Internal versus external control: An analysis of board composition and ownership in UK takeovers

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 17-35

  O'Sullivan, Noel ^a   Wong, Pauline ^b  

^a LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0004953650     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1009903426321     Document Type: Article

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