
30. Carole Webb, “Theoretical Perspectives and Problems,” in Helen Wallace et al., eds., Policy Making in the European Community, 2d ed. (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), pp. 1–41.
31. Critics have pointed out that, ironically, neofunctionalism has failed to recognize that the emergence of the EC coincided with the rapid evolution of the welfare state. See Milward and Sørensen, “Interdependence or integration?”.
32. For application of neoliberal institutionalism to the analysis of the EC, see Cornett and Caporaso, “‘And Still It Moves!’” pp. 232–36.
33. Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity.
34. See also Shlomo Weber and Hans Wiesmeth, “Issue Linkage in the European Community,” Journal of Common Market Studies 29 (March 1991), pp. 255–67.
35. See Keohane and Hoffmann, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” pp. 13-15;.
36. Cornett and Caporaso, “‘And Still It Moves!’” pp. 232-36; and.
37. B. Guy Peters, “Politics and the Institutions of the EC,” in Sbragia, Euro-Politics, Institutions, and Policymaking in the “New” European Community, pp. 75–122 and pp. 113–15 in particular.
38. See, for example, Juliet Lodge, “Institutional Considerations,” in Juliet Lodge, ed., The European Community and the Challenge of the Future (London: Pinter, 1989), pp. 26–57.
39. Gerald Schneider and Lars-Erik Cederman, “The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration” in International Organization 48 (Autumn 1994), pp. 633–62.
40. See Peter Ludlow, “The European Commission, ” in Keohane and Hoffmann, The New European Community, p. 121. This argument, however, is not convincing: leadership has not changed significantly over last eight years, and yet a period of stagnation has followed the progress made during the second half of the 1980s.
41. The quotation is drawn from pp. 65–66 of William Wallace, “Europe as a Confederation: The Community and the Nation-State,” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (September/ December 1982), pp. 57–68.
42. See also Stanley Hoffmann, “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today,” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (September/December 1982), pp. 21–37 and pp. 33–35 in particular. During the 1960s, scholars advocated analyzing the conduct of states and the domestic resistance to integration.
43. See, for example, Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete?” pp. 267–68.
44. As Stanley Hoffmann writes, “the state acts… as a shaper capable of moulding its own domestic support, of choosing among national interests and external constraints.”.
45. See Hoffmann, “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today,” p. 27, emphasis original.
46. Cornett and Caporaso, “‘And Still It Moves!’” pp. 229–31.
47. See Keohane and Hoffmann, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” pp. 23-25; and.
48. Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act.”.
49. See Geoffrey Garrett, “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market,” International Organization 46(Spring 1992), pp. 533-60; and.
50. Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act.”.
51. Moravscik, “Negotiating the Single European Act,” pp. 72–74.
52. For the former argument, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).
53. See Hoffmann, “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today,” pp. 33-35; and.
54. Keohane and Hoffmann, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” pp. 22–23.
55. See David R. Cameron, “The Expansion of Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 72 (December 1978), pp. 1243-61); and.
56. Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
57. Moravcsik concludes his analysis by a plea for domestic analysis. See “Negotiating the Single European Act,” p. 74.
58. See Simon Bulmer, “Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-making,” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (June 1983), pp. 349-63; and.
59. Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977).
60. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); and.
61. Peter J. Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” International Organization 30 (Winter 1976), pp. 1–45.
62. Compare also Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomatic and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 43 (Summer 1988), pp. 427–60.
63. Bulmer, “Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-making,” p. 351.
64. The exception is Moravscik, who, recognizing the limits of intergovernmentalism, transforms his approach into “intergovernmental institutionalism” and reviews developments on the level of the EC. However, he finds no convincing argument at the EC level. See Moravscik “Negotiating the Single European Act.”.
65. Moravcsik conceives the EC as an intergovernmental regime but extends the analysis to domestic societal pressures. See Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,” in Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scott, eds., Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
66. Huelshoff has provided an interesting synthesis that links domestic policymaking models and government strength to bargaining positions in the Council of Ministers. See Michael G. Huelshoff, “Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage.”.
67. Cameron draws this conclusion in his analysis of the 1992 initiative. See Cameron, “The 1992 Initiative,” pp. 64–65.
68. Compare Wayne Sandholtz, “Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht,” International Organization 47(Winter 1993), pp. 1–39.
69. Compare Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 335–70.
70. This observation has been made by Loukas Tsoukalis and Robert Strauss, “Crisis and Adjustment in European Steel: Beyond Laisser-Faire,” Journal of Common Market Studies 22 (March 1985), pp. 207-228 and p. 213 in particular.
71. On policy competition, see Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); and.
72. L.A. Geelhoed, “De semi-soevereine staat” (The semisovereign state), Socialisme en Democratic 47 (February 1990), pp. 40–47.
73. See Jeffry A. Frieden, “Invested Interest: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance,” International Organization 45 (Autumn 1991), pp. 425–451 and p. 449 in particular.
74. For a discussion of the competency and independency of the European Commission, see Michael Felder, “Die Krises des EG-Systems und Perspektiven seiner Weiterentwicklung in den neunziger Jahren” (Perspectives on the development of the EC in the 1990s), in Frank Deppe and Michael Felder, Zur Post-Maastricht-Krise der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG), Arbeitspapier der Forschungsgruppe Eutopäische Gemeinschaften (FEG), no. 10 (Marburg, Germany: 1993), pp. 63–82.
75. see Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” p. 356; and.
76. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, “Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 17 (October 1991), pp. 393-110 and p. 397 in particular.
77. For an analysis of the distributional effects, see Stuart A. Scheingold, “Domestic and International Consequences of Regional Integration,” in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 374–98.
78. For an analysis from a Marxist perspective, see André Gorz, Strategy for Labour: A Radical Proposal (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). On the distributional effect of financial integration, see Frieden, “Invested Interest.”.
79. Compare Paul Pierson, “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change,” World Politics 45 (July 1993), pp. 595–628. Pierson argues that policy changes may create niches for interest groups who want to take advantage of new policies.
80. See Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
81. See R. Vaubel, Internationale samenwerking een “public choice” benadering (International cooperation, a “public choice” approach) (Rotterdam: Stichting Monetaire Studies, 1986).
82. For empirical arguments supporting this idea from the field of energy policy, see Stephen Padgett, “The Single European Energy Market: The Politics of Realization,” Journal of Common Market Studies 30 (March 1992), pp. 53–75.
83. Compare Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations, Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982).
84. Compare Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C. Schmitter, “From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market,” chap. 7 in Wolfgang Streeck, Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalist Economies (London: Sage, 1992).
85. For an example of such a middle course, see Philippe C. Schmitter, “The European Community as an Emergent and Novel Form of Political Domination,” paper presented at Juan March Institute, Madrid, 16 May 1991. Schmitter, among others, expects different results for each policy field.
86. E. B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, p. 74.
87. See Pablo Cecchini et al., The European Challenge 1992 (Aldershot, England: Gower, 1988); and.
88. P. Buigues, F. Ilzkovits, and J.-F. Lebrun, “The Impact of the Internal Market by Industrial Sector: The Challenge for the Member States,” European Economy/Social Europe, special edition, 1990.
89. For the attitude of governments, see David Allen, “Managing the Common Market: The Community's Competition Policy,” in H. Wallace, Policy Making in the European Community, pp. 209–36.
90. See Gerd Junne, “Der strukturpolitische Wettlauf zwischen den kapitalistischen Industri-elandern” (The structural and political rivalry among the capitalist industrial countries), Politische Vierteljahresschrift 25 Jahrgang, Heft 2 (June 1984), pp. 134–55, for a report of a subsidy race aimed at improving the position of domestic industries.
91. On the case of Britain, see B. C. Roberts, “United Kingdom,” in Collective Bargaining in Industrialised Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1987), pp. 281–300.
92. Cameron, “The 1992 Initiative” p. 38.
93. See Wouter Hobbelen, “Industrial Policy,” in Menno Wolters and Peter Coffey, eds., The Netherlands and EC Membership Evaluated (London: Pinter, 1990), pp. 33–40.
94. Cecchine et. al. escribe this situation described as economic incest. See their The European Challenge 1992.
95. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times, p. 196–97.
96. Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act.”.
97. For a discussion of the German way of handling the steel crisis, see Josef Esser and Wolfgang Fach, “Crisis Management ‘Made in Germany’: The Steel Industry,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Industry and Politics in West Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 221–48.
98. The governments included those of Britain, France, and Germany, among others. See Ad Vollenberg, “The European Steel Industry: Model for European Cooperation?” in Malcolm Macmillan et al., eds., European Integration and Industry (Tilburg, Netherlands: Tilburg University Press, 1987), p. 222.
99. Joseph Gilchrist and David Deacon, “Curbing Subsidies,” in Peter Montagnon, ed., European Competition Policy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), pp. 31–51.
100. For a discussion of Article 100A(4), see D. Wyatt and A. Dashwood, European Community Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1993), pp. 363–68.
101. On average only 2 percent of public purchases are awarded to foreign firms. See Jim Campbell et al., “Implementing the Internal Market,” in Colin Crouch and David Marquand, eds., The Politics of 1992 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 138–56 and p. 145 in particular.
102. On Britain and Germany, see Stephen Woolcock, Michael Hodges, and Kristen Schreiber, Britain, Germany, and 1992: The Limits of Deregulation (London: Pinter, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991).
103. See Woolcock, Hodges, and Schreiber, “The Limits of Deregulation,” p. 36 ; and.
104. Campbell et al., “Implementing the Internal Market,” p. 148.
105. For an example of interest groups’ persuading governments to safeguard adjacent areas, see Padgett, “The Single European Energy Market.”.
106. Commission of the European Communities, First Survey on State Aids in the European Communities (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1988), p. 7.
107. Commission of the European Communities, 19e Verslag mededingingsbeleid (Nineteenth report on competition policy) (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990), p. 143.
108. Commission of the European Communities, Second Survey on State Aids in the European Community in the Manufacturing and Certain Other Sectors (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990).
109. Compare Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, “Belangenorganisaties en het Europa van 1992” in Beleid & Maatschappij 6 (1991), pp. 261–78.
110. Translated from Phillippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, “Organized Interests and the Europe of 1992,” American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. 1990.
111. See Rhodes, “The Social Dimension of the Single European Market,” p. 262.
112. Guido Baglioni and Colin Crouch, eds., European Industrial Relations: The Challenge of Flexibility (London: Sage, 1990).
113. See D. Vaughan-Whitehead, “Wage bargaining in Europe,” In: Social Europe, supplement 2/90 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990), pp. 1–32.
114. In the Netherlands, the method has been to delink wages and welfare payments. See Hans Slomp, Labor Relations in Europe: A History of Issues and Developments (New York: Greenwood, 1990).
115. See J.G. Murcia, “Social bargaining in Spain,” in W.J. Dercksen, ed., The Future of Industrial Relations in Europe: Conference Documents ('s-Gravenhage: The Netherlands Scientific Council for Governments Policy, 1990), pp. 105–11.
116. On Ireland, see Patricia O’Donovan, “Make Europe Work For Us: Our Response to Maastricht.” Address to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions national conference, 12May 1992.
117. See Rhodes, “The Social Dimension of the Single European Market”; and Han delsblatt, 3 November 1989. For the Netherlands, see de Volkskrant, 7 November 1991.
118. Campbell et al., “Implementing the Internal Market,” p. 145.
119. See Woolcock, Hodges, and Schreiber, “The Limits of Deregulation,” p. 36 ; and.
120. Campbell et al., “Implementing the Internal Market.” For an Irish perspective,.
121. see Owen Keegan and George Hennessy, “Building and Construction,” in Anthony Foley and Michael Mulreany, The Single European Market and the Irish Economy (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1990), pp. 292–306 and p. 305 in particular.
122. See Elisabetta Manunza, “Effectiviteit van de nieuwe communautaire regelgeving inzake overheidsopdrachten voor de uitvoering van werken” (Effectiveness of the new European regulation on procurement of public works). Report prepared for EG-Beraad voor de Bouw, te Den Haag, Netherlands, 1993.
123. Jean Malsot, “Construction,” European Economy/Social Europe vol. 3, 1993, pp. 313–37 and p. 328 in particular.
124. Woolcock, Hodges, and Schreiber, “The Limits of Deregulation,” p. 28.
125. P. Donders, “De lobby rond aanbestedingen en veiligheid” (The lobby around procurement and safety), in M. P. C. M. van Schendelen, ed., Nederlandse lobby's in Europa ('s-Gravenhage, Netherlands: SDU Uitgeverij, 1993), pp. 167–82.
126. For an interesting analysis, see John Holloway, Social Policy Harmonisation in the European Community (Westmead, England : Gower, 1981), especially pp. 263-72.
127. On the increase in workers posted from non-EC countries, see W. S. R. Ritmeijer, “Posting of Workers in the Construction Industry,” in Bruno Köbele and Jan Cremers, eds., European Union: Posting of Workers in the Construction Industry (Bonn: Witterschlick, 1994) pp. 169–228.
128. Jean Malsot, “Construction,” p. 330.