When financial intermediaries are corporate owners: An agency model of institutional ownership

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 207-237

  Schneider, Marguerite ^a  

^a The College of New Jersey   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Governance; Institutional ownership; Mutual funds; Pension plans

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011238720     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026586429071     Document Type: Article

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