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Volumn 12, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 361-375

Policing team production through job design

(1)  Valsecchi, Irene a  

a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0030371831     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023367     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (5)

References (12)
  • 5
    • 0002430504 scopus 로고
    • Multitask principal-agent analysis: Incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design
    • _. 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design," 7 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 24-52.
    • (1991) 7 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization , pp. 24-52
  • 6
    • 0000103052 scopus 로고
    • Economic incentives to help in multi-agent situations
    • Itoh, H. 1991. "Economic Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations," 59 Econometrica 611-36.
    • (1991) 59 Econometrica , pp. 611-636
    • Itoh, H.1
  • 7
    • 38248999816 scopus 로고
    • Coalitions, incentives and risk sharing
    • _. 1993. "Coalitions, Incentives and Risk Sharing," 60 Journal of Economic Theory 410-27.
    • (1993) 60 Journal of Economic Theory , pp. 410-427
  • 10
    • 0000376222 scopus 로고
    • A formal theory of the employment relationship
    • Simon, H. A. 1951. "A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship," 19 Econometrica 293-305.
    • (1951) 19 Econometrica , pp. 293-305
    • Simon, H.A.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.