Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 87, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 144-168

  Krasa, Stefan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007093615     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2535     Document Type: Article

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