Psychopathology in the light of emergent trends in the philosophy of consciousness, neuropsychiatry and phenomenology

Current Opinion in Psychiatry

Volumn 10, Issue 5, 1997, Pages 383-389

  Mishara, Aaron L ^a,b   Schwartz, Michael A ^a  

^a CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSCIOUSNESS; HUMAN; MENTAL DISEASE; NEUROPSYCHIATRY; PHENOMENOLOGY; PHILOSOPHY; REVIEW;

EID: 0030884538     PISSN: 09517367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1097/00001504-199709000-00011     Document Type: Review

References (52)

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