A resolution of N-person prisoners' dilemma

Economic Theory

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 531-540

  Nishihara, Ko ^a  

^a FUKUOKA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031286015     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050172     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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12. 12. Varian, H.R.: A solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well-informed. The American Economic Review 84, 1278-1293 (1994)