Reasoning about others: Representing and processing infinite belief hierarchies

Proceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000

Volumn , Issue , 2000, Pages 71-78

  Brainov, S ^a   Sandholm, T ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE;

AUCTION PROTOCOLS; BELIEF STRUCTURES; COMMON KNOWLEDGE; EQUIVALENCE THEOREM; EXPECTED REVENUE; FINITE STRUCTURES; NESTED BELIEFS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 0009919184     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/ICMAS.2000.858433     Document Type: Conference Paper

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