Evolutionary game theory and the modeling of economic behavior

Economist

Volumn 146, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 59-89

  Van Der Laan, Gerard ^a   Tieman, Xander ^a  

^a VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Evolutionary stable strategy; Learning and imitation; Metastrategy; Noncooperative symmetric bimatrix game; Replicator dynamics; Stable population

Indexed keywords

EID: 0005880276     PISSN: 0013063X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1003253925406     Document Type: Article

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