Randomization and adaptive learning in a simplified poker game

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 31-49

  Rapoport, Amnon ^a   Erev, Ido ^a   Abraham, Elizabeth V ^a   Olson, David E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009218843     PISSN: 07495978     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.1996.2670     Document Type: Article

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