The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 123-151

  Warskett, George ^a   Winer, Stanley L ^a   Hettich, Walter ^b  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Administration costs; Flat tax; Probabilistic voting; Self selection; Tax complexity; Taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040371554     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008669403754     Document Type: Article

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